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ABSTRACT
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT 
IN SMALL AND MEDIUM-SIZED CITIES
Larry Jack Slayton, Ph. D.
The University of Oklahoma, 2000 
Supervising Professor David R Morgan
This research traces the history of intergovernmental relations and fed­
eral mandates from the time of the founding of the United States until today. 
The study begins with a historical overview of national public policy mandates 
in general and unfunded mandates in particular. It analyzes the forces and 
conditions that influence the implementation of unfunded national policy man­
dates taking as its main focus the implementation of the Americans with Dis­
abilities Act of 1990 (ADA) among small and medium-sized municipalities na­
tionwide. The Act requires that public and private employers having more than 
twenty-five employees revamp their facilities and employment rules to provide 
for increased facility access and employment opportunities for the disabled. 
The research takes the approach that the ADA implementation efforts of small 
and medium-sized cities are conditioned upon the intemal and external envi­
xi
ronment of city government. Thus, the influences on ADA Implementation ef­
forts are theorized to t»  economic, social, and political.
Implementation of the ADA has been a slow and tedious process due to 
the complexity of the Act and court cases arising from the Act. This study fo­
cuses on cities between 10,000 and 100,000 in population and attempts to 
show that non-compliance is more pervasive than is commonly believed. The 
data set for the research consists of a random sample mail survey of seventy- 
five small and medium-sized municipalities from each of the four regions of the 
United States. The number of individual observations for this research is 135 
respondents. These observations form the dependent variable for the re­
search.
The theoretical perspective taken in this research combines the incremental 
and the boundedly rational approach to decision-making. It suggests that the 
level of compliance is based on the fact that municipal decision-makers do not 
take a rational approach to implementation but, instead, take an integrated 
boundedly rational/incremental approach to implementation. This approach 
agues that organizations, when faced with a complex, confusing, or potentially 
conflictual decision, will seek to simplify the decision-making process. Further, 
when simplifying the decision-making process, organizations will rely upon a few 
key variables to influence and guide their decision-making. Additionally, the 
study argues that the variables that influence an organization's decisions may be 
found in the intemal and extemal environment of these organizations.
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utilizing existing literature, a model of influences upon implementation is 
developed and tested, and its parameters estimated using regression analysis. 
The research results show that municipal officials remain confused and lack 
knowledge of the requirements of ttie ADA Results from the questionnaire sug­
gest that municipalities are implementing the ADA, albeit incrementally. The 
qualitative findings also show that many municipal officials are behaving in a 
boundedly rational fashion concerning ADA implementation. The research dem­
onstrates that national public policy implementation is not necessarily a linear, 
top-down process, nor do municipal officials behave in a rational, comprehensive 
fashion. Further, the research findings provide support for the view that it is in­
deed the local environment that most affects municipal compliance with policy 
mandates.
In the area of intergovernmental relations this research suggests that 
many existing theoretical approaches to the study of federalism may be out­
dated, and also highlights the declining usefulness of political culture as a pre­
dictor of public policy innovation. In summary, many questions remain unan­
swered concerning municipal implementation of the Americans with Disabili- 
ties Act. If the results of this research are indicative of mandate implementa­
tion in general, then the federal government is not successfully meeting its 
public policy goals by relying on the willingness of municipalities to comply 
with the requirements of unfunded mandates.
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION
This research analyzes the forces and conditions that influence the im­
plementation of unfunded national policy mandates among small and medium­
sized cities nationwide.' Specifically, the research focuses on The Americans 
with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA).
This undertaking should appeal to a cross section of scholars and practi­
tioners for several reasons. Public policy implementation scholars will find that 
this project responds to the dearth of existing empirical and comparative re­
search in the field. Additionally, it responds to the lack of predictive and ex­
planatory theory in implementation research (Goggin et al. 1990, 10). Further, 
it challenges the perspective that implementation is a linear top-down process. 
The study also looks at a heretofore much neglected area of implementation 
research: the implementation behavior of small and medium-sized cities.
Because the research tests the utility of a number of theoretical con­
structs, practitioners at various levels of government may find it relevant. Ur­
ban scholars, sociologists and local officials may find the environmental influ­
ences analyzed in the research to be of some interest. In sum, this research 
should appeal to a broad spectrum of scfiolars and practitioners since an im­
plementation study of this size, scope, and nature has previously not been
undertaken. In particular the research considers the issues of federal—local 
mandates. More specifically, the question of unfunded mandates is addressed.
Mandates are one of the principal tools a higher level of government 
uses to influence the behavior of a lower level of government. Some may 
quibble with the superior/subordinate aspect of the foregoing statement noting, 
for instance, that in United States federalism the states and localities are 
themselves not without influence (Massey and Straussman 1985, 299). How­
ever, the truth remains that mandates, by definition, influence the behavior of 
states and localities.^  Mandates may take three different basic forms; they 
may be funded, partially funded or remain unfunded by the federal govern­
ment. It is through funding, or lack of funding by which a higher government 
may influence the behavior of a lower government.
In the United States the federal government maintains an extensive 
system of grants to state and local governments. In fact, in 1998 federal aid to 
states and localities was 269 billion dollars. In order to continue to receive fed­
eral aid, the states and localities are mandated to comply with not only the 
specific conditions of the grant, but often with other non-grant specific condi­
tions. For instance, in order to receive federal highway funding, states are 
mandated to maintain a minimum drinking age of twenty-one (Gray, Jacob, Al­
britton 1990,61).
It is inherent in the grant-in-aid system that along with federal funding 
comes federal regulation (Whght 1982, 128-129). To be sure, the
States and localities may choose not to participate in the grant-in-aid system. 
However, choosing not to do so may be tantamount to political suicide on the 
part of state and local officials—if for no other reason than that the loss of fed­
eral funding means higher state and local taxes to maintain the same level of 
services. It should be noted that the federal monies received often take the 
place of expenditures that would have to be made anyway in order to provide 
appropriate services. By accepting federal funds, states and localities may 
utilize the equivalent dollars in other policy areas.
Either way, state and local officials seldom tum down federal monies in 
favor of autonomy. Instead, they often seek to minimize federal regulatory ef­
forts. For example, state and local officials may bargain with federal officials in 
order to delay compliance. In the alternative they may rally effected interest 
groups to forestall any potential federally imposed sanctions. They may also 
seek redress from Congress or tum to the courts for assistance citing constitu­
tional or other grounds for intervention.
In general, states and localities seem to understand that mandates and 
regulations stemming from grants-in-aid are a condition of doing business with 
the federal government. Conversely, unfunded mandates and especially un­
funded, direct order mandates, are highly unpopular among state and local of­
ficials (MacManus 1991, 59-76, Hanson 1990, 47). Derthrick (1986, 36) has 
probably summed up the unfunded mandate issue best when she noted that 
Congress often treats the states "as if they were administrative agents of the
national government, while expecting state officials and electorates to bear 
whatever costs ensue."
The objection to unfunded mandates on the part of state and local offi­
cials is three-fold. First, there is the loss of political power to the national gov­
ernment (Fabricius 1992,17-18). Second, these mandates bring unreimbursed 
costs (Dearborn, 1994) and third, since the Reagan presidency, Congress 
has increasingly relied on unfunded mandates as a method of implementing 
national policies (McDowell 1994,17). In fact, it may be as Hawkins (1988, 74) 
has said, "No activity of state and local governments is now beyond the scope 
of Congressional regulation, and indeed takeover—not criminal justice, not 
corporation chartering, not taxing authority, not banking and insurance regula­
tion, not even political sub-division." Despite various recent Supreme Court 
decisions and federal laws granting the states and localities some relief, the 
foregoing issues have important ramifications for both U.S. federalism and in­
tergovernmental relations
This study begins with a historical overview of national public policy man­
dates in general and unfunded mandates in particular. The period covered is 
from the time of the founding of the United States until the present. Although 
not commonly recognized, federal mandates in some form or another have 
existed since the founding. In fact, it is arguable that the major impetus for 
creating a new nation from the existing confederation was the lack of federal 
preemptive power over the states? By tracing the legal and political history of
federal mandates, Chapter Two sets the stage for what follows and gives the 
reader insight into existing issues surrounding mandate implementation.
In Chapter Three, "The Americans with Disabilities Act*, the issue of in­
tergovernmental relations and the implementation of unfunded mandates is 
considered. Chapter Three also addresses existing theoretical approaches to 
implementation and the implementation environment of small and medium­
sized municipalities.
Chapter Four presents an "environmental influences* theory of imple­
mentation behavior of small and medium-sized cities. In Chapter Five, the 
theoretical perspective is operationalized, measured and tested. Chapter Five 
also assesses the validity of the model developed in the preceding chapter. A 
summary of findings and conclusions are then presented in Chapter Six.
In sum, this research takes the approach that the ADA implementation 
efforts of small and medium-sized cities are conditioned upon the intemal and 
extemal environment of city govemment (Lazin 1973; 264-271; Ringquist 
1993, 322-323; Mueller 1984, 167). Thus, the influences upon ADA implemen­
tation efforts by small and medium-sized cities are theorized to be economic, 
political and societal. Each of these theoretical perspectives of implementation 
behavior is operationalized and is a component of the model developed and 
tested in the research.
Intergovernmental Relations and Policy Imolementation
Existing studies of policy implementation have been criticized for ne-
glecting local implementation variables. Likewise, critics complain that existing 
implementation studies often assume that a national policy takes a top-down 
path to implementation. The assumption is that after the "fiederals" have en­
acted a policy, the localities will merely implement it (Goggin et al. 1990, 11- 
15).
In the alternative, the implementation role of localities is assumed to be 
limited to bargaining over policy content and/or implementation timetables (In­
gram 1977, 501; Mueller 1984,167; Ripley and Franklin 1986, 219). The result 
of these assumptions may be an incomplete view of national-to-local public 
policy implementation. This may be especially true for the implementation of 
national-to-local unfunded mandates. In such cases, local officials often must 
attempt to reconcile local goals and interests with national goals and interests 
(MacManus 1991).
The reconciliation of local interests and goals with a mandate intended to 
serve national interests and goals may, for a number of reasons, be problem­
atic:
1. the local community may not understand or even care that local 
governments often must face a choice between accommodating a 
national or a local interest or goal;
2. the local community and/or its elected officials may not understand 
the U.S. federal system or the ramifications of non-compliance with 
an unfunded mandate;
3. local citizens and their elected representatives may not comprehend 
that the implementation of an unfunded mandate often requires an 
increase in local taxes or in the alternative, a reduction in local serv­
ices;
4. the local citizenry, for the most part, cannot stop the implementation 
of an unpopular mandate at the national level of govemment but can 
at the local level;
5. local citizens and/or their elected officials may often object on social, 
political, or economic grounds to the imposition of a policy by a higher 
govemment authority;
6. local citizens and their elected officials may often be confused about 
what is, or is not, required by the complicated regulations contained 
in a mandate or may simply lack the resources necessary to imple­
ment a mandate.
The foregoing propositions indicate that the local implementation of an 
unfunded mandate may depend as much on the local environment as it does 
on national govemment intent.
Municipal Environment; Common Influences
The municipal operating environment is in general much different from 
that of the national govemment. This is true for many reasons. Among these 
reasons are different functions at the different levels of govemment. For 
instance, street-level public safety functions of local police and fire depart­
ments have no national counterparts. Similarly, waste treatment, potable water 
production, and street maintenance are solely local functions. Also, zoning and 
building code enforcement activities as well as animal control functions have 
few corresponding activities at the national level. The environment is also dif­
ferent because municipal officials typically have a larger degree of direct inter­
action with the citizenry, and there Is often a significant expectation on the part 
of the general public that city officials conform to community mores and cus­
toms. Not only does the municipal operating environment differ from that of 
other levels of govemment, the operating environment also differs among mu­
nicipalities.
Small and Medium- Sized Municipaiities
Preoccupied with the glamour and prestige of research in large cities, im­
plementation scholars have long neglected the study of smaller municipal 
governments. Where such studies exist, they are often problematic. For ex­
ample, most take a "one size fits all" view of public organizations. However, 
the one size approach neglects the different environment in which smaller cit­
ies operate. This neglect may lead to an incomplete view of these govern­
ments' implementation behavior.
Counted among these environmental differences are fewer resources 
and a closer relationship between legislative politics and administration. Also, 
smaller dty governments often possess less professional staff expertise than 
found in larger governments. A greater sense of community also may exist in
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smaller localities. As a result, local social and political culture may often play a 
larger role in implementation behavior. In sum, not only is the environment of 
municipal govemment different from national govemment, environmental dif­
ferences exist between large and small or medium-sized municipalities.
The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990
The Americans with Disabilities Act is an unfunded national public policy 
mandate, and compliance with ADA requirements was mandated to take place 
before July 26, 1992. The Act requires that public and private employers hav­
ing more than twenty-five employees revamp their facilities and employment 
rules to provide for increased facility access and employment opportunities for 
the disabled.
The ADA thus may be broken down into two general components, em­
ployment practices and physical plant renovation. The ADA requires that em­
ployers make "reasonable accommodation" in their employment practices for 
disabled workers and job applicants (Title 1 ADA, 1990). Thus, employers are 
faced with such issues as job restructuring, the acquisition of special equip­
ment and the modification of entry level and promotional examination em­
ployment procedures. As long as disabled workers or job applicants can per­
form the "essential functions" of a position, with or without reasonable accom­
modation, employers are prohibited from discriminating against them on the 
basis of their disabilities (Title 1 ADA, 1990). The ADA mandates compliance 
unless such compliance creates an "undue hardship" on the organization
(Hollwttz, Goodman, and Botte 1995).
The second component of the ADA requires that existing facilities be 
modified to be accessible to the disabled. New construction must also be ac- 
cessikHe to disabled persons.^  Upon first perusal, the implementation of the 
ADA does not appear to be difficult or especially onerous. However, a closer 
look reveals that it may present a problem to many municipalities. For exam­
ple, what exactly is "reasonable" accommodation, what is an "essential job 
function” and what constitutes an "undue* hardship? The ADA leaves these 
terms undefined. Likewise, what is access to public facilities, how much ac­
cess is required, and under what circumstances is it not required?
ADA implementation is also expensive. If one considers the cost of pro­
viding special equipment to assist disabled workers, the cost of changing job 
descriptions and modifying testing procedures and the cost of modifying 
physical plants, the burden on some cities may be prohibitive
Additionally, because the ADA contains vague and complicated lan­
guage, smaller cities may simply lack the expertise to implement the Act’s re­
quirements. In the alternative, because the ADA has been, and is, the object 
of much legal controversy, smaller cities may not be able to negotiate the path 
to implementation as established by the courts.
Political culture may also play a role in ADA implementation. The pre­
vailing culture may oppose mandates in general, unfunded mandates in par­
ticular or implementation of any new policies whatsoever. Likewise, the culture
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of the local bureaucracy may impede the Implementation of new policies or 
give the ADA low priority. Of course the opposite may also be true. Some 
small or medium-sized cities may face few problems with ADA implementation 
and, In fact, may whole-heartedly embrace It.
The ADA was selected as the policy mandate for study In this project for 
four reasons. First, It Is relatively new and thus a fair test of timely municipal 
Implementation efforts (Bishop and Jones 1993,128). Second, It is the subject 
of much controversy among local governments (Percy 1993, 103). Third, little. 
If any, scholarly research exists regarding ADA compliance efforts among 
small and medium-sized cities nationwide.^  Fourth, the ADA fits well with the 
theory building, model-testing nature of this research.
Research Design
The data for the research were taken from several different sources. 
These sources Include U.S. Bureau of Census Statistical Abstracts, Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission enforcement records. International 
City/County Management Association Municipal Year Books and survey re­
search conducted by the author. The data set consists of a random sample 
survey of seventy-five small and medium-sized municipalities from each of the 
four regions of the United States. The number of Individual observations for 
this research Is 135 respondents. These observations form the dependent 
variable for the research.
It Is Important to note that because the ADA Is a relatively new mandate.
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it would be expected that few municipalities are, as of yet, in full compliance. 
Thus, what is measured in this research is compliance effort (Ripley and 
Franklin 1986,11). The dependent variable for this research is called Compli­
ance. It is coded as the percentage of ADA compliance reached by each city 
surveyed. The percentage of total ADA compliance effort of each city is cal­
culated from the percent of ADA implementation reached in the following ADA 
requirement areas:
1. modification of existing and new fecilities;
2. modification of personnel policies and employment prac­
tices;
3. reasonable accommodation policies for existing and pro­
spective employees;
4. modification of general benefits and employee benefit plans 
to eliminate discriminatory practices in health insurance and 
sick leave.
Each of the above is counted as being 25 percent of total ADA compliance. 
Multivariate regression is the analysis technique of choice.
In summary, this research considers the forces and conditions that influ­
ence the implementation of the ADA among small and medium-sized cities 
across the United States. It argues that the influences on ADA implementation 
stem from the internal and external environment of city governments. The 
study is theory building and model testing in nature and provides a gauge of
12
ADA implementation efforts among small and medium-sized cities in the 
United States.
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CHAPTER 2 
INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS AND FEDERAL MANDATES: 
LAW AND POLITICS
This chapter considers the history of intergovernmental relations (IGR) 
and federal mandates. Its purpose is to provide background and insight into 
the complexity of IGR and mandate implementation. By reviewing the history 
of IGR and mandates, it is possible to discern causes of the current problems 
surrounding the implementation of mandates.
The Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (1984, 8) has 
noted the existence of four types of federal regulatory programs. Of course, 
not all federal programs are mandates.
1. Partial preemptions are predicated on the enumerated powers of the 
national govemment contained in the Constitution. These require­
ments preclude state and local governments from adopting weaker 
standards than those of the national govemment in a given policy 
area;
2. Crosscutting requirements are directed toward federal programs for 
which states and localities receive federal funds. They are intended 
to achieve uniform administration among program participants Ex­
amples of these include regulations requiring that prevailing wage
14
rates be paid to workers on construction projects involving federal 
funds or regulations that ban discrimination in hiring;
3. Crossover sanctions threaten a reduction in aid for one federal 
program if the state or locality kails to meet the requirements of 
another federal program. An example would be the potential loss of 
a portion of highway funds if states failed to raise the drinking age to 
twenty-one;
4. Direct order mandates are intended to force states and localities to 
comply with federal policy by providing for civil and/or criminal sanc­
tions for non-compliance.
Direct order mandates differ from other types of federal requirements in 
several ways. Partial preemptions are constitutional in nature and have a long 
political and legal history dating to the founding of the United States. Cross­
cutting and crossover requirements are conditioned upon participation in fed­
eral programs. Perhaps more important, crosscutting and crossover require­
ments or techniques are based upon the acceptance of federal assistance by 
state and local governments.
In contrast, direct order mandates most often arrive at the level of local 
govemment without funding. They also have a relatively short history and are 
applicable to local governments regardless of participation in other federal pro­
grams. It is direct order mandates that the states and localities most object to 
and most resist (Conlan et al., 1995,26; Hanson 1990,61).
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While It Is true that the Implementation of public policy Increasingly has 
become the purview of the courts (Anton 1989, 199), It may be equally true 
that this Is as Congress Intended. For example, although the Equal Employ­
ment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) Is charged by the ADA with the Act’s 
enforcement, the remedies available to the Commission are limited to litiga­
tion. Thus, the bureaucratic discretion variable In policy Implementation has 
been replaced by judicial activism. It would therefore seem reasonable that 
any account of the history of mandates should take a legalistic approach.
The Court Federalism. Politics and Policy Mandates: Law and Order
The history of IGR and mandates Is the history of the evolution of the 
United States federalist system of government.^  In turn, the evolution of feder­
alism Is closely related to the history of the Supreme Court’s Interpretation of 
the constitutional powers of the states versus those of the national govem­
ment. In truth, federalism is much what the Court has determined it to be at 
any given point In history (Ducat and Chase 1983 , 361-364). Murphy and 
Pritchett (1986, 43) make this clear when they write "Bluntly put, the people 
who settle the critical conflicts within a society are the people who In fact. If not 
In name, govern that society.”
Over the years the Court has utilized a number of legal theories con­
cerning constitutional Interpretation (Murphy and Pritchett 1986, 479-491). The 
neutralist theory Is predicated on objective Impartiality, or the Constitution says 
what It says, no more and no less. Under this theory. Interpreting the Constl-
16
tution is conditioned upon a proper reading of the document itself. A corollary 
to this perspective is that the Court seeks to impartially and objectively divine 
the intentions of the Constitution's framers.
A second legal theory is judicial restraint. Under this theory, the Court 
reaches decisions by balancing the interests of litigants with a presumption of 
the correctness of majority rule. A contrarian perspective is that of judicial ac­
tivism. In this theory, the Court sees majority rule as tyrannical and equates 
majority rule to the deprivation of the rights of minorities. Thus, it is the duty 
and responsibility of the Court to level the playing field. Another theory of Con­
stitutional interpretation is for the Court to treat the document itself as a living, 
growing, and evolving contract. Thus, the Constitution should be interpreted in 
keeping with social, economic and political changes in American society.
Of course, none of the theories of interpretation are pure constructs of le­
gal reasoning, and historically much overlap occurs in the theoretical thinking 
of the Court. Yet, the foregoing serves to highlight several important points: 
historically, there has been diversity in the Court's interpretation of the Con­
stitution, and the Court "s definition of federalism may depend on its theoretical 
approach. Thus, not only is federalism what the Court determines it to be at a 
particular time, but also wtiat it determines it to be may change over time. 
Therefore, the Court's view of the constitutionality of mandates is subject to 
change over time (Rohde and Spaeth 1976, 38-39; Friedman 1985, 21-22).
The legal doctrines of the Court are roughly equivalent to the generally
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accepted historical evolution of United States federalism: dual, cooperative, 
centralized and new federalism. In dual federalism (circa 1789-1937), the na­
tional govemment was supreme within its grant of power and the states within 
their grant of power. Conversely, cooperative federalism (circa 1938-1961), 
while acknowledging the separate grants of power between state and national 
govemment. suggests there are a number of concurrent powers. Centralized 
federalism (circa 1962-1969) marked the creation of policy at the national level 
and its imposition on the states. New federalism (circa 1970-present) is nota­
ble for a retum of policymaking power to the states. Each of these forms of 
federalism may be related to the Court's theoretical perspective of mandates. 
However, it must be noted that the Court itself, while setting the precedents 
utilized by political and legal historians to describe the evolution of federalism, 
has often deviated from the precedent it has set.^
In Chisholm v. Georgia (1793) the Court said, "The United States are 
sovereign as to all the powers of govemment actually surrendered, each state 
in the union is sovereign as to all the powers reserved." It would seem, then, 
that the issue of state versus national policymaking power would have been 
well settled: each was sovereign within its own sphere (dual federalism). The 
Supreme Court decided its first major federalism case in McCulloch v. Mary­
land (1819).* At issue was the power of the federal govemment to establish 
and operate a national bank and the power of the state of Maryland to tax the 
bank. In McCuHordi, Chief Justice John Marshall stated that Congress not only
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had the power to establish and operate a national bank, but also that the 
states had no power to regulate or tax that bank. Had Marshall ended with that 
ruling, his opinion may have caused little controversy. However, Marshall's 
opinion went far beyond the issue at hand. As Marshall wrote, "If any proposi­
tion could command the universal assent of mankind, we might expect it would 
be this—that the govemment of the Union, though limited in its powers, is su­
preme within its sphere of action” (3).
As Marshall further stated in McCultoch, "Let the end be legitimate, let it 
be within the scope of the Constitution, and all means which are appropriate, 
which are plainly adopted to that end, which are not prohibited but consistent 
with the letter and spirit of the Constitution are constitutional” (7-8).
On its face, Marshall's statement appears reasonable, not sweeping or 
incongruent with states' rights.^  After all, any govemment not supreme within 
the parameters of the powers granted unto it is no govemment at all. Likewise, 
a govemment that cannot take those actions necessary to enact and 
implement policies stemming from its grant of power, has no power.
However, the question before the Court was not the supremacy of the 
national govemment in its "sphere of action” but rather what that sphere of ac­
tion was. In other words, what was the constitutional power of the national 
govemment to establish and operate a national bank vis-a-vis the power of the 
states to regulate it? While this statement may appear to be a question of se­
mantics. one must consider Marshalfs penchant for taking a reasonable ar­
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gument to the extreme of reasonableness.
Taken as a whole, In McCuHoch Marshall turned the Tenth Amendment 
on end. In his own unique style and fashion, Marshall greatly expanded the 
policymaking power of the national govemment. First, he declared the national 
govemment to have limited power, but supreme power within Its constitutional 
grant of power Second, he stated that unless specifically prohibited by the 
Constitution from doing so, the policymaking power of the national govemment 
was virtually unlimited. Accordingly, the national govemment need only to re­
late a policy or the desired end result of a policy to one or more of Its enumer­
ated powers'" and the policy would be constitutional." Henceforth, the consti­
tutional policymaking power of the national govemment did not have to be 
specifically stated In the Constitution Itself. Instead, It could stem from Its enu­
merated powers, be related to these powers, implied by these powers, or nec­
essary to carry out these powers (Ducat and Chase 1983, 129). Thus, what 
was perhaps the first major federal mandate was upheld and the parameters 
established for Intergovemmental relations.
In establishing a national bank backed by the full faith and credit of the 
nation. Congress had In actuality created a centralized banking system. Al­
though states could still charter banks, authorize them to Issue notes, and 
regulate them, the sheer size of the new national bank meant that it would now 
mandate Interest rates and the value of money In the United States. Similarly, 
the value of gold and silver would now be determined by what the national
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bank would pay for It and not by the state banks. With the help of the Court, 
Congress had mandated a national monetary policy.
This expansion of federal policymaking power was upheld In Gibbons v. 
Ogden (1824). in Gibbons the Court, again with the opinion written by Mar­
shall, upheld the right of the national govemment to enact policies regulating 
and controlling Interstate and more notably, intrastate, commerce. In Gibb<^s 
Marshall states.
It Is the power to regulate, that Is, to proscribe the rule by which 
commerce Is governed. This power, like all others vested In Con­
gress, Is complete In itself, may be exercised to Its utmost extent, and 
acknowledges no limitations, other than are prescribed In the Con­
stitution (4).
Again, If Marshall had limited himself to upholding an enumerated power of 
Congress, Gibbons might be little more than a footnote In legal history. How­
ever, Marshall also granted that "Commerce among the states cannot stop at 
the external boundary line of each state, but may be Introduced into the Inte­
rior* (3). Thus Marshall extended the policymaking power of the national gov­
emment to Intrastate commerce arising from interstate commerce.
Although the Marshall Court went on to decide other Important federalism 
cases, they need not be discussed here. It Is sufficient to note that, as evi­
denced by the two cases discussed, the policymaking power of the national 
govemment was expanded and Its preemptive power established during the 
Marshall Court.
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The Court Federalism. Politics and Policy Mandatas: Law and Disorder
To one extent or another, the Justices of the Supreme Court are political 
creatures (Rohde and Spaeth 1976,19). The biographies of past justices dem­
onstrate that most possessed a large amount of political experience.'^  It is 
also evident, however, that through constitutional interpretation, the Court sets 
the ground rules for U.S. politics (Hanson 1990, 47). Thus, while the existing 
political climate may affect the Court's decision making, its decisions also af­
fect the existing political climate.
For example, in 1809, in response to the decisions of the Marshall Court, 
the states of Connecticut, Massachusetts and Pennsylvania enacted legisla­
tion affirming the rights of the states to void national policies and challenging 
the power of the federal courts to adjudicate federal/state disputes.'^  Addition­
ally, during the War of 1812 the anti-war New England states either refused to 
allow state militia to serve outside their borders, or disallowed federal control 
of their militia. In fact, in 1814, several New England states held a consti­
tutional convention to pursue additional constitutional safeguards for state 
sovereignty against federal encroachment. At the convention, talk of seces­
sion was rampant. It is ironic, given what occurred almost half a century later, 
that it was the southern states that in this case stood up for the existing Con­
stitution and Union.
It is indisputable that the direct cause of the War Between the States was 
the imminent threat of southern secession growing out of the issue of slavery.
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However, the underlying causes may be traced to the Court's doctrine of dual 
federalism and economic freedom.'^  For example, in Strader v Graham 
(1850), the Taney Court declared that slaves were "property " as well as per­
sons and that policymaking power regarding the issue of slavery rested "ex­
clusively with the states."
In Prigg v Pennsylvania (1842), the Court invalidated laws in northern 
states protecting runaway slaves from being returned to their owners. These 
cases were decided on dual federalism and economic freedom grounds. Per­
haps with tongue in cheek, some northern "free states'" simply refused to com­
ply with Strader and Prigg on the grounds of state sovereignty. It is, of course, 
possible to argue that in Strader and Prigg the Taney Court relied on legal 
precedent. However, the Court's record regarding Marshall's other opinions 
repudiate this argument.'^  As early as 1787 the southern states had threat­
ened to go their own way if slavery were banned. Likewise, in the 1820's the 
southern states had promised to secede from the Union over the issue of 
slavery. By the time of the Court's decisions in Strader and Prigg, slavery had 
become the nation's main political issue. In upholding slavery on economic 
freedom and dual federalism grounds, the Court politically forestalled the se­
cession of the southern slave states.
The problem was that the Court's decisions served to heighten political 
conflict between North and South over slavery. In an effort to enforce the 
Court's decisions in Strader and Prigg, the southern-controlled Congress en­
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acted the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850. The Act placed responsibility for return­
ing run-away slaves with the United States Marshall Service. The free states 
responded by enacting "personal liberty codes" which had the net effiect of 
nullifying the Slave Act.
Perhaps nowhere is there better evidence of the recursive relationship 
between Supreme Court decision-making and politics than Dred Scott v. 
Sanford (1857). At a time when Congress had abdicated its responsibility re­
garding slavery by declaring it to be a popular sovereignty issue, and while 
"Bleeding Kansas” was in the midst of an undeclared civil war, the Supreme 
Court chose to play politics.'* At bar in Scott was the legal status of a black 
slave who had resided with his owner for some time in a territory and state in 
which slavery was forbidden. At stake in Scott were the presidency of James 
Buchanan and the preservation of the Union. Scott claimed "freedman" status 
under both state law and national law -  the "Missouri Compromise.” In Scoff, 
Chief Justice Taney ruled that Scott was not a citizen of any state or of the na­
tion because he was a slave and a Negro. Thus, he had no standing to claim 
his freedom.
Taney also invalidated the Missouri Compromise on the grounds of dual 
federalism. The way was now open for the spread of slavery into all federal 
territories, and the delicate balance of power between free and slave states 
was sacrificed to political expediency. To make matters worse, the Court had 
notified President Buchanan in advance of its decision, thus opening itself and
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President Buchanan to charges of conspiracy by abolitionists.
As Kelly and Hartxson (1948, 390-391) have said regarding the Court's 
decision in Scott, "The Dred Scott case was on the whole a sorry episode in 
Supreme Court history. Both majority and minority opinions betrayed a clear 
attempt to interfere in a political controversy, to extend aid and comfort to one 
side or the other in the slavery controversy."
The Court's decision in Scott became the focal point for the election of 
1860. Of course. Abraham Lincoln was elected President, albeit by a minority 
of popular votes, and the South seceded from the Union. It is ironic that the 
deadliest war in United States history came about, in part, as a result of the 
Supreme Court's invalidation of one federal mandate and its validation of an­
other. It is equally ironic that, having greatly contributed to the War Between 
the States by its steadfast adherence to the twin doctrines of dual federalism 
and economic freedom, in the post war years the Court continued to cling to 
these doctrines. The post war era eventually brought with it the presumption 
on the part of the Court that it was a super legislature, guarding the economic 
rights of Americans (Ducat and Chase 1983,604).
The Fourteenth Amerxtment to the Constitution provides in part, "Nor 
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due proc­
ess of law." Although the amendment was clearly intended to protect the rights 
of former slaves, the Court utilized it to a different end. The meaning of the 
word "liberty" in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is
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subject to judicial interpretation.'^  The Court thus interpreted it to mean eco­
nomic liberty, which is to say the right of individuals and corporations to be 
free from governmental regulation in their economic endeavors. This so-called 
"substantive economic due process ' theory approach of constitutional inter­
pretation was used by the Court, along with the notions of dual federalism and 
impairment of contract, to hamstring both state and national policy man­
dates.'*
In fact, it may have been as Ducat and Chase (1983, 604) have said.
Taken together, then, the doctrine of dual federalism and substantive 
due process contributed a lethal sequence of knockout punches which 
killed off almost all social legislation . . . Govemment economic sup­
port of business continued unabated, it was only govemment regula­
tion of business enterprise which the Supreme Court forbade.
Thus, not only were federal to state mandates generally held to be unconstitu­
tional, but national and state mandated regulation of private enterprise was 
also, for the most part, prohibited.'*
The first two cracks in the economic due process and dual federalism 
doctrines of the Court began to appear in the ringing dissents of Justice 
Holmes^ in Lochner v. New York (1905) and the acceptance by the Court of 
the so called, "Brandeis brieT in Mullers. Oregon (1908).^ ' A third crack in the 
Court's doctrine was perhaps the selective incorporation of the Bill of Rights 
into the Fourteenth Amendment and the application of portions of the Bill to 
the states. It is not commonly understood to be so, but prior to the Court's de­
cision in GAiowy. New York (\92S) the Bill of Rights did not apply to the
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States. Thus, where the national govemment was constitutionally prohibited 
from infringing upon such individual rights as religious freedom, freedom of 
speech, etc. the states were not so prohibited (Barron v. Battimore 1833).
The states and their political subdivisions could search and seize at will, 
did not have to worry about self-incrimination, speedy trials, free speech, free­
dom of religion or any other provision of the Bill of Rights. In the absence of 
state constitutional provisions to the contrary, state citizens had few rights. 
Where the Court did uphold individual rights, it was as stated previously, in the 
area of economic rights (Cushman 1982,140-141).
In Gitlow the Court determined that the word liberty in the Fourteenth 
Amendment was shorthand for the extension of the Bill of Rights to the citi­
zens of the states.^ As Justice Sanford said in Gitlow, "For present purposes 
we may and do assume that freedom of speech and of the press -  which are 
protected by the first Amendment from abridgement by Congress -  are among 
the fundamental personal rights and liberties' protected by the due process 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from impairment by the states* (2).
It is beyond the scope of the topic in this research to fully recount the 
Court's long and arduous journey to selective incorporation of the Bill of 
Rights. It is sufficient to note that in the years since Gitlow the Court has util­
ized the Due Process clause to make the majority of the Bill of Rights appli­
cable to the states and their political subdivisions. A by-product was to set the 
stage for the demise of dual federalism.”
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The discussion in this chapter so far would indicate that after the Marshall 
Court, mandates seldom met with the Court's approval. It also suggests that a 
recursive relationship exists between the Court's legal interpretation of feder­
alism and federalism's political history in the United States. The "Federalist 
Party/Marshall Court” centralized and expanded federal policymaking power. 
Conversely, the "Democratic/Taney Court”, although supportive of some fed­
eral policymaking powers, the area of commerce being notable, tended toward 
decentralization and restriction of federal power.
The Court Federalism. Politics and Policv Mandates: Law and Reorder
To some it must have appeared that Marx’s apocalyptic prediction of the 
fall of capitalism had come true. The market crash of 1929 set off a cycle 
wherein as more workers became unemployed, competition for jobs in­
creased. Conversely, as competition among workers increased, wages fell. 
Hunger and homelessness ensued.^ ^
By 1933 some thirteen million U.S. workers were unemployed. In re­
sponse, President Roosevelt launched the First New Deal. The Supreme 
Court moved to strike down many of its first actions or key provisions affecting 
trade and commerce. In 1935 the Court declared the National Industrial Re­
covery Administration unconstitutional on dual federalism and separation of 
power grounds {Schechterv. U.S. 1935). Likewise, in early 1936 the Court, 
again citing dual federalism, struck down the Agricultural Adjustment Act {U.S.
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V. Butler 1936).
Undaunted, Roosevelt launched not only the Second New Deal but also
a proposal to pack the Court with justices favorable to his policies.”  In what
has subsequently become known as the "switch in time that saved nine," the
Court began to approve of what it had declared unconstitutional a short time
before. Thus, in NLRB v. Jones and Laughlin Steel (1937) the Court upheld
the power of Congress to regulate industrial production. In \Mckard v. Fllbum
(1942) the Court approved of agricultural production quotas and in U.S. v.
Darby (1941) approved federal wage and hour laws. The era of cooperative
federalism had begun. ^
In fact, it may be as Key (1966, 31) has said.
The federal govemment underwent a radical transformation after 
1932. It had been a remote authority with a limited range of activity... 
Within a brief time, it became an institution that affected intimately the 
lives and fortunes of most, if not all, citizens.
While Key's observation may lead one to conclude that the national govem­
ment had become dominant in all policy areas, it is probably more as Fried­
man (1985, 659) has argued," The decline of state and local govemment has 
been relative and not absolute.” Friedman's view comports with that of Grod- 
zin's (1966, 65) who called the change one from "layer cake" to "marble cake” 
federalism. No longer were the functions and responsibilities of state and na­
tional govemment separate, but inextricably intertwined. As much as anything, 
cooperative federalism was founded upon the flow of federal funding to the
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States and localities. During the Great Depression states and localities were 
on the verge of bankruptcy. They simply could not perform their traditional 
function as social welfare providers. The New Deal tunneled federal monies 
for social welfare through the states and localities. It also provided federal 
funding for state and local public works projects, Thus, the states and localities 
became increasingly dependent upon federal dollars (Friedman 1985, 659- 
660).
The growth in federal funds received by state and local governments 
during cooperative federalism was explosive. From 1933 to 1939, federal 
grants to states and localities increased fifteen-fold (Conlan, Beam, and 
Walker 1983, 263). It was but a small step from federal funding for depression 
relief to federal funding for a vast array of different programs. The 1940’s and 
1950”s brought with them federal funding for public education, highway con­
struction, urban development, mass transit, and school lunches among other 
things.
Fiscal federalism -  the financial assistance provided by a higher level of 
govemment to a lower level of govemment -  is one factor in govemment cen­
tralization (Wright 1982, 117-118). Although some may dispute this, it is axio­
matic that upon accepting the terms of a grant from a higher level of govem­
ment, a lower level of govemment gives up at least some independence.^ '
However, it was perhaps the civil rights issue that portended the nation's 
tum from cooperative to centralized federalism. It was in 1954 that the Warren
30
Court paved the way for centralized federalism and created judicial and social 
mandates.”  In Brown v. Board of Education (1954) the Court found public 
school segregation to be unconstitutional and ordered desegregation of local 
school districts.”  In Brown the Warren Court overturned the precedent set in 
Pfess/ V. Ferguson (1896), in which it was ruled that segregation by race in 
public fecilKies was constitutional if provided for by state law.^ Thus, the Court 
invigorated the Civil Rights movement and at the same time opened the door 
for other social mandates.
Aside from isolated use of federal troops or marshals to enforce the 
Court’s decision in Grown, the Eisenhower administration showed little interest 
in social mandates.^ ' The election of 1960 was pivotal regarding social man­
dates in particular and federal mandates in general The question was whether 
to maintain the status quo with Nixon or to pursue change with Kennedy. The 
electorate chose Kennedy and change.
After the assassination of Kennedy in 1963, it fell to President Johnson to 
bring about changes in American society Johnson’s “Great Society* initiative 
was predicated on advancing the economic and political rights of groups of 
citizens who had previously been precluded from pursuing the American 
dream. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 proscribed discrimination on the basis of 
“race, color creed, religion, sex or national origin.” The Voting Rights Act of 
1965 banned literacy tests and other such state election laws designed to dis­
enfranchise minorities.”
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A series of cases followed which continued to enhance national power. In 
Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States (1964) the Court upheld the Civil Rights 
Act. Likewise, In South Carolina v. Katzenbach (1966) the Court upheld the 
Voting Rights Act.”  In Baker v. Carr (1962) the Court struck down Tennes­
see’s reapportionment plan.”  Likewise, in Alexander y. Holmes County Board 
of Education (1969) the Court ordered every school district in America to "ter­
minate dual school systems at once." In Loving v. Virginia (1967) the Court in­
validated state laws prohibiting interracial marriage. What the Court had done 
in a matter of a few years was to overturn several hundred years of legal 
precedent spanning both the dual and cooperative eras of federalism.
Taken as a whole it is safe to surmise that cooperative federalism could 
not bear up under the weight of federal mandates and financial assistance to 
states and localities or withstand the Court’s activist approach to civil 
rights/liberties.
Centralized Federaliam: One Law -  One Order
Centralized federalism may be noted as a period during which the na­
tional govemment, if not supreme in all policy areas, behaved as if it were. 
For example, from 1960 to 1967 the national govemment enacted 335 new 
grant programs. Pertiaps of equal importance is the fact that these new pro­
grams were for the most part categorical grants.”  Along with these new pro­
grams came a plethora of new federal bureaucratic agencies and federal
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regulations. Most, If not alt, contained crosscutting or crossover sanctions for 
noncompliance. Some were preemptive or partial preemptive In nature.^ For 
example, the Water Quality Act of 1965 allowed the national govemment to 
take responsibility for abating water pollution If the states failed to meet man­
dated water quality standards. During the period of centralized federalism. 
Congress enacted some nineteen preemptive laws in the policy areas of 
health and safety alone (Zimmerman 1991,63-67).
By 1970 In the policy area of employment and training there existed sev­
enteen different federal programs administered by thirteen federal agencies. 
Each program had its own separate rules, guidelines, clients, and service de­
livery system. The terms and conditions of categorical grants were, at least 
from a local perspective, often less than ideal requiring that new local bureauc­
racies be constructed to administer them. These new bureaucracies were of­
ten Independent or quasi-independent of local govemment control. Thus, local 
housing authorities, community action agencies, and other similar programs 
had their own boards or commissions establishing policies separate and often 
different from those of the local govemment
For the most part the Court, having helped bring about the era of cen­
tralized federalism, supported the centralization of power in the national gov­
emment. Thus, In Maryland v. WIrtz (1968) the Court sanctioned the applica­
tion of the Fair Labor Standards Act to local govemment employees engaged 
In work activities that were "non-tradltlonal.' In fact, the era of centralized fed-
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eraiism, at least at the level of the Court, may have been as Alexander BIckel 
has said (1981. 32).
It has been a time of populism to the left and populism to the right, 
strongly encouraged by the Supreme Court. There was a powerful 
strain of populism In the rhetoric by which the Court supported its one- 
man. one-vote doctrine, and after promulgating it. the Court strove 
mightily to strike down all bamers. not only the poll tax. but duration of 
residence, all manner of special qualification . . .
The outcome of the Court's assault on state voters' qualification laws is 
chronicled by Hanson and Crew, Jr. (1973) who conclude that the Court’s one- 
man. one-vote ruling in Baker v. Carr had a strong impact upon state policy­
making.
The challenge to centralized federalism came about for three reasons. 
Along with a change in the composition of the Supreme Court came a change 
in the Court's ideology; the categorical grant system was so unwieldy and irra­
tional that it became more and more controversial; and, a conservative Re­
publican president was elected. In 1969 Chief Justice Earl Warren, staunch 
advocate of judicial activism and proponent of national govemment suprem­
acy. left the Court. His replacement as Chief Justice was Warren Burger who 
was more conservative than Warren and less keen than Warren concerning 
the expansion of federal power (Murphy and Pritchett 1986. 40). As important 
as the appointment of Burger was to the path and direction of fiederalism. it 
was the categorical grant system that fueled the debate over federalism's fu­
ture. The categorical grant system became the target of govemment reformers
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at the local, state, and federal levels of government. The generally accepted 
method of grant reform was to substitute block grant funding for existing and 
new programs. President Nixon not only supported grant reform but. in addi­
tion, was pledged to govemment reform in general It is ironic that, claims of 
decentralization and rationalization of intergovernmental relations to the con­
trary, during the Nixon/Ford administrations more regulation of state and local 
govemment occurred than during centralized federalism. As depicted in Table 
1 the number of intergovemmental regulations enacted during the Nixon/Ford 
years was far greater than during the Kennedy/Johnson years.
TABLE 1
Original Enactment of Major Intergovernmental Regulations, 
by Date and Administration
Pre-Johnson Johnson Nixon/Ford Carter
1931-1963 1963^8 1969-76 1977-80
Number enacted 2 8 21 5
% ofalllG R  
regulations en> 
acted
6 22 58 14
Predominant 
regulatory ob­
jectives
Labor Rights Civil Rights,
Consumer
Rights
Environment, 
Health & Safety, 
Civil Rights
Energy Con­
servation, Envi­
ronment
Source: Conkxi (1968, 86).
The Burger Court, while more restrainist than the Warren Court, did not 
shy away from upholding the Warren Court's decisions or the extension of na-
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tionai power into policy areas by upholding lower court decisions. For exam­
ple, in Wÿatt v. Stickney (1972) the federal district court took actual control of 
the state of Alabama’s mental hospital. In that case the district court ap­
pointed a master to improve and operate the hospital and ordered the state to 
pay the costs. The right of mental patients to constitutional protection was up­
held by the Supreme Court in O' Conner v. Donaldson (1975). Similarly, two 
judges in Boston placed themselves in charge of city jails, schools, public 
housing and the sewer system and for several years made all the operating 
decisions concerning these city agencies and functions (Murphy and Pritchett 
1986, 41). “
The actions of the courts coupled with the proliferation of administrative 
subsystems and benefit coalitions made many state and local elected officials 
believe that they had lost control of their own governments (Anton 1989, 30- 
36). Although responsible to the electorate for policy outcomes, these officials 
in reality had little or no say in policy implementation. The election of 1976 
swept former Georgia Governor Jimmy Carter into the White House. A moder­
ate Democrat, Carter shared with former Presidents Nixon and Ford the idea 
that federal programs had become unwieldy."
Preoccupied with a poor economy, an energy crisis. Middle East conflict, 
and the hostage crisis in Iran, the Carter administration accomplished little in 
the way of intergovemmental change. During the Carter years only five new 
intergovemmental regulations were enacted, and these were in the areas of
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energy and the environment (Table 1). Instead of new programs the Carter 
presidency seemed content to maintain and expand existing ones. Thus, ex­
cept for increased funding and a change in grant funding allocation formulas, 
the Carter years are relatively unremarkable from the standpoint of intergov­
emmental relations. (See Table 1.) What the Carter administration did achieve 
was to help spread the belief among Americans that their govemment was out 
of control. As Carter said, "The gap between our citizens and our govemment 
has never been so wide” (quoted in American Govemment 1994, 217). In turn 
the gap between the putMic and the national govemment set the stage for 
massive change in federalism and intergovemmental relations.
The election of 1980 was important to the path and direction of U.S. fed­
eralism. Deregulation and devolution became the watch words of the Reagan 
administration. Reagan had promised to retum the United States to its former 
military preeminence but to do so was extremely expensive. At the same time 
the cost of federal entitlement programs was experiencing tremendous growth.
Additionally, Reagan had promised the American people that he would 
present them with a significant tax cut. All of the foregoing, coupled with the 
increases in federal aid to the state and localities during the Johnson, Nixon, 
Ford, and Carter administrations, made it readily apparent that something had 
to give. New federalism was atxxjt to take a new direction, and fiscal federal­
ism has never been the same.
As stated earlier, for the most part federal aid to states and localities had
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been predicated on the notion that the national govemment was to provide the 
lion’s share of funding (Stanfield 1992, 256). At most, state and local govern­
ments were required to match federal funds and were able to claim in-kind 
services as part of that match. Under Reagan’s devolution plan responsibility 
for administering various programs would be returned to the states. Thus, the 
power centralization effect of federal grants would in theory be negated.
What actually occurred, however, was that programs were handed to the 
states and localities with less federal funding (Conlan, Riggle and Schwartz 
1995, 25-26). For example, where previously the national govemment had 
paid half the cost of the salaries of Community Development Block Grant 
(CDBG) employees, states and cities were now responsible for the entirety of 
this expense.^  In addition, such grants as General Revenue Sharing were 
scaled back and eventually terminated. Of course, the states and localities 
were still responsible for meeting the requirements of federal regulatory pro­
grams such as the Clean Water Act, only henceforth they would have to do so 
with less federal help. (See Figure 1.) Federal funding for such things as water 
supply resources also began to dry up.^ ' The national govemment would no 
longer construct a flood control lake, build recreational facilities, and sell sur­
plus water to the states and localities. Instead, such projects now required a 
“local sponsor.'^ *
Figure 1 tracks the rise and decline of federal aid to states and local 
govemments. As easily discerned, federal aid peaked during the Carter ad-
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Figure 1. National aid to states and localities and national sending compared to state 
and local sperxiing. Adapted from Johnson et al. (1994. 86)
ministration and rapidly declined thereafter *^  It was as perhaps Reagan him­
self said, " . . . history will record that I not only talked atx)ut the need to get 
the federal govemment off the backs of the states but that I did, in fact, fight 
the use of federal grant-aid-dollars — and sought to retum power and respon­
sibility to the states, where they belong."** Yet, the fact remains that the effect 
of Reagan’s devolution plan upon state and local govemments has been 
higher local expenditures for social services, employee layoff, and program 
elimination (Hansen 1983, 433; Cole, Taebel and Hissong 1990, 345-360). 
New federalism itself brought with it a number of new mandates in the areas of 
age discrimination, asbestos removal, and clean water, all passed in 1986 as 
well as clean air and civil rights mandates passed in 1990. In fact, thenumber 
of new mandates enacted from 1980 to 1990 was greater than in any previous 
decade (AGIR 1993, 56).
It may seems strange to some that the Reagan/Bush years continued the 
trend of new mandates. However, as Schlesinger (1991, 56) has noted,
39
The party in power always feels that the Constitution is perfectly safe 
in its keeping, while the minority party is convinced that the welfare of 
the people demands that the majority should be restrained to a very 
narrow exercise of governmental authority. Hence, the "ins" have al­
ways tended to be strong nationalists, and the "outs” strict advocates 
of states rights.
One legacy of new federalism to the nation has been a staggering nation­
al debt—some 17 percent of the federal budget goes to pay only the interest 
on this debt. To be sure, this debt was not created solely by the federal grant 
system. However, it is certain that federal aid to the states and localities has 
contributed to it.
Although the federal govemment is currently experiencing a budget sur­
plus and is forecasted to do so for the foreseeable future, it is unlikely that 
there will be a retum to the heyday of centralized federalism and federal 
grants-in-aid. This holds true for a number of reasons; first, the mood of Con­
gress and the public has shifted to a more restrictive perspective of the role of 
the federal govemment in our political system. Likewise, in recent years the 
Supreme Court has taken a decidedly conservative view of state versus fed­
eral rights. Despite current and projected budget surpluses. Congress has 
failed to deal with the looming Social Security funding crisis or to provide any 
viable mechanism for repayment of the existing national debt.
ArK>ther legacy is that of a less national view of federalism among federal 
judges/* President Reagan and President Bush were in a position to appoint 
an unprecedented number of judges to the federal bench. It goes without say­
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ing that one litmus test for the appointment of these judges was conservatism 
and judicial restraint. For example, from the presidency of Johnson until 
Clinton's first term, all new Supreme Court justices were Republican nomi­
nees.^ Likewise, during their terms Reagan and Bush appointed 60 percent 
of all current federal district judges and 584 federal judges in total. As O’Brien 
(1988, 62) said, "Reagan’s Justice Department put in place the most rigorous 
and decidedly ideological screening process ever." Evidence of Reagan’s and 
Bush’s affect on federalism may be found in the fact that 77 percent of the 
time their judicial appointees have ruled in favor of states attempting to restrict 
abortion rights (Alumbaugh and Rowland 1990,153-162).
The direction of the Supreme Court began to take a predictable twist in 
1986. Upon the retirement of Chief Justice Burger, Reagan appointed conser­
vative justice William Rehnquist to Chief Justice and political conservative 
Antonio Scalia to Rehnquist’s old seat. Given Reagan’s additional appointment 
of O Conner and Kennedy to the Court, conservative justices now comprised a 
majority on the Court. This majority was increased by President Bush with the 
appointment of Justices Thomas and Souter.
As a result of these appointments the Court adopted a conservative ac­
tivist ideology. Thus, in Keeny v. Tasmago-Reyes (1992) the Court placed re­
sponsibility tor guaranteeing defendants’ rights in state criminal cases on state 
courts.^  ^In fact, after the Supreme Court had upheld the death sentence of a 
California man, Ninth Circuit Court Judge Stephen Reinhard said of the Su­
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preme Court, "It is clear that the constitutional rights of individuals are no 
longer of paramount importance to the Court” (Quoted in "Judge Criticizes 
High Court” 1992). If anything, federalism in the United States may tie 
viewed in terms of a great pendulum swinging back and forth between states' 
rights and national supremacy. The federal courts swing on the axis of presi­
dential appointments while the presidency and Congress swing on the fulcrum 
of public opinion (Pagano and Bowman 1995, 2; Conlan 1993, 4). The pen­
dulum was about to swing again
In 1992 the electorate chose former Arkansas governor Bill Clinton as 
president. Upon taking office Clinton found 115 judicial vacancies.^  Further, 
because of the retirement of various judges, Clinton will have the opportunity 
to appoint well over half of all federal judges by the time he leaves office. In 
part because of Clinton's promise to appoint more minorities to the federal 
bench and in part because of Clinton's liberal/moderate politics, it may be an­
ticipated that the federal courts will take a more national view of federalism in 
the future.^  ^The Clinton administration has a mixed record concerning man­
dates and IGR. For example, new mandates in the areas of gun control, 
school safety, and violence have been enacted. Further, as noted below, fed­
eral agencies have adopted new rules and regulations for existing mandates 
Meanwhile, state and local govemments have received some measure of 
mandate relief. In 1995 Congress passed the Unfunded Mandates Reform 
Act. (PL 104-4). The Act provides for a cost-benefit analysis for new man-
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dates. It should be noted that the Act does not apply to existing mandates or 
ongoing rulemaking by federal agencies nor does the Act preclude future 
mandates (Pagnano and Bowman 1995; Conlan, Riggle and Schwartz 1995, 
38).^ Thus, a proposed ADA rule will require state and local recreational fa­
cilities to be accessible to the disabled (Federal Register July 9, 1999). Like­
wise, the U.S. Department of Labor has recently reduced the amount of leave 
an employee may be charged for partial absences under the Family and 
Medical Leave Act (Wage and Hour Opinion Letter FMLA -  89. July 3, 
1997). In the meantime, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) contin­
ues to tighten air and water quality standards while the courts continue to de­
fine and redefine what federalism means {National Public Employers Labor 
Relations Newsletter Novemt)er, 1999). For Instance, in 1997 the Supreme 
Court invalidated the portion of the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act 
of 1993 that required state and local govemments to conduct background 
checks for handgun purchases {Phntz v. U.S. 1997). The Court did so en­
tirely on tenth amendment, dual federalism grounds. Likewise, in U.S. v. Lo­
pez (1995) the Court struck down the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990 as 
having carried the commerce clause too far.
Although recent decisions of the Supreme Court have limited the power 
of Congress to mandate to states and localities, it remains to be seen what 
the future will hold. All things considered. Conlan et al. (1995, 38) may be 
correct, "Despite signs of fundamental change, obituaries for the era of regu­
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latory federalism may be premature.” In future months the Court will consider 
the right of state and local employees to sue in federal court under the Age 
Discrimination and Employment Act {Kimel v. Ftorida Board of Regents). The 
Court will also consider whether state govemments have sovereign immunity 
from the Federal False Claims Act (Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. 
United States) and whether Congress has the right to prohibit states from 
selling motor vehicle licensing information (Reno v. Condon ).
The final effect of the Clinton years on U.S. federalism and intergovem­
mental relations remains to be seen; however several trends are apparent. 
The federal judiciary may be more liberal in the future. The most prot)able im­
plication for intergovemmental relations is a tendency toward national over 
states' rights. Likewise, while the states and localities have gained some 
measure of mandate relief during the Clinton administration, the feet remains 
that the underlying issues that gave rise to federal mandates have not been 
addressed. Although the federal budget deficit has been addressed, the na­
tional debt remains largely untouched. The issues of Social Security and 
Medicare funding are still unresolved, and health care for many Americans 
remains illusive. Unless the national govemment manages to get its financial 
house in order, it appears that mandates are here to stay
fignçlwlçn
In this chapter the history of federalism, intergovemmental relations, and 
federal mandates has been detailed. Highlights include the Marshall Court’s
44
outward support for dual federalism while rendering decisions more in line with 
cooperative federalism; the Taney Court’s obeisance to precedents set by the 
Marshall Court and its own advocacy of dual federalism; the long retreat of the 
Supreme Court from dual federalism; and, the continued march of states’ 
rights toward cooperative federalism and national supremacy. Other highlights 
include the rise and fall of centralized federalism that set the stage for new 
federalism, the ascendancy of new federalism and the attendant shift from lib­
eral activism to conservative activism on the part of the Court, the increasing 
number of mandates enacted by the national govemment, especially social 
mandates, and the potential for a retum to a more centralized system of feder­
alism in the future
Whatever the future may hold, it appears from the discussion here that 
mandates are not going to be eliminated anytime soon. The same conditions 
that gave rise to previous mandates still exist. Notwithstanding the much 
touted current balanced federal budget, the massive national debt persists. 
Thus, Congress can ill afford the new policies and programs that citizens will 
undoubtedly demand in the future. Caught between the national need for a 
balanced budget and citizen demands. Congress will have little choice except 
to pass on the cost of new programs to the states and localities.
Finally, the chapter has underscored the complexity of the issues of in­
tergovemmental relations and mandates. Few, if any, state or local officials 
would disagree with the stated purpose of most mandates. Equal opportunity.
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civil lights, dean water, dean air, and other policy issues concern state and 
local governments as much as they do the national govemment. The question 
is, "at what cost and at whose expense?” will these issues te  addressed.
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CHAPTER 3
INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS AND THE IMPLEMENTATION OF
MANDATES: THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT OF 1990
In this chapter the issues of intergovemmental relations, policy imple­
mentation, federal mandates, the municipal environment, and the ADA are ad­
dressed. Before proceeding, however, it is important to briefly explore the na­
ture of the relationships between intergovemmental relations, policy mandates 
and implementation.
The previous chapter demonstrates that there exists in the United States 
system of federalism an essential and perhaps irreconcilable tension. Stem­
ming from the division of authority between state and national govemment that 
is provided for by the Constitution, this tension has historically manifested itself 
in political, legal, and upon occasion, armed conflict. If, as Nice (1967, 2) and 
others have suggested, the study of intergovemmental relations is the study of 
the interaction between the various levels of govemment in our federal sys­
tem, it follows that the study of state and local implementation of national pol­
icy is the study of intergovernmental relations. To be sure, not all intergovem­
mental relations involve policy implementation, but by definition, all imple­
mentation of national policy by state or local govemments involves intergov­
emmental relations.
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The previous chapter also demonstrates that the issue of the implemen­
tation of national policy mandates has t)een problematic since the early days 
of the United States federalist system. The adoption of a policy mandate is a 
political act that sends a political message to other levels of govemment. It Is 
nothing more, or less, than an attempt to force other govemments to alter their 
existing behavior. As such, the most bitter intemal conflicts in United States 
history have come about over the implementation of policy mandates. In short, 
federalism creates intergovemmental relations which lead to policy mandates. 
In tum, policy mandates produce implementation which leads to conflict. Thus, 
much may be leamed about the implementation of policy mandates from the 
study of intergovemmental relations and vice-versa.
Many general approaches to the study of intergovemmental relations 
(IGR) exist. These include Wright’s lines of authority model (1982,40) and the 
competitive model (Dye 1990, 189-191) as well as the functional perspective 
model (Nice 1987, 10-12) and the pyramid-center-periphery model (Elazar 
1991, 71). Others include Schattschneider's scope of conflict model (1960, 2-
11) and the fiscal federalism model (Musgrave 1969). In recent years public 
choice models of IGR with their multi-disciplinary approach of economic and 
political analysis have gained attention (Anton 1989, 27). In addition are the 
aforementioned dual, cooperative, centralized, and new federalism models. 
According to Grodzins (1960, 365-366), contemporary federalism is depicted 
as a * . . .  rainbow or mart)le cake . . .  characterized by an inseparable min­
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gling of different colored ingredients, the colors appearing in vertical and di­
agonal strains and unexpected whorls. As colors are mixed in a marble cake, 
so functions are mixed in the American federal system.”
Yet, Grodzins’ and other general models of IGR suffer from one or more 
problems. They are either prescriptive, descriptive, normative, or suffer from a 
lack of specificity. For the most part they are little more than representations of 
the various historical stages of the evolution of federalism. Thus, while each 
has some explanatory power, most lack predictive capacity. For example, 
while fiscal approaches readily lend themselves to operationalization, they fail 
to account for the realities of politics (Anton 1989; 20-24). Conversely, al­
though conflict approaches account for political reality, they do not consider 
fiscal reality Public choice theory rectifies the above omissions but is flawed 
itself in that it ignores the complexity of IGR. Similarly, functional, competitive, 
and other such theories explain the complexity of IGR but are not specific 
enough to be useful as a predictive tool. Although by no means exhaustive, 
the foregoing serves to highlight two important issues: first, no single unifying 
approach to the study of IGR exists and, second, existing approaches often 
lack predictive and/or explanatory capacity.
The sub-field of implementation has also been criticized as exhibiting a 
lack of predictive and explanatory theory (Elmore 1978, 601-616) and for a 
dearth of empirical and comparative research (Linder and Peters 1987, 459- 
475). Sabatier (1986 21-48), among others, has noted the existence of two
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overarching approaches to the study of implementation: top down and bottom 
up. The top down model views implementation as a linear process. In this 
model the implementation path of a given policy is treated much as a vehicle 
traveling a highway. Once enacted, a policy may be delayed, it may encounter 
detours, bumps and turns, or it may run into roadblocks, but somehow in the 
end, the policy should reach its final destination: implementation. The view of 
implementation as a top down process has been criticized as neglecting state 
and local variables (Hjem and Hull 1982: 105-115).
The bottom up approach concentrates on the local variables surrounding 
the implementation of a given policy. In this model the implementation of a 
policy is traced from the local level back to the federal level. The bottom up 
approach seeks to find implementation variables utilizing "network like analy­
sis” (Hjem 1982, 301-308). This approach assumes implementation is much 
like an outdoor market where various actors confer, bargain, negotiate and fi­
nally reach an implementation deal. This approach has been criticized, how­
ever, for discounting federal implementation variables (Goggins et al. 1990,
12).
States presumably play a pivotal role in implementation by acting as 
policy gatekeepers between local and national govemment (Aron 1979, 451- 
471; Lester and Bowman 1989, 731-753). This approach may be likened unto 
water flowing through a conduit. The state gives a path and direction to the 
flow of implementation. Granted, the flow is constricted at times and at other
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times the flow runs freely. States may at times divert the flow or even reverse 
it but in the end. implementation will occur. The state—centered approach to 
implementation has been criticized tor narrowly focusing on state actors and 
variables and neglecting federal and local ones (Riggs 1980, 107-115; Hanson 
1983).
Given the foregoing, it is small wonder that Elmore (1978, 278-279) has 
suggested that the study of implementation is in "disorder." The problem with 
implementation research may stem from a lack of understanding of the imple­
mentation process. The assumption has been that implementation is a linear 
process. Thus, when the national govemment adopts a policy, the states and 
localities will implement it. This, of course, is not to say that a policy’s imple­
mentation path will not be influenced by state and local govemments, nor does 
it say that states and localities will not bargain for better implementation terms. 
What it does say is that the implementation or non-implementation of a policy 
may be conditioned on the environment of the basic governmental unit 
charged with its implementation. If the environment is conducive to imple­
mentation, the policy will be implemented. If the environment is not conducive 
to implementation, the policy will not be implemented.
Archibald (1970; 86) best states the case for this perspective when he 
argues that,
I am not merely saying that an alternative, when implemented, may 
not produce the consequences expected. Rather, I am saying that the 
policy alternative actually executed is quite likely to have undergone 
radical revisions at the hands of the operating levels. And since a
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policy Is no better than its implementation, this suggests that analysts 
need to pay attention to the teasitxiity of a policy alternative at oper­
ating levels.
Archibald’s view of implementation is supported by among others Quade 
(1975, 253) and Ripley and Franklin (1986, 219).
Downs (1967,41) has argued that in order to understand the behavior of 
bureaucratic organizations, one must understand their internal and external 
environments. Ripley and Franklin (1986, 220) have said that *. . .  no single 
authority appears to be in charge of the implementation of any major single 
policy. . ." The view of implementation as chaotic rather than routine is sup­
ported by the work of Pressman and Wildavsky (1973).
In light of the foregoing, it is reasonable to conclude that implementation 
of a policy is best studied from the level of the environment of the basic unit of 
govemment responsible for the implementation of that policy. After all, it mat­
ters little what path and direction a policy takes if that policy is not carried out. 
Thus, policy compliance is key to implementation. In short, any policy that is 
not complied with, in reality is no policy at all.
Factor» Affecting Poiicv Implementation
Many factors have been suggested to affect policy implementation. 
Among these are bargaining (Ingram 1977; 501; Elmore 1978, 222), content 
and language (Murphy 1973, 194-195), funding (Weikart 1993 407-456; Kee 
and Shannon 1992, 321-329), incrementalism (Lindblom 1959; Mueller 1984, 
162-168), co-option (Lazin 1973, 264-271) and environment (Wirt 1985, 83-
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112). Tebben (1990, 113-122) argues that the courts play an important imple­
mentation role. Massey and Straussman (1985, 298) find that federal en­
forcement efforts are significant, and Peterson and Wong (1985, 321) note 
that bureaucracy and policy type are important to implementation. Sharkansky 
(1978, 39) and Stone, Whelan and Murin (1979, 316) as well as Kincaid (1982, 
121) and Hanson (1990, 68) dte political and/or societal culture as variables. 
The form of govemment existing in a locality may also affect implementation 
(Rosenthal and Crain 1966, 273; Lineberry and Fowler 1967, 109; Judd 1988, 
179).
Further, the existence or non-existence of benefit coalitions may affect 
the implementation of a policy (Moneypenny 1960, 15). Ringquist (1993, 336) 
has found that organized interest groups "exert significant influence over state 
air pollution policy.” It should be noted that benefit coalitions often form around 
various issues and are not limited to economic issues. Thus, coalitions may 
form around juridical or even symbolic benefits (Anton 1989, 31-32). The ca­
pacities of the agency responsible for implementation may also impact imple­
mentation. For example, some agencies are more likely to implement a given 
policy than others because some agencies have an adaptive organizational 
culture while some organizations resist change (Ott 1989,12-19).
Simon (1981, 190) has called the capacities of organizations to accept 
change "bounded rationality.” In Simon’s (1985, 294) view individuals and or­
ganizations engage in "behavior that is adaptive within the constraints im­
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posed by both the external situation and by the capacities of the decision­
maker.” Thus, the intemal environment of an organization may influence im­
plementation.
Although non-comprehensive, the foregoing illustrates the diversity in the 
variables utilized in existing implementation research. Two ftxits may be 
gleaned from the diversity of previous research in the area of implementation. 
First, the variables that influence implementation are economic, societal or po­
litical in nature. Second, these variables may be found in the internal and ex­
ternal environments of implementing entities.
Several observations concerning the foregoing discussion of existing ap­
proaches to IGR and policy implementation are in order First, existing ap­
proaches to IGR provide great insight into the influences on state and local 
policy implementation efforts. For example, the scope of conflict approach 
suggests that where implementation is thwarted at the state or local level, in­
terest groups or individuals may take the issue of implementation to a different 
level of govemment such as the federal courts. Likewise, the fiscal federalism 
model underscores the importance of financial resources to implementation. 
Additionally, each approach helps explain why the implementation of unfunded 
mandates is particularly objectionable to state and local govemments.
Perhaps of equal import is the insight to be gained from the shortcomings 
of existing approaches to IGR. One shortcoming is the lack of explanatory and 
predictive capacity inherent in many theories of IGR. Another is the fiag-
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merited status of IGR researcti. In the field there seems to tie an over abun­
dance of theory and a dearth of empirical study.
Pertiaps what is missing in IGR research is that many scholars do not 
see the linkage between IGR and policy implementation. As noted above, the 
sub-field of implementation also suffers from fragmentation. As a relatively 
new area of study the sut)-field has, for the most part, abandoned its IGR roots 
and gone down the well-traveled path of substituting theory for substance.
Goggins, et al. (1990, 15) recognized this when they first set forth an 
Integrated and empirical approach to the study of implementation. Perhaps to 
underscore their perspective, they call their approach "the Communications 
Model of Intergovemmental Policy Implementation” (19). Thus, it may be sur­
mised that to Goggins et al. IGR and implementation are, if not identical, so 
closely intertwined as to be inseparable. This supports the conclusion that the 
study of policy implementation complements and builds on IGR research. In 
truth, without the foundation of IGR theory, the study of implementation would 
be more akin to policy evaluation than anything else (Palumbo 1986, 598-605; 
Goggins et al. 1990, 9-22; Patton 1986,14-22). In sum. IGR and implementa­
tion may be seen as the top and bottom of a ladder one may ascend or de-
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scend. but one cannot utilize the ladders' full potential without doing both.
Municipal Government#: Are They Different?
Under "Dillon's Rule” municipalities are creatures of the state in which 
they exist. As political sub-divisions municipalities have no powers other than
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those granted by a state. This one thing sets municipalities apart from state 
and national govemment whose powers are provided for by the Constitution. 
Another is that as the level of govemment at the bottom rung of the U.S. politi­
cal system, municipalities, at least in theory, have little say in how that system 
operates.”  Additionally, as noted earlier, most municipal functions have no 
state or federal counterparts. Wastewater treatment, potable water production, 
refuse disposal, planning and zoning, building inspection and animal control 
are all primarily municipal functions. Leaving aside for the moment the inher­
ent differences between govemments generally, smaller municipalities are un­
like larger municipalities in a number of ways.
In smaller municipalities, civil service systems and unionism are not as 
prevalent as they are in larger govemments. Similarly, bureaucrats in large 
govemments whose jobs are eliminated often have lateral transfer rights. This 
is often not the case in smaller municipalities and, where it does exist, these 
benefits are usually contained in city council policy statements which are sub­
ject to rapid change by legislative fiat.
Also, the level of employee skill and expertise frequently differs in small 
municipalities compared to employees in larger city govemments. In many 
smaller municipalities the dty attorney, dty engineer, and even the human re­
sources manager may be only a part-time employee who serves in a consult­
ing capacity. Even when employees are full time, they may have limited gov­
emment experience.
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Likewise, in smaller municipalities elected officials may have little prior 
governmental experience and. for the most part, serve only part-time with little 
monetary compensation for their efforts. Additionally, in smaller municipalities 
elected officials are members of a relatively small sociological unit.’  ^As such, 
they must face their constituents on an almost daily basis and account for their 
political decisions. If a municipal official alienates the local community, he or 
she may be censored or shunned by the community. Thus, neighbors, friends, 
and even business associates may constantly confront the elected official. 
Such alienation may last for many years, even long after the official has left of­
fice. In extreme cases physical violence or threats of violence may occur.^
As Bernard (1962. 84) says.
The people in a community may be viewed as cards in a deck. In one 
deal they line up against one another. Reshuffled for another deal, 
they line up together against another hand. Many conflicts thus tend 
to neutralize one another. Where people line up against each other 
on one issue only and have no issue to reshuffle them the cleavage 
may become very deep. Indeed, if each of the parties to a conflict had 
racial, economic, religious, cultural, and class interests in common, 
and if each had no interests in common with the opposing side, con­
flict might well assume the proportions of civil war.
Smaller municipalities also operate with fewer total resources than larger 
govemments whether these resources are financial or human. Because most 
existing resources are already dedicated to basic services (and whatever other 
services the citizens have chosen), it is often difficult if not impossible for 
smaller municipalities to respond quickly to requests for mandates for new 
programs. It is important to note that it is the local level of govemment. not the 
state or national, that is responsible for providing basic services to the local
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public. These basic services do not include the somewhat abstract "quality of 
life" programs such as fair housing, equal opportunity, or equal access, but the 
basic services upon which life itself depends.^  ^The preoccupation of officials 
in smaller municipalities with concrete outputs also sets these municipalities 
apart from larger govemments. It is therefore difficult, if not impossible, to con­
vince municipal officials that implementation of something such as the ADA 
takes precedence over the replacement of a broken sewer line flooding sew­
age in the homes of fifty citizens. In larger govemments an official charged 
with pollution abatement policy may have never even seen a sewage treat­
ment plant in operation.
It is also important to understand that municipalities do not operate on a 
for profit basis. The price they may charge for their goods is not set by the 
market place. Rather, municipalities must raise prices in an environment of 
political and economic constraints. While it Is true for the most part that mu­
nicipalities have a monopoly on the goods and services they deliver to the 
public, it is equally true that the public determines the product mix and their 
cost. In addition, the municipal product mix is diverse ranging from the "neces­
sities of life" products to "quality of life" products. As any municipal practitioner 
can readily attest to, the cost of producing a product often has little relationship 
to the price the public pays for that product. Golf courses and swimming pools 
provide a good example of this. The use of these facilities is not predicated on 
the cost of operating them, but instead, on what the people who use them are
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willing to pay *
Thus, the resources needed to implement a new program such as a fed­
eral mandate generally come from either an increase in taxes or fees, or a re­
duction in other programs (Agger, Goldrich, Swanson 1964, 17-32). This 
problem is exacerbated by the fact that municipal finance must conform to 
state laws which seldom grant local govemments much flexibility regarding 
taxation and spending (Harrigan 1994,47-48).
As noted in Chapter One of this study, the reconciliation of local and na­
tional interests is problematic to local offlcials.^ ^ Faced with a choice between 
local community conflict and conflict with another level of govemment, many 
local officials opt for the latter if for no other reason than that the penalties or 
sanctions for mandate non-compliance fall upon the community as a whole 
and not solely on the local officials.
The idea that public officials seek to avoid risk is so widely accepted as to 
not bear recounting. Either way municipal officials are caught between local 
interests, state laws and federal mandates. It is only the extremely naïve or 
new local official who elects to cater to national interests rather than pander to 
local ones. This may be especially true in regard to social mandates because 
these often do not provide concrete benefits to the public.
The ADA; History. Background, and Requirements
For the majority of United States' history, disabled Americans have been 
treated as second class citizens. Generally considered to be unable or un­
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worthy to participate equally in American society, public policy relegated dis­
abled citizens to an existence predicated on charity or social welfare
Physically challenged citizens and those suffering from even minor men­
tal disorders were frequently placed in segregated schools or institutions 
where, for the post part, they received training to perform low paying jobs. In 
the alternative, disabled citizens, shunned by the general population, were 
kept at home by their families and thus often received little or no education or 
job training.
To be sure, disabled veterans were granted government pensions and, 
later, preferences in government employment. However, the majority of the 
disabled were forced to rely on the largesse of family, friends, and government 
or non-profit agencies to survive. Disabled Americans were also segregated 
by the design and construction of both private and public facilities. Infra­
structure in the United States was built and maintained based on the needs of 
the average citizen. Thus, physically challenged citizens found it difficult if not 
impossible to conduct personal business, visit public and private buildings or 
travel very far from home.
On the heels of the civil rights movement of the 1960's, the first disability 
related civil rights act was passed in 1973. The Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (RA) 
is noteworthy for several reasons; for the first time federal legislation recog­
nized that discrimination against the disabled is a civil rights issue and the Act 
acknowledged that disabled Americans were discriminated against in employ-
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ment, education, and access to public facilities.
Like The ArchHectural Barriers Act of 1968 before it, ttie RA was flawed; 
it only pertained to the federal government, entities receiving federal funding 
and federal contractors. The first comprehensive piece of disability related 
legislation enacted by the federal government was the Education for All 
Handicapped Act of 1975 (EAHA). The EAHA provided for equality in public 
education for disabled persons nationwide. Thus, while some disabled Ameri­
cans had received national protection from discrimination, many still had not. 
This situation continued until the passage of the Americans with Disabilities 
Act of 1990 (ADA).^
It was in 1986 that the National Council on the Handicapped (1986, 18) 
proposed that "Congress should enact a comprehensive law requiring equal 
opportunity for individuals with disabilities, with broad coverage. . The 
Council's report to the president and Congress was, in part, predicated upon 
polling results obtained by Louis Harris and Associates Polls taken by Harris 
showed that disabled Americans were poorer, less educated, and enjoyed a 
lower quality of life than other Americans. Additionally, the Harris polls found 
that 8.2 million disabled Americans wanted to work but were unable to obtain 
gainful employment. Likewise, the polls indicated that the disabled in America 
were discriminated against in health care and education and that public build­
ings and public transportation were, for the most part, inaccessible to the dis­
abled. The Coundl's report became the ADA bill introduced in Congress in
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1988. The ADA became law on July 26,1990 with a mandated implementation 
date of July 26.1992.
From the onset the ADA has been the subject of much controversy and 
confusion. For example, in early 1991 Creasman and Butler asked if the ADA 
would disable employers rather than empower disabled workers. Likewise, 
Mayerson stated (1991, 7) that the ADA would " . . .  transform the landscape of 
American society . . .  " Percy (1993, 103) has noted the adverse impact of the 
ADA on municipal govemments in particular. He cited the ADA's inclusion by 
the U.S. Conference of Mayors on its list of the ten most costly non- 
environmental federal mandates. Likewise, Holwitz, Goodman and Bolte 
(1995, 149) believe that the vague definitional language contained in the ADA 
is intentional. They conclude that this vague language " . . .  makes it difficult to 
implement the ADA's employment provisions in a systematic manner. "
Without doubt the ADA is a vague and complex national public policy 
mandate. ADA requirements are contained in five separate titles. Title I pro­
vides for a general ban on discrimination in employment. Title II prohibits dis­
crimination in public services. Title III considers the issue of accommodations 
in the private sector. Title IV concerns telecommunication. Title V contains a 
number of miscellaneous provisions including a prohibition against retaliation 
or coercion involving those who daim rights under the ADA.
More specifically, the Act provides for the same enforcement, penalties 
and processes as Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 "  Title I Section C-3
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of the ADA defines a "qualified disabled person’ as one "who, with or without a 
reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the em­
ployment position the person holds or desires." Section C-4 of Title I defines 
"disability* as "an individual with a disability who has a physical or mental im­
pairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities; or has a rec­
ord of such impairment, or is regarded as having such an impairment." Im­
pairment is defined by Title I of the ADA to be
Any physiological disorder or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or 
anatomical loss affecting one or more of the following body systems; 
neurological; musculoskeletal; special sense organ; respiratory, in­
cluding speech organs; cardiovascular; reproductive; digestive; 
genito urinary; hemic and lymphatic; skin; and endocrine; or
Any mental or psychological disorder, such as mental retardation, or­
ganic brain syndrome, emotional or mental illness, and specific 
learning disabilities.
Also included are orthopedic, visual, speech, and hearing impair­
ments, cerebral palsy, epilepsy, muscular dystrophy, multiple sclero­
sis, infection with the Human Immunodeficiency Virus, cancer, heart 
disease, diabetes, mental retardation, emotional illness, specific 
learning disabilities, drug addiction, and alcoholism.
Under the ADA virtually anything that interferes with a major life activity is 
covered:
A substantial limitation' of a major life activity means that an individ­
ual's activities, such as caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, 
walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, working, and 
participating in community activities, are restricted as to the condi­
tions, manner or duration which they can be performed as compared 
to most other people.
The ADA prohibits discrimination against disabled individuals in the fol­
lowing employment areas: job application procedures, hiring, promotions, dis-
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charge, compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges 
of employment. Title II of the ADA provides that state and local govemments 
may not discriminate against disabled persons in the delivery of public serv­
ices including "the benefits of the services, programs or activities of a public 
entity," or in the access and use of public transportation. State and local gov­
ernments must also construct new and/or renovate existing public facilities so 
as to make them comport with the Architectural Barriers Act of 1968.
To properly assess the ADA, one should understand that public employ­
ers are mandated to meet its requirements regarding employment unless do­
ing so would work an "undue hardship" on the organization. The ADA defines 
undue hardship as an accommodation requiring a "significant difficulty or ex­
pense." A reasonable accommodation according to the ADA is; making exist­
ing facilities used by employees readily accessible to and usable by individuals 
with disabilities; and, job restructuring, part-time or modified work schedule, 
reassignment to a vacant position, acquisition or modification of equipment or 
devices, appropriate adjustment or modification of examinations, training ma­
terials or policies, the provision of qualified readers or interpreters, and other 
similar accommodations.
In light of the foregoing it may be surmised that the ADA brings with it a 
number of problems inherent in most federal mandates. McDowell (1994, 17) 
identifies the problems encountered by state and local govemments with the 
implementation of federal mandates as follows:
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* Excess costs due to complex and rigidly specified implementa­
tion mechanisms;
* Inadequate consideration of costs and benefits:
* Distortion of state and local budgets and policy priorities;
* Erosion of state and local initiative and innovation;
* Inefficiencies due to the application of single, uniform solutions to
geographically diverse problems;
* Inadequate consideration of varying state and local financial and 
personnel resources;
* Attenuated accountability to citizens, due to the separation of 
responsibilities for policy direction and public finance; and
* A double standard, whereby the federal government exempts it­
self from compliance, or complies only partially, with the regula­
tions it imposes on state and local govemments.
With the ADA these problems must also include vague and ambiguous 
language, complexity of the issues, and financial assistance which is generally 
lacking on the part of the federal government.
Although the problems surrounding ADA implementation are formidable, 
they are not insurmountable. Municipal employers faced with the task of ADA 
implementation may take several different steps to reduce the burden on the 
organization. For instance, they may employ ADA specialists to facilitate its 
implementation. Likewise, employers may seek additional revenues for ADA
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implementation or, in the alternative, reallocate existing financial resources. 
They may also pursue implementation help from Congress or other institutions 
and organizations. Conversely, the local community and the organization may 
support ADA implementation and thus need or require little ADA implemen­
tation assistance.
Intergovernmental Problems
The general problems with ADA implementation are worsened by the 
penchant of Congress for enacting mandates and leaving their interpretation to 
the federal bureaucracy. The federal bureaucracy responsible for overseeing 
ADA implementation, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
(EEOC), does not provide specific on-site implementation assistance. Instead, 
the EEOC provides general guidelines for ADA implementation and investi­
gates compliance on a case-by-case basis after receiving a complaint of an 
alleged violation.
The problem with the EEOC's lack of ADA implementation guidance is 
exacerbated by its ongoing ADA rule making. For instance, although the ADA 
has provided protection for the mentally impaired, the EEOC has only recently 
finalized rules for their accommodation in the work place. Other implemen­
tation rules appear to be constantly in a state of flux.
The ongoing interpretation and reinterpretation of the ADA by the EEOC 
is a major problem for municipal employers. For example, an employer who 
relies on EEOC's interim rules to implement some aspect of the ADA may later
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be sanctioned for following those rules. Even a written opinion letter from the 
EEOC to an employer does not absolve that employer from guilt if later the 
EEOC changes its mind regarding its previous opinion.^  Thus, employers 
might implement the EEOC's ADA interim rules only later to be found in non- 
compliance for doing so, or in the alternative, they may wait until the EEOC is­
sues final rules and risk being sanctioned in the meantime. An employer may 
also implement those aspects of ADA rules finalized by the EEOC and post­
pone implementing the others.
The EEOC does little to further its credibility with employers in much of 
the rule making it does. In EEOC v. Jostyn Manufacturing Co. (1996), the 
agency sued an employer that sent a job applicant for a medical examination 
before reaching a determination as to his physical ability to perform the job for 
which he applied. The case was settled prior to tnal because as EEOC attor­
ney, John Hendrickson, said, "Before rejecting an applicant for medical rea­
sons, an employer must individually evaluate his or her ability to do the job"*^ 
{Fair Employment Practices Sept. 5, 1996, 108). Thus, EEOC's interpretation 
of the ADA submits that employers should be able to ascertain the extent of a 
prospective employee's disability before the applicant has seen a professional 
health care specialist.
Likewise, Chris Kuczynski, Director of EEOC’s ADA Policy Division, has 
stated in regard to psychiatric disability that an employer would be "overgen­
eralizing by assuming that anyone who did anything in the past is more likely
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to do something in the future.^ Thus, a person who has displayed past violent 
behavior must be evaluated for employment under the EEOC’s ‘direct threat* 
guidelines which examine the following: duration of the risk of potential harm, 
its nature and severity, the likelihood that the harm will occur, and who is im­
minent to the harm. In other words, an employee who has a history of violent 
behavior because of mental problems cannot be terminated from employment 
without the employer determining how long the behavior will last, how severe 
the behavior will be. the likelihood of the behavior reoccurring and when it may 
or will occur.
Municipal and other employers are legally liable under the concept of 
"negligent hiring” or ‘negligent retention‘ for the workplace related violent be­
havior of their employees if they are aware of similar past violent behavior on 
the employee’s part. However, Kuczynski’s response to this problem is per­
haps typical of EEOC thinking. The fear of negligent hiring and negligent re­
tention litigation is ‘not a defense under the ADA for the failure to hire some­
one when the decision not to hire is based upon someone’s psychiatric dis­
abilities*.
The problems stemming from the EEOC's ADA enforcement efforts may 
be understandable. The EEOC has a backlog of pending cases that, in the 
words of the former Director of the EEOC and current U. S. Representative. 
Eleanor Holmes Norton, "will bury the agency." Thus, the EEOC may simply 
be overloaded with complaints.
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Between July 1992 and September 1999 the EEOC received 125,946 
ADA complaints, ranking the ADA third among the EEOC's caseload, behind 
only race and sex bias cases." The result has been $261.2 million in settle­
ments by employers to workers covered by the ADA. The above figure does 
not include money collected through litigation sponsored by the EEOC^' Of 
course, not ali ADA litigation is sponsored by the EEOC or initiated by the Jus­
tice Department. Disabled workers or job applicants who allege ADA violations 
may also opt to pursue legal relief on their own. Indeed, the ADA has been 
called by one long time local personnel officer who shall remain anonymous, 
the "Attorneys' Dollars Act "
Legal Problems
The problematic nature of ADA implementation is worsened by the U.S. 
legal system, where judicial interpretation of the ADA may vary from jurisdic­
tion to jurisdiction and even from court to court in the same jurisdiction. Thus, 
a judicial interpretation of the ADA by the Ninth U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals 
may uphold a section of the ADA struck down by the 10th U.S. Circuit Court. 
Likewise, fiederal district judges within the jurisdiction of the circuit courts on 
the Ninth or Fifth or any other of the ten remaining circuit courts may have on 
record differing ADA legal opinions. Additionally, because the ADA provides 
that the states may enact and enforce their own disability laws, state courts 
may become involved in judicial determination of the rights of the disabled.
In general, the courts have heretofore interpreted the ADA broadly.
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Thus, in EEOC v. Community Coffee Co. (1995) an employer's questioning of a 
job applicant concerning a facial disfigurement, even though the employer did 
not discriminate in hiring, was held to be a violation of the ADA. The ADA, 
unlike most federal laws, regulates the questions a potential employer may 
ask of a job applicant.”  Likewise, in EEOC v. United WelHire Fund (1996) 
the EEOC reached a court-approved settlement in which an employee infected 
with AIDS was deemed to be disabled under the ADA and his estate was to 
receive actual and punitive damages totaling $15,200. The settlement also 
overturned the employer’s insurance company's cap on HIV and AIDS related 
expenses.
The City of Denver, Colorado's City Charter was found to be in violation 
of the ADA in U.S. v. Denver (1996) and thus overturned. It is interesting to 
note that in this case, no discrimination was determined to have occurred. The 
simple fact that the City Charter prohibited transfers between uniformed and 
non-unifbrmed Civil Service positions was sufficient grounds to find the city in 
violation. As the court said, it was not necessary for the Department of Justice 
to show that any individual employees were "otherwise qualified individuals"; it 
needed only to establish that the policy exists.”  These, among many other 
examples of ADA litigation, show that the courts are often active in broadly 
interpreting and enforcing the ADA. As Cozzette (1994, 106) states, 
"Hundreds of complaints will be adjudicated over the next several years and 
new rights will be defined that have a dramatic, lasting impact on public
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administration in both operational as well as fiscal terms '
Cozzette's observation is supported by Lucky Stores Inc. v. Holihan 
(1997). In Lucky the Supreme Court let stand a lower court ruling that an 
employee could sue under the ADA even though the employee was not 
disabled. As the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals said in Lucky, "Although the 
employee was not actually disabled within the meaning of Americans With 
Disabilities Act, there was genuine issue of material fact as to whether the 
employer regarded' him as disabled within the meaning of the ADA”.
In other words, the mere perception on the part of an employer that an 
employee is disabled is sufficient for that employee to claim ADA protection 
and sue for damages under the ADA.^ ° In more recent times the Court has 
ruled that disabled prisoners in state or local prisons have ADA protection 
{Pennsylvania Department of Conectionsv. Yeskey 1998). Further, the Court 
held in Brogdon v. Abbof (1998) that AIDS is a covered disability under the 
ADA.
To be sure, the Court has lessened the burden of the ADA on some em­
ployers by finding that a disability must be evaluated in its mitigated state 
{Sutton V. United Airlines 1999). Thus, citizens whose disability is correctable 
through medication, prosthesis, etc. cannot daim ADA protection.^  ^ In Sutton 
the Court considered the issue of visual impairment and the ADA. The argu­
ment in this case concerned airline pilot applicants who did not meet vision re­
quirements and who daimed entitlement to ADA protection. Reasonable ac­
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commodation was sought on the part of the plaintiffs because their vision was 
correctable with glasses or contact lenses. The Court determined that the 
plaintiffs were not entitled to ADA protection for the somewhat paradoxical 
reason that because their vision was correctable, they were not disabled.^ ^
In July 1999, however, the EEOC responded by issuing new instructions 
to its field officers concerning the Investigation of correctable disabilities. The 
field officers were now required to consider whether the mitigating measure 
"fully or only partially controls the symptoms or the impairment, whether the 
mitigating measure controls the symptoms or limitations all of the time or only 
some of the time, and whether the mitigating measures tend to become less 
effective under certain conditions such as stress, fatigue, environmental 
change or Il lness.The implications of the Court's Sutton decision for em­
ployers remains to be seen. Although many are heralding the decision as a 
victory for employers, the EEOC’s response has not yet been factored into this 
perspective. For example, EEOC chairwoman Ida L. Castro has gone on rec­
ord as viewing the Court's decision in Sutton and Murptiy as victories for the 
organization.'^
As she states.
The decisions appear to significantly narrow the scope of those 
covered under the ADA, the Court affirmed EEOC's standard of 
an individualized approach to the assessment of coverage under 
the ADA. In other words, the determination of whether an indi­
vidual can bring a daim under the ADA should be assessed on a 
case-by-case basis.
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Further, Ms. Castro noted that the Court did not exclude any condition from 
ADA coverage nor did it preclude the determination that individuals who use 
mitigating devices are still disabled. She went on to outline EEOC’s plan for 
responding to the Court’s decisions. The plan includes educating, training, and 
outreach programs to ADA stakeholders including EEOC staff, businesses, 
private attorneys, civil rights groups, unions, and other employee groups. In 
sum, what Ms. Castro has said is that not only were the decisions in Sutton 
and Murptiy EEOC victories but also that the EEOC intends to rally affected 
interest groups in support of the EEOC position. In the meantime the EEOC 
recently released its proposed accessibility guidelines for recreation facilities 
nationwide. These guidelines cover amusement rides, boating facilities, fishing 
piers/platfbrms, golf courses, sports fecilities, swimming pools, wading pools, 
and spas.
A few highlights of the proposed guidelines include that 3 percent of ma­
rina boat slip moorings be wheelchair accessible and that guardrails around 
fishing piers and platforms be no higher than thirty-two inches. Also, golf 
course greens must be wheelchair accessible and swimming pools must have 
sloped entries, lift systems, transfer walls or moveable fkxxs.'^  The guidelines 
at first do not appear to be particularly onerous until one considers that thou­
sands of municipalities nationwide operate these and other fecilities covered 
under the guidelines. If the guidelines are finalized as proposed, these munici­
palities will be required to make major modifications to their recreation fecilities
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at taxpayer expense. This holds true whether or not a disabled person ever 
uses or even desires to use a Gcility.*
Thus, while both employers and the EEOC are claiming victory in recent 
ADA court decisions, the final outcome remains much in doubt. Either way, it 
is obvious that the ADA continues to be problematic for many employers.
For example, in Cleveland v. Policy Management Systems Co. (1997) the 
Supreme Court held that people who file for disability payments such as Social 
Security disability benefits can sue their former employers for discrimination 
under the ADA. Thus, the specter of employers being forced to place disabled 
employees on indefinite leave arises.^ Also, in Wright v. Universal Maritime 
Services Corp. (1997) the Court found that a worker who received permanent 
disability payments could claim ADA protection in regard to employment in­
stead of arbitrating the issue as required by a collective bargaining agreement 
between the union and the employer. The implication of this case for employ­
ers is indeed ominous. An employer may be forced to employ or re-employ a 
disabled worker with reasonable accommodation where that worker has al­
ready been declared permanently disabled.
In many ways the problems with ADA implementation are reminiscent of 
the heyday of affirmative action implementation efforts. Like affirmative action 
implementation, ADA implementation efforts are marked by confusion, com­
plexity, misinformation and differing interpretations of the Act's requirements.'*
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ADA implementation efforts also mirror the U.S. Department of Labor's 
(DOL) implementation of the Fair Labor Standards Act among public sector 
organizations during the late 1980's. The concept of DOL appeared to many 
practitioners to be, "we don't know what you're guilty of, but you must be guilty 
of something and we'll find out what."^* It may well be as the National Public 
Employers Labor Relations Association has surmised, "We know through our 
experience with the Fair Labor Standards Act that the applicability of such 
general fiederal statutes to the public sector can give rise to various onerous or 
absurd results.""
This brief discussion of the ADA would indicate that the ADA produces a 
vague, complicated and confusing public policy. Further, it indicates that con­
fusion over the ADA is compounded by ongoing rulemaking and interpretation 
of the Act by the EEOC and the courts."' ADA implementation may be an ex­
pensive proposition, both in terms of financial and/or intellectual resources. 
Nonetheless, municipalities must somehow and some way determine what to 
do about ADA implementation. The question then arises, how do municipali­
ties respond to the need to implement the ADA and other unfunded man­
dates? For an answer to this question, we turn to the field of organizational 
behavior.
Decision-Making and Policy Implementation
As stated earlier municipalities are communities. However, they are also 
governmental organizations. While the extended community which envelopes
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an organization plays a major role in shaping that organization’s behavior, it is 
the organization itself that must decide what to do about a policy mandate. 
After all, even a so-called "non-decision* requires that the organization make a 
choice to avoid making a decision.
Organizations, like individuals, have been theorized to reach decisions in 
many different fashions. The rational model suggests that organizations be­
have as goal-seeking utility maximizers. Thus, organizations presumably 
choose from among many different competing alternative responses to a 
problem after weighing the cost and benefit of each response (Lewis 1978, 62; 
Lindt)lom 1959.) In this model, organizations and organizational members are 
viewed to behave much the same as a computer. Data concerning the prot)- 
iem and potential solutions are placed in the collective minds of decision­
makers. After elimination of unpalatable and unworkable solutions, the one 
having the greatest benefit at the least cost is selected.
Adapted from "rational man" economic theory, the rational model often 
tails to account for organizational reality. For example, the model assumes that 
organizations are fully aware of problems and solutions. Further, it assumes 
that organizations have the time and other resources to conduct exhaustive in­
vestigation of problems and solutions. Similarly, the model assumes that or­
ganizations, upon arriving at a response, are capable of adopting that response 
(McKinney and Howard 1979, 232-233; Quattrone and Tversky 1988, 719-735). 
Additionally, as an analytical tool the model, like a computer, is limited by the
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‘garbage in -  garbage out* phenomenon by which inputs only account for out­
puts.
In Agenda. Alternatives, and Public Policies, Kingdon (1984, 82) pre­
sents his findings concerning the rational model;
If policy makers were operating according to a rational, comprehensive 
model, they would first define their goals rather clearly and set the levels 
of achievement of those goals that would satisfy them. Then they would 
canvass many (ideally all) alternatives that might achieve these goals. 
They would compare the alternatives systematically, assessing their 
costs and benefits, and then they would choose the alternatives that 
would achieve their goals at the least cost. For various reasons already 
developed by other writers, such a model does not very accurately de­
scribe reality. The ability of human beings to process information is more 
limited than such a comprehensive approach would prescribe. We are 
unable to canvass many alternatives, keep them simultaneously in our 
heads, and compare them systematically. We also do not usually clarify 
our goals, indeed, this is often counter productive because constructing a 
political coalition involves persuading people to agree on a specific pro­
posal when they might not agree on a set of goals to be achieved. It 
could be that some individual actors in the process are fairly rational a 
fair amount of the time, but when many actors are involved and they drift 
in and out of the process, the kind of rationality that might characterize a 
unitary decision-making structure becomes elusive. The case studies in 
this research also dont have the flavor of a rational, comprehensive ap­
proach to problem solving.
Next, organizations may make choices incrementally, in many stages 
leading to an outcome (Lindblom 1959, 82). In the incremental model organiza­
tions do not make exhaustive calculations to respond to a problem. Instead, in 
this model organizations reach decisions in a piecemeal fashion. Beginning from 
a base of past experienoes, organizations calculate solutions by successive lim­
ited comparison with other potential solutions. In other words, decisions are 
reached gradually in small steps toward a final outcome. Lindblom's successive
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limited comparison model of organizational decision-making is a powerful lens 
through which to view policy implementation. Beginning with the basic fact that 
organizations are not always rational, the model arrives at the conclusion that 
organizations simplify decision-making. This is especially so when they are faced 
with a complicated or conflictual policy issue.
In the rational approach values play little or no role in policy formulation or 
analysis. Instead, policies are empirical and means-end based. Further, an ex­
haustive search for the best means to reach the end is conducted. Conversely, 
in Lindblom’s approach, values and empirical analysis are not separable. The 
means-end search is not comprehensive but very limited, and important potential 
policies and outcomes are neglected. In Lindblom’s approach reliance on theory 
is reduced, and trial and error are enhanced Table 2 depicts Lindblom’s model 
and compares it to the rational approach.
It is readily discernable from Table 2 that a wide theoretical gap exists be­
tween the rational comprehensive (strategic planning) and the successive limited 
comparison (incremental) approach to decision-making. The strategic approach 
for example, may be likened to a battle plan issued by a military high command. 
Thus, each battlefield movement of every individual unit is carefully ordered to 
achieve a strategic goal. The affect of terrain, weather and the comparative 
strengths and weaknesses of each opposing force on the goal is plotted and ac­
counted for, the theory being that if each unit performs as expected, a strategic 
victory will ensue.
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Table 2
Rabonal Theory versus Lindblom’s Limited Comparison 
Model of Decision-Making
Ratfonal CompratMnsiv* (Root) SuccoMivo Limftod Compariton (Branch)
1 a. Clarification of values or otÿedives distinct 
from and usually prerequisite to empirical 
analysis of aNemative policies
2a Policy-fdrmulation is therefore approached 
through means-end analysis; First tfie 
ends are isolated, then the means to 
achieve ttiem are sought.
3a The test of a ‘good* policy is that it can tw 
shown to t)e ttie most appropriate means 
to desired ends.
4a Analysis is comprehensive; every impor­
tant relevant factor is taken into account.
5a. Theory is often heavily relied upon.
1b. Selection of value goals and empirical 
analysis of the needed actions are not 
distinct from one ancttier txjt are closely 
intertwined.
2b. Since means and ends are not distinct, 
means-end analysis is often inappropriate 
or limited.
3b. The test of a "good" policy is typically that 
various analysts find themselves directly 
agreeing on a policy witlxxit their agree­
ing that it is the appropriate means to an 
agreed objective.
4b Analysis is drastically limited:
i) Important possible outcomes are ne­
glected
ii) Important alternative potential policies 
are neglected
iii) Important affected values are ne­
glected.
5b. A succession of comparison greatly re­
duces or eliminates reliance on theory.
Source: Lindblom (1959,82).
Conversely, the incremental approach In such a situation would suggest that 
command and control of Individual battlefield units be left in the hands of the 
leaders of each unit. The goal, of course. Is still victory, but the means to achieve 
the goal is tactical and not strategic. This is not to say that planning does not 
take place in the incremental approach. Rather, it is to say that by shifting re­
sponsibility to the tactical command level, means and ends analysis on a grand
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scale is severely limited. In this approach the theory is that since it is virtually im­
possible to have perfect information on which to base a decision, decision­
making must take place in stages leading to goal achievement.
The incremental model has been attacked as mindless and irrational 
(McKinney and Howard 1979, 232-233; Quattrone and Tversky 1988,719-735). 
It has further been attacked for making the assumption that organizations do not 
fully embrace a given policy (Baum 1981). However, as WikJavsky (1974, 216) 
argues, " . . .  mindless or not, incrementalism and other such devices to simplify 
and speed decisions are inevitable responses to the extraordinary complexity of 
resource allocation in govemments of any size."
The idea that individuals and organizations seek to simplify decision­
making is supported by the work of Simon (1946, 1957, 1976, 1979, 1982, 
1985). Simon believes that the ability of an individual or organization to process 
decisional information is limited. Thus, organizations, like humans, seek to sim­
plify decision-making by relying upon a few key variables. Simon argues that 
these variables are contained in the internal and external environment of deci­
sion-makers. As he states (1959, 273), "A real life decision involves some goals 
or values, some facts about the environment and some inferences drawn from 
those values and facts."
Simon (1981,190) has called such decision-making behavior "bounded ra­
tionality." Thus, humans engage in decision-making "behavior that is adaptive 
within the constraints imposed by the external situation and by the capacities of
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the decision maker”(1985, 294). In Simon’s view individuals and organizations 
cannot possibly grasp all of the complexities of the world around them. There­
fore, they do not attempt to find the optimal solution to a problem. Instead, the 
search for a solution ends when one is found with which the decision-maker 
fieels comfortable (1979,3).
in Administrative Behavior (1957, 6) Simon makes his point when he ar­
gues.
In an important sense, all decision is a matter of compromise. The al­
ternative that is finally selected never permits a complete or perfect 
achievement of objectives, but is merely the best solution that is avail­
able under the circumstances. The environmental situation inevitably 
limits the alternatives that are available, and hence sets a maximum to 
the level of attainment of purposes that is possible.
In comparing the theoretical perspectives of incrementalism and bounded 
rationality many similarities may be found. First, each proposes that organiza­
tions attempt to simplify decision-making. Second, each is predicated upon the 
allocation of scarce resources, intellectual or otherwise. Third, each argues that 
organizations cannot grasp the complexities surrounding decisions and therefore 
do not always behave rationally. Fourth, each account for the values held by or­
ganizations and how they go about working these values into a decisional equa­
tion. Fifth, each emphasizes the environment surrounding an organization and its 
decision-making. Sixth, each theory submits that organizational decision-making 
is constrained by a number of inside and outside influences.
Thus, incremental and boundedly rational theories have the potential to be 
combined into a single theoretical perspective. Each theory fleshes out the other
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and accounts for that portion of organizational decision-making not explained by 
the other. For example, incrementalism explains how organizations go about im­
plementation but falls short of telling us exactly where the specific decisional 
variables they rely on may be found. Conversely, bounded rationality explains 
where specific variables may be found but not how these variables are translated 
Into outcomes.
An integrated boundedly rational incremental approach to implementation 
also offers the advantage of being parsimonious. Organizations, according to the 
"integrated theory," key upon a few variables to influence and guide their ded- 
sion-making. Each also fits with the evidence presented in this research and 
elsewhere concerning the behavior of small and medium-sized municipalities. 
This combined theoretical approach also comports with the known facts sur­
rounding the ADA.
A boundedly rational or incremental approach to the study of public policy is 
not unique to this project. Variations of the two perspectives have often been 
used to explain organizational decision-making. For example, Mueller (1984) 
took an incremental approach to the study of public housing. Likewise, Ignagni 
(1991) has viewed Supreme Court decision-making from a boundedly ra- 
tional/cybemetio perspective (also Slayton 1992). What is unique to this project 
is the use of bounded rationality to help identify the variables that influence the 
decisions organizations reach and the use of incrementalism to explain how or­
ganizations go about policy implementation.
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Likewise, the approach taken in this study builds on existing IGR and im­
plementation research. As noted earlier, a problem with research in each of 
these sub-fields has been the lack of a sound theoretical basis for the operation­
alization of the variables that influence policy outcomes. This is especially true in 
the area of national to local unfunded mandates. For example, where the scope 
of conflict model of IGR accounts for the escalation of conflict between levels of 
government over policy, it does not explain what happens when this conflict has 
been resolved. This means that the model is predicated on points of access for 
political remedies between levels of government but neglects decisional out­
comes when these remedies have been exhausted.
Similarly, the fiscal federalism approach to IGR explains the linkages be­
tween federal funding for policies and state and local reactions to these policies. 
However, it foils to explore the full range of responses by these govemments 
when funding is non-existent. The use of a boundedly rational/incremental ap­
proach in this study helps illuminate how municipalities respond once political 
remedies to objectionable policies are exhausted and federal funding for the im­
plementation of these policies remains non-existent. It does so by accounting for 
the environmental influences on implementation outcomes at the local level.
If anything, the genius of Pressman's and Wlldavsky’s (1973) seminal 
study resides in its account of local influences on national policy implementa­
tion. In fact, its true genius is its explanation of how and why the outcome of a 
national policy often differs greatly from what the policy was Intended to accom­
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plish. Although this research can’t t)e compared to the work of Pressman and 
WNdavsky, it too seeks to explain why and how national policies often undergo a 
transformation at the local level of government. What a boundedly rational ap­
proach to local implementation of national policy mandates does is provide a 
theoretical basis for why municipal organizations decide as they do. What incre­
mental theory adds is how municipal organizations go about implementing an 
unfunded policy mandate.
In sum, the integrated approach taken in this study agues that organiza­
tions, when foced with a complex, confusing, or potentially conflictual decision, 
will seek to simplify the decision-making process. Further, when simplifying the 
decision-making process, organizations will rely upon a few key variables to in­
fluence and guide their decision-making. Additionally, the study argues that the 
variables that influence an organization's decisions may be found in the internal 
and external environment of these organizations.
While it is arguable that the theory is flawed because it cannot be observed 
in practical application and therefore must be assumed to reflect decisional out­
comes, much the same can be said of other existing decisional models. For ex­
ample, McMillan (1992, 8) notes that game theory observes rational choices but 
does not account for personal and idiosyncratic ones."^  Perhaps Baum (1976, 
51) put it best when he concluded, "In sum, the concept of rationality can be de­
fined at various levels depending on the environmental constraints assumed to 
be operative. At all levels the focus is exclusively upon outcomes, which we have
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assumed are the only things valued by voters.'"^ It would therefore appear that a 
unified boundedly rational/incremental perspective of the ADA implementation 
behavior of small and medium-sized municipalities is appropriate for use in this 
study.
Ç9nç»wlçff
In summary, this chapter has addressed the setting for intergovemmental 
relations. General and specific theoretical approaches to intergovemmental 
relations and policy implementation have been considered. Further, the history 
of the ADA and its background have been detailed. Also, the internal and ex­
ternal environment of small municipalities has been described.
This chapter also demonstrated that intergovemmental relations is a 
complex and complicated issue. Within the field there exists little consensus 
as to the best research approach. This chapter finds that general theories of 
intergovemmental relations lack predictive and/or explanatory capacity. Spe­
cific approaches to the study of intergovemmental relations, while adequate 
predictive tools, are for the most part not generalizable. It seems reasonable 
that any study of intergovemmental relations must take an environmental ap­
proach. By doing so, the specific influences upon intergovemmental relations 
and more importantly to this research, policy implementation, may be discov­
ered. As noted above, the study of implementation has also been shown to 
suffer from a lack of predictive and/or explanatory capacity. Perfiaps this is 
because most research considers implementation to be a linear process, or
85
perhaps it is because most research is case specific. Either way it seems rea­
sonable that implementation is best studied from the perspective of the basic 
entity responsible for implementation.
This chapter has also demonstrated that the implementation environment 
of small municipalities is much diffierent from that of larger municipal govern­
ments. This chapter has also addressed the general and specific requirements 
of the ADA. The ADA is vague and complicated and the courts and the EEOC 
have done little except contribute to the confusion surrounding ADA imple­
mentation. Finally, several leading theoretical approaches to organizational 
decision-making have been discussed and two selected for use in the project.
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CHAPTER 4
A THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE OF ADA IMPLEMENTATION
As stated earlier, this project takes the perspective that the ADA imple­
mentation environment of smaller municipalities is both internal and external. It 
has been argued in this research that these municipalities behave in a bound­
edly rational/incremental fashion. The problem with this perspective is one of 
observation. Cue-fact theory provides a method for bridging the gap between 
the direct observation of the decision-making process and a decisional out­
come This framework, for example, has often been utilized to quantitatively 
explain and predict the decisions reached by the Courts (Kort 1973, 555-559; 
Ulmer 1984, 891-90; 1985, 461-478). In the cue-fact approach one or more 
variables are theorized to "key" the decisions that decision-makers reach. The 
gauge of the accuracy of what is assumed is the variables' explanatory and 
predictive power after measurement and testing. If the variable is powerful, it 
may be assumed that, all other things being equal, the variable did indeed cue 
or key the decision reached. If the variable is not powerful, then, as in any 
other approach, the variable is suspect.
Ignagni (1990) has successfully unified cue-fact theory with bounded ra­
tionality and cognitive-cybemetics concerning Supreme Court establishment 
clause decision-making. Slayton (1992) has utilized Ignagni’s model to help
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explain municipal Fair Labor Standards Act implementation. A cue-fact tx)und- 
edly rational perspective submits that from among the many variables that 
may influence a decisional outcome, only a few key factors and facts are con­
sidered. These are keyed on by decision-makers to cue the decisions they 
reach. The factors and facts they rely on may be internal or external, and may 
be either environmental or stem from the issue itself. Thus, decision-makers 
may rely on such things as ideology, values or beliefs to cue their decisional 
behavior. In the alternative, they may rely on more concrete cues such as fi­
nancial or human resources.
Cue-fact theory therefore accounts for how individuals and groups work 
amorphous and non-amorphous variables into a decisional equation. Thus, it 
provides theoretical support for the operationalization of bounded rationality 
and incrementalism. For example, it is widely accepted that state political cul­
ture plays a role in policy implementation. Yet, political culture is a rather 
amorphous concept because it may vary greatly within a single geographic 
area (Sharkansky 1978, 39). Thus, it is difficult to operationalize state political 
culture as a variable as it relates to a given decision in a given locality. Most 
scholars therefore resort to relying on state political culture as a stand-alone 
behavioral theory. Cue-fact theory provides a basis for integrating local politi­
cal culture into a combined factual-environmental model of decisional behav­
ior. In sum, cue-fact theory provides a firm theoretical basis for the opera­
tionalization of a bounded rationality and incremental perspective of ADA im­
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plementation. Further, it is broad enough to allow for the inclusion of both fac­
tual and subjective variables in the model to be developed here. The model 
also complements the internal-external environment approach to implementa­
tion taken in this study.
While at first glance the theoretical approach taken in this research may 
appear complicated, its primary attribute is its simplicity. If municipal officials 
cannot possibly grasp the complexities of their ADA implementation decisions, 
they must rely on some mechanism other than rationality to determine a 
course of action.
A second-best decisional mechanism is bounded rationality (some facts, 
some inferences, some value judgments). If bounded rationality is accepted as 
the decisional mechanism local officials use, it becomes necessary to explain 
how these officials mentally account for the facts, inferences and values that 
guide their implementation behavior Cue-fact theory bridges this gap by sut>- 
mitting that from among all the other potential variables that may influence lo­
cal officials, some are more important than others. These important variables 
may be foctual, such as knowledge that 'the unions have always grieved this 
type of decision.” These variables may be inferential such as, 'its like the 
FLSA; it’s an impossibility, but we will try.' In the alternative, these variables 
may be intuitive or value laden such as 'the citizens won't like it but it’s the 
right thing to do.”
In each of the above instances, the most likely outcome is an incremental
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approach to implementation. What a boundedly rational, cue-fact, incremental 
theory of implementation proposes is that local officials behave as "cognitive 
misers.” They do not even attempt to calculate the altemative solutions to a 
problem, nor do they seek to determine all the ramifications of their actions. 
Instead, they use a combination of known facts, a few inferences from those 
facts and previously stored values and intuitions to cue, and therefore deter­
mine their course of action.
For example, a firefighter factually knows when a building is on fire; the 
smoke and flames can be seen. The firefighter also knows the factual dynam­
ics of the progress and course of the fires. He or she then responds to these 
facts in order to put out the fire. However, it is past experience, intuition, and 
value judgment that determines to what extent the firefighter will risk life and 
limb to extinguish the fire. Is there an adult trapped inside, or perhaps a dog or 
a child? In such an instance extensive calculation of risk is not possible. In­
stead, the firefighter considers facts as only one of several influences on a 
course of action. Other influences, such as the willingness or ability to do it; 
the fact that he/she had done it before; whether the firefighter has children or 
pets all enter the decisional matrix. Values, intuition, inference, experience and 
facts all unite to reach a judgment.
In sum, the ADA is a complicated, complex and vague policy mandate. 
As such, municipal organizations cannot possible grasp all of the ramifications 
and consequences of its implementation. If these organizations cannot calcu­
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late the ramifications and consequences of ADA implementation, they must 
rely on something other than rationality to guide their decision-making. A sec­
ond best decisional mechanism is bounded rationality. However, while bound­
edly rational theory explains how ADA decision-makers reach their decisions, 
it fails to provide a basis for operationalizing specific influences on these deci­
sions.
Cue-fact theory fills this theoretical gap. Some variables cue a given im­
plementation decision. In cue-fact theory decision-makers mentally scan their 
environment. They do not perform extensive mental calculations; instead, they 
rely on cues to trigger the decisions they reach In short, cue-fact theory pro­
poses that certain facts stand out in the minds of decision-makers; it is these 
facts that decision-makers rely on to reach a decision. Cue-fact theory is par­
ticularly useful in explaining municipal decision-making concerning unfunded 
mandates—especially unfunded social mandates such as the ADA. This is be­
cause it Is these policies that have historically been the source of much local 
controversy They also provide the least visible benefits to the community as a 
whole in the eyes of the citizens. Thus, unless they receive or have stored in­
formation to cue (trigger) the implementation of an unfunded social mandate, 
municipal decision-makers may opt to maintain the status quo rather than risk 
community conflict.
To recapitulate, a cue-fact approach merely provides a theoretical basis 
for operationalizing bounded rationality and. thus, the influences on the im-
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plementation of unfunded mandates. As previously noted, the central problem 
with boundedly rational approaches to decision-making has always been iden­
tifying specific influences on decisions. All that cue-fact theory adds to this re­
search is a theoretical justification for the primary theoretical framework set 
forth in the previous chapter
A TvDoloav of Municipal ADA Implementation Behavior 
Internal Influences
Mueller (1984,167) has stated that "one of the most important vari­
ables, arguably the most, influential in the intergovemmental setting is the lo­
cal sodal/political environment." Mueller's statement is supported by among 
others. Stone, Whelan, and Murin (1979, 316). Likewise, Ringquist (1993, 324- 
326) notes the importance of political and socioeconomic variables to policy 
implementation when he states, "The first requirement in constructing an inte­
grated theory of public policy is acknowledging that the political and economic 
characteristics of a state will influence state policies; wealth and economic de­
velopment do matter "
This research follows the lead of Mueller and Ringquist. The political and 
socioeconomic variables that influence municipal policy implementation may 
stem from two general sources: the internal and the external environment. The 
internal environment of a municipality is an important indicator of that munici­
pality’s ability and willingness to adopt and implement public policies. For ex­
ample, it is the internal environment of a municipality that determines resource
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allocation and the path and direction of change in the local political and socio­
economic system. Likewise, the external environment plays an important role 
in a municipality's overall ideological and social orientation and, in turn, its re­
ceptiveness to change in general. In the case of the former, the political sys­
tem within a municipality may t)e an important influence on its tiehavior (Kin­
caid 1982, 181; Lineberry and Fowler 1967, 109; Meier, Stewart and England 
1989, 646-647). In the case of the latter, state ideology may influence a mu­
nicipality’s decisions.
Generally, the type of political system a municipality exhibits may be 
classified as eKher reformed or unreformed. Reformed municipal governmen­
tal systems are characterized by the existence of civil service systems, coun- 
cil-manager forms of government, at-large council representation, and non­
partisan elections. Conversely, unreformed government systems are partisan 
with ward elections, have an elected chief executive officer, and often provide 
weak or non-existent civil service protection for employees. While the terms 
reformed and unreformed bring with them connotations of good and bad, this 
is not necessarily the case. For instance, while the reformed city manager 
form is generally associated with professionalism and efficiency, the mayor- 
council form is associated with representation and pluralism (Lineberry and 
Sharkansky 1971,127; Kessel 1969, 284-291).
It might seem then that the mayor-council form of government would 
automatically lead to more indusionary public policies. However, elected offi­
93
cials are typically utility maximizers in regard to re-election. Therefore, they re­
spond to the opinions and views of those constituents most likely to aid in their 
re-election efforts, opinions that may or may not coincide with indusionary 
policy. Conversely, city managers, although engaging in the goal-seeking be­
havior of maintaining their current positions, must keep an eye on their long 
term future—a future which, more likely than not, lies some place other than in 
the munidpality they currently serve. This may lead to a cold and impersonal 
style of management as well as less sensitivity to diverse community groups.
Leaving aside the issue of which is the better form of government, it is 
generally acknowledged that the city manager form leads to a greater degree 
of policy innovation and implementation (Svara 1990, 57; Bingham 1976; 
Linet>erry and Sharkansky 1971, 165-173). Perhaps this is because dty man­
agers are career oriented and, for the most part, are professionally oriented 
and trained. They also tend to be career administrators with few emotional ties 
to the local community. Instead, they are "hired guns" brought in from the out­
side and as such realize that their tenure as administrators may be short lived. 
As one manager said concerning job security, "Your job is never as safe as it 
is on your first day there. This being the case, city managers must develop 
and maintain a reputation of innovation and progressiveness in order to secure 
new employment. As Lineberry and Fowler (1967, 109) have argued. '. . . 
mayor-council and ward cities are less willing to commit their resources to 
public purposes than their reformed counterparts." Either way. it is reasonable
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to conclude that the form of government existing in a municipality influences 
policy implementation.
A second internal influence on municipal implementation behavior may
be available resources. Resource availability is a particularly important aspect
of the implementation of unfunded mandates. As school superintendent Roger
Shaw says regarding unfunded mandates in public education,
When a mandate is issued by any governmental agency, the local 
schools are required to meet it, often using funds designated for 
other purposes. Thus, nearly every unfunded or under funded man­
date takes money out of the classroom. When you consider that most 
schools budget about 85 percent of their funds for staff salaries and 
benefits, very little is left over to pay for these mandates, let alone the 
fixed costs.
Shaw goes on to note that while personally he is in favor of accommodating 
students with special needs, "it isn't fair to other students who may have to do 
without to accommodate mandates." Two points may be taken from Shaw’s 
statements; first, unfunded mandates are difficult to implement with existing 
budgetary resources and, second, budgets reflect the values of citizens and 
administrators.
Masotti and Bowen (1965, 39) support this perspective wfien they state,
" . . . the community budget can be viewed as public policy spelled out in dol­
lars and cents, and . . . budget decisions represent the allocation of certain 
kinds of values." Although municipal budgets are a reflection of community 
values, budgets alone do not necessarily present an accurate picture of a mu­
nicipality’s ability to implement policies. Municipal budgets often contain ear­
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marked funds such as state or federal grants, public works projects, and simi­
lar items. Additionally, municipal budgets are often heavily weighted in favor of 
public safety expenditures." It should also be understood that municipal 
budgets, like all governmental budgets, are subject to amendment and change 
and seldom present an accurate depiction of costs.
Perhaps the most accurate and accessible gauge of the resources avail­
able to a municipality is the income level of its citizens (Hanushek 1975, 130- 
147; Svara 1990, 3; Ringquist 1993, 327-328). Of course, it is axiomatic that 
per capita income is not the sole measure of available resources. Per capita 
income as a measurement brings with it its own set of problems For example, 
the existence of a relatively wealthy citizenry does not equate to a willingness 
to spend part of that wealth on new policies or programs However, a higher 
per capita income is indicative of educational levels, white-collar employment, 
and a greater concern for quality of life issues. In turn, educational levels, em­
ployment status and concern with quality of life issues are generally associ­
ated with the willingness of citizens to support the implementation of new poli­
cies. It should also be remembered that what is actually being measured here 
is available resources and not overall expenditures. Thus, it seems logical that 
per capita income would be a greater influence on municipal ADA implemen­
tation than total expenditures.
A third internal influence on municipal ADA implementation may be the 
municipality's total population. Population has long been a mainstay in political
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science research as an indicator of policy outcome. For example, Wolfinger 
and Field (1968, 176) utilize population size as an independent variable to 
analyze what form of government and the method and type of elections a city 
will have.
The population of a municipality may influence ADA implementation in 
many different ways. For instance, the greater the population, the greater the 
diversity within the community. Thus, larger cities should experience more 
scrutiny by the advocates for the disabled. Likewise, the greater the popula­
tion, the laws of probability dictate that a greater number of disabled citizens 
will reside in the municipality. These disabled citizens may form a significant 
lobby for ADA implementation."
While it is arguable that data concerning the number of disabled citizens 
residing in a municipality might provide a better measurement than population, 
such data may be unreliable. For example, although the U. S. Bureau of Cen­
sus collects such data, it is based on a self-reporting system, and many peo­
ple may feel stigmatized by reporting themselves as being disabled. Although 
the census bureau addresses this problem, they do so by using a mathemati­
cal probability model based on population."
Population size also allows for the indirect measurement of minority 
population. Again, the larger the population the greater probability that the mi­
nority population will be larger (Wolfinger and Fields 1968, 177). This is im­
portant since, in general, ethnic minorities are more receptive to federal poli-
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des and programs than are whites.^ Judd (1988, 244) discusses the Impor­
tance of Hispanics in local politics when he says, ‘ It would be a serious over­
sight to fail to recognize the social and political significance of Hispanics in 
American dties. . .  ‘ The view that minority population influences public policy 
is supported by Fessier and May (1975. 157-195) and Stedman (1972, 243) 
among others.
It is also arguable that census bureau records would provide a more ac­
curate measure of minority population, but these data are also notoriously in­
accurate.*  ^ Here also, the census bureau relies upon estimates based on 
population sampling. By using population size as a measurement, the usual 
co-variance issues inherent in demographic research are also avoided. Given 
the foregoing facts and in the name of parsimony, it seems reasonable that 
population size can be utilized in this study as a stand-in for the various influ­
ences noted above.
The next internal influence is the existence of labor unions within the mu- 
nidpal government work force. Stedman (1972, 74), among others, has noted 
the importance of the unionization of munidpal employees to urban politics. 
The idea that employee unions affect the dedsions reached by munidpalities 
is supported by Sharp (1990,43) and Stahl (1976, 342).
The existence of one or more unions within a munidpal work force may 
influence ADA implementation in one or more ways. First, unions have a min­
isterial duty to represent their membership in disputes with management over
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wages, benefits, and working conditions.”  Thus, given the broad definition of 
disability contained in the ADA, at any given time a union could be expected to 
represent one or more disabled members. Representation of disabled mem­
bers may take several different forms: contract language addressing disabled 
workers, grievance arbitration, and/or legal action. Second, unions may go to 
the media and cause adverse publicity for the municipality as a whole. Third, a 
union may request and support an EEOC investigation of city ADA policies 
and procedures. With these union considerations in mind, it may be that rather 
than piecemeal ADA implementation, municipal governments in which em­
ployees are represented by one or more unions may choose to implement the 
ADA across the board. It would therefore seem reasonable that the existence 
of employee unions within a municipality would influence ADA implementation.
The final internal influence on ADA implementation may be the location of 
a municipality. The location of a municipality may influence ADA implementa­
tion for several reasons. As Judd (1988, 179) notes regarding small suburban 
cities, "Politics in small suburbs tends to be simple and non-controversial, and 
this fact is the most important reason for the existence of suburbs; so the local 
population can gain control over the governmental policies which affect their 
lives." The perspective that suburt>an municipalities are different from other 
cities is supported by Murphy and Rehfuss (1976), and Danielson (1971,191).
As Hawkins (1971, 29) submits, "Suburbs are the natural habitat of the 
upper middle dess." Vidich and Bensman (1969, 69) note that suburt» dis­
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play low  tax ideologies." Such a dichotomy between wealth and taxes may at 
first glance appear to be irreconcilable. After all. for municipal expenditures to 
occur wealth must exist and the citizenry must be convinced to give up part of 
that wealth in taxes. Yet, the wealth and tax dichotomy may be mitigated by a 
number of factors. By definition, suburt» are located in close proximity to 
larger cities. Thus, suburban elected and appointed officials as well as citizens 
have the benefit of access to a relatively high degree of technology and infor­
mation diffusion. Councils of governments and metropolitan associations of 
mayors and managers, as well as informal networking, all serve to raise 
awareness of federal policies and programs and their requirements. Likewise, 
the proximity of suburban officials and citizens to numerous media outlets also 
serve to inform them of federal laws and requirements. Additionally, access to 
the technical expertise needed to implement new policies is more available in 
metropolitan areas than in rural areas.
For the most part, suburban municipalities exist to protect their resi­
dents from the strife, conflict, and dangers inherent in central city life. By living 
in the suburbs, residents attempt to avoid political confrontation (Backrach and 
Baratz 1962,166; Lineberry and Sharkansky 1971, 34). The net effect may be 
that local bureaucracies are in actual control not only of policy implementation 
but also of policymaking. In such a situation the ADA is more likely to be im­
plemented than otherwise.
Conversely, municipalities located in rural areas are often closed socie­
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ties. Rural municipalities display an extreme degree of self-sufUciency and 
autonomy (Vidich and Bensman 1969, 27). Rural municipalities are also, for 
the most part, divorced from the information and technology diffusion that 
takes place in metropolitan areas. Cut off from the mainstream of current in­
formation and technology, these municipalities may not even be aware of the 
ADA or other federal laws or requirements. Even if aware, rural municipalities 
may resist change and intrusion by higher authority. It may therefore be con­
cluded that the location of a municipality, whether suburt)an or rural, plays a 
role in ADA implementation.
External Influences
The external environment of a municipality may also influence ADA im­
plementation. For example, the state in which a municipality is located may 
have enacted its own disability law. In the altemative, a state may have cre­
ated a strong advocacy council for the rights of the disabled. Such things as 
prevailing state culture or ideology may also influence ADA implementation. 
Knowledge on the part of local officials, existing federal court decisions and 
interest group strength also may affect ADA implementation.
Elazar (1972, 100-101) has noted the existence of three separate and 
distinct state political cultures; individualistic, moralistic and traditionalisme. In­
dividualistic cultures tend to view govemment as utilitarian, existing primarily to 
facilitate private transactions. Public officials, responding to individual prefer­
ences, tend to be less willing to initiate new programs unless they see a direct
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political payoff. Conversely, in moralistic cultures citizens view govemment in 
terms of public interest, neutrality, civil service and ethical behavior. Tradition- 
alistic cultures believe govemment exists to preserve the reigning social order 
and view it in terms of elitism, personalized service and patronage. The per­
spective that states have an over­
arching political culture is supported by the work of Sharkansky (1978, 38-45) 
and Dran, Albritton and Wyckoff (1991, 15-30). However, others, in particular 
Morgan and Watson (1991, 31-48), have found Elazar's typology to have de­
clining utility. In addition, as stated earlier, because of variations in local cul­
ture. it is difficult to utilize political culture as a variable in a study of this type.
Perhaps a better approach would be to employ the overall ideological 
orientation of the citizens of the various states. Wright. Erickson, and Mclver 
(1985, 469-489) have constructed a scale of state ideologies from the most 
conservative to the most liberal. This scale has often been used as an indica­
tor of the receptiveness of a state’s citizens to new policies and programs 
(Ringquist 1993. 328). The perspective that state ideology strongly influences 
public policy is supported by the work of Holbrook-Provow and Poe (1987, 
399-414) and, in part, by the work of Morgan (1973.209-223).
The overall ideological orientation of a state’s citizens may influence mu­
nicipal ADA implementation in a number of ways. First, ideological orientation 
sets the norm for the acceptance or rejection of new policies and programs. 
Second, it establishes the general proclivity of citizens to tax themselves to
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pay for these policies and programs. Third, ideological orientation reflects the 
opinions of a state’s citizens concerning what is or is not an intrusive federal 
policy. Thus, reasonably it would be expected that state ideology influences 
municipal ADA implementation.
A second external influence upon municipal ADA implementation may be 
the existence of a state disability law. Although the ADA is a federal law and 
provides for federal enforcement, the Act does not preclude the states from 
enacting similar non-conflicting statutes.^  ^ Likewise, states may adopt the 
ADA itself as a basis for enforcement of the rights of the disabled. In addition, 
the states are not preempted from adopting disability laws more stringent than 
the ADA.
The existence of state disability laws may affect municipal ADA imple­
mentation in several ways. First, such laws may come replete with their own 
set of sanctions for non-compliance. Second, these laws may increase the 
scrutiny brought to bear on municipal ADA compliance. Third, the existence of 
a state disability law may increase awareness of the ADA among municipali­
ties. Therefore the existence of a state disability law should influence munici­
pal ADA implementation.
A third external influence that may affect municipal ADA implementation 
is the existence of an ADA appellate court decision in the jurisdiction in which 
the municipality is located. It is a unique feature of the United States judicial 
system that many courts have concurrent jurisdictions. At first glance it would
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appear that this feature might preclude the use of court decisions as a variable 
in this studyT However, it is also a unique feature of the United States judicial 
system that federal appellate court decisions set precedent that is binding on 
lower courts unless overturned by the United States Supreme Court. The 
power of appellate courts over public policy in the United States is indisput­
able. Whereas trial courts must concern themselves with existing law, appel­
late courts are free to make new law. Glick and Vines (1973, 61) have noted 
that appellate court judges see themselves as interpreters of the law and not 
as administrators of the law. In short, appellate courts make law and trial 
courts enforce existing law. Thus, appellate courts are major actors in policy 
implementation.
There are twelve federal circuit courts of appeal in the United States. The 
ADA decisions of these courts may provide insight into municipal ADA imple­
mentation. In part, this is because different circuit courts may have different 
legal views of the ADA. Thus, where the Fifth federal Circuit Court of Appeals 
may have upheld a particular ADA requirement, the Sixth Circuit Court may 
have overturned the same requirement.
The differences between the ADA decisions of federal appellate courts 
are important since they provide a means to gauge the influence of these 
courts on municipal ADA implementation. More importantly, they help to illus­
trate a measure of the professionalism of the municipal bureaucracy. If any­
thing, bureaucracies are risk adverse. It would therefore seem that if a munici­
104
pal bureaucracy is professionally oriented, then that bureaucracy would keep 
up with leading court decisions and react accordingly. Likewise, these deci­
sions provide a measure of the professionalism of elected officials. If indeed 
the elected officials in a municipality are keeping up with current develop­
ments, they should know about the ADA legal environment. It would therefore 
seem reasonable that where municipal officials are knowledgeable about fed­
eral appellate court decisions in the jurisdiction in which their city is located, a 
higher degree of ADA implementation would be the result.
The last extemal influence upon municipal ADA implementation may be 
the existence of a strong state public interest lobby.^ Ringquist (1993, 328- 
329) utilizes the existence and strength of the environmental lobby within a 
state to help explain state air pollution standards. Likewise, Sabatier (1987, 
649-692) has noted that coalitions often form around policy issues.^ Thus, it 
may be as Goggin et al. (1990, 103) have said, "The weaker the group, the 
more important it becomes for that group to join with like minded groups in an 
alliance.” Thomas and Hrebenar (1990, 133) have remarked on the growth of 
state interest groups and, in particular, non-traditional interest groups. In fact, 
they note the existence of intermittently active advocacy groups for the physi­
cally and mentally handicapped in twenty to forty states. The perspective that 
interest groups influence public policy is further supported by Zeigler (1983, 
99) and Morehouse (1981,108-112).
However, interest group influence upon public policy is not equally dis­
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tributed between the states nor do interest groups themselves have equal in­
fluence within a given state For example, Thomas and Hrebenar (1990, 144- 
147) find that in only nine states do interest groups dominate public policy and, 
further, that the effiectiveness of specific interest groups varies from state to 
state. Thus, it would seem that where municipalities are located in states 
where public interest lobbies are effective, those municipalities would be more 
likely to implement the ADA.
Figure 2 depicts the various internal and extemal influences on municipal 
ADA implementation as discussed above.
FEDERAL AND STATE INFLUENCES
Federal Courts 
State Interest Groups 
State Ideology 
State Law
COMMUNITY INFLUENCES
Finarxaal Resources 
Location 
Size
MUNiaPAL INFLUENCES
Govemment Structure 
Unionization
ADA IMPLEMENTATION
Figure 2. Factors Influencing ADA Implementation
From the foregoing discussion, it may be concluded that the existence of
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a city manager form of govemment may favorably influence municipal ADA 
implementation. Likewise, it may be concluded that the larger the per capita 
income in a municipality, the greater the degree of that municipality’s ADA im­
plementation. A larger population, and the existence of employee unions may 
also increase a municipality's implementation rate -  population because it rep­
resents a number of other influences on implementation such as greater num­
bers of minorities and disabled citizens. The existence of employee unions 
may influence municipal ADA implementation because of greater scrutiny 
brought to bear on municipal employment policies. Likewise, the existence of 
a strong public interest lobby may bnng about greater scrutiny on municipal 
ADA implementation efforts.
The rate of municipal implementation may also be enhanced by the 
proximity of a municipality to a central city, and also if the state in which the 
municipality is located has a state law mandating rights for the disabled. Addi­
tionally, it may be that municipalities located in more liberal states will have a 
higher degree of ADA implementation. Next, where municipal officials are 
aware of a federal appellate court decision that has upheld the ADA, there 
may be higher rates of implementation.
Intervening Variablea
Before proceeding further it is important to address several intervening 
variables in this research. It is obvious that before a municipality can comply 
with the ADA, it must know what is required. However, as previously noted.
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the ADA is a confusing, complicated and vague policy. The ADA itself recog­
nizes the foregoing when it requires that public employers conduct a written 
self-evaluation of their compliance status.'^  Likewise, the Act requires that 
public employers appoint a responsible employee or group to oversee its im­
plementation.^
Although the ADA does not require that public employers permanently 
retain their self-evaluation or turn it into a plan of action, it does require that all 
deficiencies found as a result of the evaluation be corrected. It would seem 
reasonable, therefore, that after having gone to the time, trouble, and expense 
of conducting an evaluation, a municipality would retain it and utilize it as a 
guide to ADA implementation. In such a case it may be expected that a mu­
nicipality would have a higher degree of ADA implementation than otherwise.
The existence of an employee or group specifically charged with ADA 
implementation may also affect municipal ADA implementation. For example, 
it would be expected that such an employee or group would serve to increase 
public and organizational awareness of ADA requirements. Also, this em­
ployee or group would logically act as a lobby for funding for ADA implemen­
tation. Lastly, an ADA specialist within municipal govemment would be ex­
pected to keep up with existing ADA related legal decisions and cases. If so, it 
is reasonable that these specialists would make their superiors aware of these 
decisions and cases and the municipality's legal liability.
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The complication brought to this research by these additional considera­
tions arises from several issues. First, strictly speaking, the existence of an 
ADA self-evaluation, coordinator, or plan may be counted as either an internal 
or extemal influence on ADA implementation. As stated above the ADA man­
dates that public employers conduct an ADA self-evaluation and appoint a 
person or entity to oversee its implementation. Thus, the impetus for these in­
fluences on the Act's implementation is extemal. However, the ADA does not 
mandate that public employers translate a self-evaluation into an implementa­
tion plan. This influence on ADA implementation is intemal.
Likewise, the ADA mandates that public employers name someone or 
some group to be responsible for its implementation. This influence is extemal; 
however, if it occurs, the influence becomes internal. It is therefore a judgment 
call as to where these influences on ADA implementation should be ac­
counted. Rather than overly complicate this study by attempting to justify one 
or the other, these influences have been placed in a separate category. The 
second issue to consider is that while accounted for in the survey instrument, 
the importance of these influences was discovered during the course of the 
research as is so often the case. When the research design for this project 
was developed, the author assumed that the vast majority of municipalities 
would have met the basic threshold requirements of the ADA. The survey 
questions relating to self-evaluation, implementation planning and ADA coor­
dinator were expected to reveal that only a handful of municipalities were non-
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compliant in these requirements. However, as the first group of completed 
surveys was received, it became apparent that many municipalities may not 
be in compliance with even the most basic ADA requirements. Thus, these in­
fluences on ADA implementation were added to the research as intervening 
variables. Therefore, although they were later statistically treated as internal 
variables, they are added here and discussed as intervening variables.
Thus, it will be hypothesized that:
where a municipal political system has a city manager form of govern­
ment, that municipality will also have a higher degree of ADA implemen­
tation.
the greater the per capita income of the residents of a municipality, the 
greater the degree of ADA implementation.
H* the larger the population of a municipality, the greater degree of ADA im­
plementation.
H* where the employees of a municipal government are represented by one 
or more unions, that municipality will have a higher degree of ADA im­
plementation.
H* suburban municipalities will have a higher degree of ADA implementation 
than will rural municipalities.
H* municipalities that have conducted an ADA self-evaluation will have 
a greater degree of ADA implementation.
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municipalities that have an designated ADA coordinator or oversight 
committee will have a higher degree of ADA implementation.
H* municipalities that have an ADA implementation plan containing time 
frames for completion will have a higher degree of ADA implementation. 
H* the more liberal the state in which a municipality is located, the greater 
the degree of ADA implementation.
municipalities located in a state having a state disability law will have a 
greater degree of ADA implementation.
H" a greater degree of ADA implementation will occur where municipal offi­
cials are aware of federal appellate court decisions regarding the ADA.. 
municipalities located in states having stronger public interest lobbies 
will also have a greater degree of ADA implementation.
Operationalization. Data Set and Methodology
In the previous section twelve hypotheses were offered concerning the 
effects of certain forces on municipal ADA implementation. These hypotheses 
must now be operationalized into independent variables for measurement and 
testing.
The dependent variable in this study is the degree of ADA compliance 
exhibited by a municipality. This variable is called Compliance and is meas­
ured by the percent of ADA implementation reached by a municipality in the 
following areas;
1. modification of existing and new facilities;
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2 modification of personnel policies and employment practices;
3. reasonable accommodation policies for existing and prospective em­
ployees; and,
4. modification of employee benefit plans to eliminate discriminatory 
practices in health care and vacation and sick leave policies.
The foregoing approach allows for greater specificity and thus a better 
measure of ADA compliance. For example, each variable will be coded as the 
actual percentage of compliance reached in each of the foregoing ADA com­
ponents by a municipality as reported by that municipality. Thus, each compo­
nent comprises 25 percent of overall compliance. In any given municipality, it 
will be possible to determine not only the overall percentage of ADA compli­
ance achieved but also the percentage of compliance in each required com­
ponent of the ADA. If a municipality reports 100 percent compliance in the 
modification of its facilities, but only 50 percent in the other three components 
of the ADA, it has achieved an overall compliance percentage of 62.5. In other 
words, the municipality has achieved 100 percent of 25 percent in the facilities 
modification component but only 50 percent of 25 percent in each of the other 
three components.”
Internal Variables
Hypothesis one stated that where a municipality has a city manager form 
of government, there will be a greater degree of ADA implementation. The in­
dependent variable drawn from hypothesis one is called Manager. Manager
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will be coded in a one/zero fashion; one where a municipality has a city man­
ager form of government and zero otherwise.
Hypothesis two submitted that the greater the per capita income of the 
residents of a municipality, the greater the degree of ADA implementation. 
This variable is called PerCaoita and will be coded as the actual per capita 
income of the municipality's residents as reported by the United States Bureau 
of the Census for 1990.
Hypothesis three stated that the greater the population of a municipality 
the greater the degree of ADA implementation. This variable is called Popula­
tion and will be coded as the actual population of a municipality as reported by 
the census bureau for 1990.
The fourth hypothesis stated that the existence of one or more labor un­
ions within a municipal government would lead to a greater degree of ADA im­
plementation. This variable will be called Union and will be coded in a 
one/zero fashion; one where the employees of a municipality are represented 
by one or more labor unions and zero otherwise.
The fifth hypothesis was that subuitan municipalities will display a 
greater degree of ADA implementation. The variable drawn from this hypothe­
sis will be called Suburb and it too will be coded in a one/zero fashion; one 
where a municipality is a suburb of a larger city and zero otherwise.
According to hypothesis six, municipalities that have conducted an ADA 
self-evaluation will also have a greater degree of ADA implementation. This
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variable is called Self Evaluation and will be coded in a one/zero fashion; one 
where a municipality has conducted a self-evaluation and zero otherwise.
Hypothesis seven stated that where a municipality has designated an 
employee as ADA coordinator, or has established an ADA oversight commit­
tee, ADA implementation will be greater This variable is called ADA Coordi­
nator and is also coded in a one/zero fashion; one where a municipality has 
appointed a coordinator or oversight committee and otherwise zero
According to hypothesis eight, municipalities that have an ADA imple­
mentation plan with time frames for completion will also have a greater degree 
of ADA implementation. This variable is called Time Frame and will be coded 
in a one/zero fashion; one where a municipality has an ADA implementation 
plan with time frames for completion, and otherwise zero.
External Variable»
The ninth hypothesis allowed that the greater the degree of liberal 
ideology within the state where a municipality is located, the greater the de­
gree of ADA implementation. The variable taken from this hypothesis is called 
Liberal. Liberal will be coded following the liberal/conservative ranking of the 
state in which a municipality is located according to Wright. Erickson, and Mcl- 
ver (1985, 469-489). The approach taken will be to scale Wright et al.'s typol­
ogy from one to five; where one is the most conservative and five the most lib­
eral.^ ®®
According to the tenth hypothesis, the existence of a state disability
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law will lead to a greater degree of municipal ADA implementation. The inde­
pendent variable drawn from hypothesis seven is called State Law. It will be 
coded in a zero/one/two fashion; zero where the municipal official does not 
know if a state disability law exists, one where there is no state disability law, 
and two where the state in which a municipality is located has enacted legisla­
tion protecting the rights of the disabled.
The eleventh hypothesis stated that a greater degree of ADA implemen­
tation will occur where municipal officials are aware of federal appellate court 
decisions concerning the ADA. The variable for this hypothesis will be called 
Court Decision. It will also be coded in a zero/one/two fashion; zero where 
municipal officials do not know if an appellate court decision exists in their ju­
risdiction, one where no federal appellate court decision exists, and two where 
the municipal official reports that there is an applicable appellate court deci­
sion.
Hypothesis twelve provided that where a municipality is located in a state 
having a strong public interest lobby, the municipality will have a greater de­
gree of ADA implementation. The variable synthesized for this hypothesis is 
called Inter—t Group. It will be coded in a one/zero fashion, one where a 
state has influential public interest lobbies active in the state and zero other­
wise. The state typology will be based on the research of Thomas and Hre- 
benar (1990, 560-567).
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The data set for this research comes from a number of sources. A survey 
Instrument was mailed to 300 small and medium-sized municipalities randomly 
selected from among each of the four regions of the United States. (See Ap­
pendix A for a copy of the survey Instrument).'"^ The total number of re­
sponses to the survey was 135. These cities form the sample population for 
the research. Randomization was accomplished by the use of a random num­
ber generator, and the regionalization of observations was done to ensure 
Ideological and cultural diversity In the data set.
The surveys were sent to the chief executive officer of each city selected. 
The surveys were completed by these officials or under their direction by other 
staff members such as the human resource director, risk manager, or ADA 
coordinator. Where necessary, a second-request mailing occurred approxi­
mately three weeks after the first. The survey was conducted during early 
2000. The survey Instrument was constructed to elicit both quantitative and 
qualitative Information from the respondents.
Additional data were obtained from International City/County Manage­
ment Association Municipal Yeartooks, the census bureau's Statistical Ab- 
stracts, and reports and data from the National Public Employer’s Labor Rela­
tions Association and the EEOC. Other data sources Included United States 
Conference of Mayors reports, and data derived from Thomas and Hrebenar 
(1990) and Wright, Erickson and Mclver (1985).
116
Methodology
Because the dependent variable for this research is continuous and be­
cause there are twelve independent variables, multiple regression is the 
analysis technique of choice. Although some may argue against the inclusion 
of dichotomous variables among the interval level independent variables, di­
chotomies will be treated as interval level data for this research (Demetrius 
1992, 80).^ ”
Speaking methodologically, there are several different ways to evaluate 
the success or failure of policy implementation. In the component evaluation 
approach, the focus is on the various operational components of the policy 
under consideration. This approach shifts the unit of analysis from the program 
to its parts which contributes to greater generalizability. The treatment specifi­
cation approach identifies and measures a policy or program effect. In other 
words, is the policy or program having the desired impact on its intended tar­
get? Process evaluation seeks to determine an explanation for a policy’s suc­
cess or failure. Conversely, effort evaluation considers the "quantity and qual­
ity" of activity (Patton 1986, 138-142). It is axiomatic that the approach one 
uses depends on what one seeks to find. This research utilizes a combined 
component and effort approach to ADA implementation.
117
CHAPTER 5 
ANALYZING THE INFLUENCES SHAPING 
MUNICIPAL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ADA
Before proceeding it is important to restate the research question for this 
study. Additionally, a brief recap of the theoretical perspective may be of aid to 
the reader. This research seeks to analyze the various forces and conditions 
that influence the implementation of unfunded policy mandates in small and 
medium-sized municipalities. It argues that the influences on implementation 
may be found in the internal and external environment of these cities. The re­
search focuses on the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990. The research 
takes the theoretical perspective that these municipalities engage in incre- 
mental/tx)undedly rational implementation behavior.
As noted in the previous chapter this research was intended to be both a 
qualitative and quantitative measurement of ADA implementation. Thus, the 
survey instrument used was designed to solicit a number of qualitative and 
quantitative answers from respondents. The qualitative and quantitative 
analysis that follows is synthesized from the survey instrument.
Qualitative Finding»
Quaiitatively the results indicate that a great deal of confusion still exists 
concerning the implementation of the ADA. For example, the ADA requires 
that employers modify existing benefits plans and health insurance coverage
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for future and current employers. Yet, the survey results demonstrate that 
many municipal employers are either unaware of this requirement or have not 
queried their insurance carrier to determine if the requirement has been met. 
In fact, more than a few municipalities that claimed 100 percent implementa­
tion of the ADA also reported that the benefit/insurance component did not 
apply to them. Some reported low compliance with the insurance requirement, 
punctuated with several question marks. One employer responded with the 
question, "Is this required under the ADA?*^^ Another respondent who 
claimed high compliance with the ADA insurance requirement also stated that 
they (the city) "did not know what is required."
Further, some respondents noted that employee t>enefit plans were "ad­
justed on a case by case basis as the need rises." One respondent cited the 
employment policies component of the ADA as a rationale for not revamping 
their benefit plan. Thus, because ADA’s policy component limits the types of 
questions that an employer may ask a job applicant concerning disabilities. It 
may be assumed that this municipality is taking the "don’t ask, don’t tell, no 
problem" approach favored by the Clinton administration concerning gays in 
the military. However, the ADA is quite clear in this regard: you can’t ask but 
you must ensure that your benefit plans do not discriminate against the dis­
abled.
Likewise, the employment policies component of the ADA is confusing to 
many municipal employers. One respondent noted that "I thought we were
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okay until [I answered] the previous question [on the survey]."'** Others re­
ported that they were in compliance tiecause they determined the essential 
functions of a given job on a case-by-case basis as needed. However, the 
ADA requires the formal adoption of a written reasonable accommodation 
policy.'®^
Several respondents took the author to task for even suggesting that a 
component of the ADA requires employers to modify the types of questions 
they can ask of job applicants.'®* Several also indicated that no modification to 
personnel practices was needed since they already complied with the ADA, 
and they did not need a written policy since the ADA was a federal law Others 
pointed out that they had an informal administrative policy concerning ADA- 
required personnel modifications.'®® One respondent may have eloquently 
summed up the feelings of many municipalities concerning this ADA compo­
nent by responding "required [but] don’t do.”
Conversely, some municipalities seem to have few problems with the 
employment policies requirement of the ADA. For example, one respondent 
simply stated, "it was part of the hiring process.” Another said that "Employ­
ment practices are fine; we are having difficulties funding changes that are fast 
enough for the public. We need an external complaint procedure.” "Most, not 
all” was the response of one municipal official when answering the question. 
"Has your city checked the job descriptions for city positions to identify the es­
sential functions of the jobs?” However, while perhaps providing a good ftiith
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effort legal defense for non-compliance, "most" or even "close” does not pro­
tect a municipality from litigation. This is substantiated by the experience of 
another city. This responding city stated, "We have developed an internal 
system to evaluate specific jobs and their essential functions on a case by 
case basis. We have made reasonable accommodations. Lawsuits pending!" 
One municipality that may soon find itself in a similar situation poetically said, 
"as needed, policies and procedures are completed."
In the area of facilities and infrastructure modification, municipal employ­
ers seem much less confused.'M any municipalities indicated that a local 
commission or committee had been appointed to oversee the facility modifica­
tions required by the ADA. Several respondents pointed to some triggering 
event that gave impetus to facility modification compliance. One municipality 
stated that not much had been done until a quadriplegic mayor was elected 
Another pointed to a police officer that was wheelchair bound because of a 
wound received in the line of duty. Several respondents noted that they had 
been sued over facility modification, thereby bringing this component of the 
ADA to the forefront of community and governmental action.
Several respondents reported that they had just been audited by the U.S. 
Department of Justice for compliance with this ADA component, and that re­
sults were pending. Another dty reported that the municipality had contracted 
with a private vendor to assess facilities modification needs, appointed a board 
of citizens to oversee implementation, and was spending $450,000 per year
121
on modifications. Despite these efforts, facility modifications were still only 60 
percent complete.
Further evidence of the costliness of this ADA component may be found 
in the response of one municipality that said, ‘We are currently spending 
$200-300,000 per year to bring public facilities into compliance. Recently, 
sidewalks and traffic control devices. . .  have become an issue with significant 
$$ implications.’
While much of the foregoing places ADA facility modification require­
ments in a negative light, some cities report little or no problems with this as­
pect of the ADA. For example, one municipality reported that ‘Satisfying the 
requirements of the ADA has helped others that may not be covered under the 
Act, primarily elderly citizens.” Another said that, “Due to the number of elderly 
and disabled within our city, we have taken the ADA very seriously. We have 
spent a great deal of time and effort to see that this city is in compliance and 
even won a historic lawsuit against a bankruptcy court to force compliance.. .* 
Finally, is the respondent who elegantly stated his city's position: ‘Though we 
are quite tardy meeting the deadline for physical improvements, we have had 
little controversy, few challenges, and no lawsuits.. .‘
Although many respondents seemed displeased with the effect of the 
ADA on their municipal operations, most mentioned that unfunded mandates 
in general are their primary concern. One respondent noted that, ‘Financially, 
this and the many other state and federal mandates are nearly impossible for
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us to meet. . . ” Another complained that "These unfunded mandates seem to 
be a trend as federal and state governments are restructuring other programs 
down to the community level.” Conversely, some municipalities seem to have 
welcomed the ADA with open arms. Representing these cities is the respon­
dent who proclaimed. "Overall, our experience with ADA implementation has 
been very positive. It has complimented our city-wide diversity efforts."
In general, the qualitative findings of this research present a mixed view 
of municipal ADA implementation. It appears that municipal employers are 
most confused over the ADA's benefit plan/insurance component and its pre­
employment and post-employment personnel components. It also appears 
that these employers are much less confused concerning the ADA facilities 
modification and reasonable accommodation components than they are the 
other two.
Confirmation that many municipal officials have little knowledge and are 
confused atx>ut how to go about implementation of the ADA may be found in 
the fact that of the 135 respondents to the survey, 51 percent reported that 
they did not know whether there had been an appellate court decision up­
holding the ADA in their jurisdiction. Further, 18 percent did not even know if 
their state had enacted a disability law. Although in itself an important finding, 
of greater import is the fact that oftentimes different municipalities located in 
the same state and appellate Jurisdiction contradicted each other when re­
sponding to these questions. Thus, in the same state and appellate court ju­
123
risdiction, different municipalities responded "yes," "no," or "don't know" to the 
same questions. If municipal officials are not relying on important fectual in­
formation as this finding suggests, then they must be relying on something 
else to key their ADA decision-making. This would definitely indicate that some 
form of simplification of ADA decision-making behavior is being utilized.
The confusion among municipalities over the ADA’s requirements ap­
pears to be mitigated by a number of influences. Familiarity and compliance 
with the ADA seems to be greatest among those municipalities that have met 
the ADA requirement of designating a responsible official or officials to over­
see its implementation. Likewise, where municipalities reported that they had 
complied with the Act’s requirement of conducting a self-evaluation of their 
ADA implementation status, greater familiarity and compliance seems to exist. 
It should be noted, however, that only a handful of these municipalities have 
turned their evaluation into a plan for timely ADA implementation.
The population size of municipalities also seems to mitigate confusion 
concerning the ADA. In general, the qualitative results support the view that 
cities having larger populations also demonstrate a larger degree of ADA fa­
miliarity and compliance. Perhaps this is due to the existence of greater re­
sources available in larger cities including the potential greater availability of 
experienced staff people. Whatever the reason, the larger the dty, the less the 
confusion over the ADA’s requirements, and the higher the degree of compli­
ance.
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All In all. the qualitative findings In this research present a mixed view of 
municipal ADA implementation. Some have embraced the ADA wholeheart­
edly while others seem to be doing only what is necessary to avoid litigation or 
sanctions by the national government. To many municipal officials the ADA 
seems to be just another onerous federal mandate, and to others a long over­
due stepping stone to inclusion and diversity.
While the qualitative findings of this research are not entirely pleasing, 
they do tend to support what has been theorized herein. Municipal decision­
makers do seem to take an Incremental approach to ADA Implementation. The 
most visible component of the ADA, facility modification, ranks highest re­
garding both awareness and compliance. Conversely, the least visible compo­
nent, benefit plan modification, ranks lowest. Pre-employment and post­
employment personnel practices are sandwiched between the other two.
Likewise, the results provide some support that municipal officials en­
gage In boundedly rational Incremental decision-making. Overall, ADA aware­
ness and compliance Is greatest where a municipality has a specific official 
charged with Its Implementation. Similarly, the existence of a self-evaluation 
seems to positively affect ADA awareness and compliance effort by municipal 
officials.
Of those respondents who voluntarily reported their positions within a 
municipality. It appears that city managers are concerned with the facility 
modification component of the ADA. Building officials shared this concern.
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Conversely, personnel officers seem to regard the employment policy compo­
nent as the top priority/"
Thus, it appears at least from a qualitative standpoint that the utilization 
of cue-fact theory as a theoretical basis for operationalizing incrementalism 
and bounded rationality has been justified.
Of course, the foregoing discussion does not exhaust the potential ex­
planations for municipal ADA implementation behavior. It does, however, re­
veal that many different, competing and conflicting influences on ADA imple­
mentation seem to be present among municipalities. In sum, it appears the 
ADA is indeed a confusing and complex public policy and that municipal offi­
cials have reacted accordingly. In fact, it may be as one respondent stated, 
"It is impossible to place your city in a position, with regards to ADA compli­
ance, where you are not vulnerable to legal action if they are really interested 
in filing against you. The law is so comprehensive that you can never do 
enough.”
Quantitative Finding»
As previously noted ADA compliance is required in four basic areas. 
Municipalities must modify existing facilities and construct new facilities to be 
accessible to disabled persons. They must also implement a reasonable ac­
commodation policy, modify insurance and other employee benefits, and 
adopt non-discriminatory employment policies. In this study each of these ADA 
components are counted as 25 percent of total ADA compliance. The calcula­
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tions below are based on the self-reported compliance percentages of respon­
dent municipalities.
The view that municipalities are confused about ADA requirements is 
supported by an analysis of the data taken from the survey. For example, re­
spondent municipalities ranged from a high of 100 percent compliance effort to 
a low of 27.5 percent. While twelve municipalities reported full compliance, 
sixteen reported compliance levels at 50 percent or less. The mean for all mu­
nicipalities in the area of compliance effort was 78.5 percent. Thus, the data 
also tend to support the view that small and medium-sized municipalities are 
taking an incremental approach to ADA implementation.
Concerning the four ADA components that comprise compliance effort, 
the data show that the fourth component, modification of employee benefit 
plans lags behind the other three components. Twenty-seven respondents (or 
20 percent of the total) reported zero compliance In the area of insurance 
benefits modification. Conversely, fifty-nine others (or 43.7 percent of the total) 
reported full compliance in this area. Twelve municipalities reported a compli­
ance rate of 1 percent to 50 percent in the area of benefit plan modification; 
the other respondents reported compliance levels at between 51 percent and 
99 percent. Thus, the data support the qualitative findings that the benefit 
modification component of the ADA is troubling to many municipalities.
The data also indicate that the facilities modification component of the 
ADA may be problematic for some municipal employers. Only twenty-eight
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municipalities (20.7 percent) reported full compliance wtiile sixteen reported a 
compliance rate of 50 percent or less. Of the sixteen reporting less than 50 
percent compliance, one municipality reported zero compliance in this area, 
one municipality reported that facility modification compliance was only at 5 
percent. Two other municipalities reported compliance rates of 20 percent or 
less. These figures are somewhat surprising since the facilities component is 
undout>tedly the most visible of the four components and also since this com­
ponent of the ADA was based on the Architectural Barriers Act which was in 
place twenty-two years before the ADA was enacted into law.
These figures are also counter-indicative of the qualitative findings in 
this research. The fact that only 20 percent of municipalities are in full compli­
ance in this area may be due to the great expense of modifying existing infra­
structures or due to some other reason. Yet the finding that after almost ten 
years, the most visible and widely known ADA requirement remains mostly 
unimplemented is puzzling However, the finding does suggest incremental 
behavior on the part of many respondents.
The next component, employment policy modification, shows mixed im­
plementation results according to survey respondents. Although fifty-four mu­
nicipalities (40 percent) daim to have reached full compliance, the other re­
spondents reported compliance levels at a low of 0 percent to a high of 99 
percent. Only 12 cities reported a compliance rate of 50 percent or less. This 
finding is also puzzling since the policy modification component is, without
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doubt, the least expensive and least complicated of the four requirements. It 
is also one of the ADA’s most visible requirements. Supportive of incremen­
talism, the data in the policy modification area also suggest boundedly rational 
behavior on the part of the majority of respondents. It appears that many mu­
nicipal officials ding to those polides that have previously been enacted.
According to the survey, municipalities are doing a relatively good job in 
meeting the reasonable accommodation policy component of the ADA. Of the 
respondent dties, eighty-six or 63.7 percent reported full compliance but 
twelve (8.9 percent) have taken no steps to implement this requirement. Al­
though this is a relatively small number, it is also important because reason­
able accommodation is also fairly easy to implement, and is not costly.
Table 3 synthesizes the information concerning compliance.
TABLES 
COMPUANCE BY NUMBER OF CITIES AND 
PERCENT OF TOTAL BY ADA COMPONENTS
0% 1-25% 26-60% 51-75% 76-99% 100%
No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % No. %
Facilities 1 .7 4 3.0 11 8.1 20 14.8 71 52.6 28 20.7*
Policies 1 7 4 3.0 7 5.2 17 12.6 52 38.5 54 40.0
Accommodations 12 8.9 2 1.5 11 8.1 21 15.6 3 2.2 86 63.7
Benefit Plans 27 20.0 5 3.7 7 5.2 6 4.4 31 3.0 59 43.7
Total Comoliance 0 0.0 0 0.0 16 11.9 40 29.6 67 49.6 12 8.9
*  numbers do not equal 100% due to rounding.
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In summary, the analysis of the data obtained from the survey provides 
mixed support for what has been theorized herein. Widespread evidence in 
support of incrementalism has been found; however, there exists less support 
for bounded rationality. Evidence that municipalities are engaging in incre­
mentalism concerning ADA implementation may be found in the disparity be­
tween the compliance rates among the four components of the ADA Likewise, 
the gap between overall compliance rates is indicative of incremental behav­
ior. Further, the qualitative data show that municipal organizations are taking a 
piecemeal approach to ADA implementation. The fact that less support has 
been found for bounded rationality is not overly troubling at this point. The 
qualitative findings provide some support for this theoretical approach. The 
only support provided by the quantitative findings, however, is that municipal 
organizations are selecting some components over others for implementation
Statistical Analysis of the Data
Before proceeding with the presentation of the statistical analysis of the 
model developed in this research, it is important to touch on several related is­
sues. First, although the response rate for the sunrey is 45 percent, the sam­
ple population should be large enough to represent municipal ADA efforts na­
tionwide. While it is axiomatic that the larger the sample, the more confidence 
one can have in the results of the model, it is also true that regression tech­
nique works well with a relatively small sample population.
Second, it should be understood that this research is exploratory in na­
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ture. A study of ADA implementation of this type, and at this level of analysis, 
has not previously been attempted. Thus, this undertaking should be consid­
ered as a first step toward explaining and predicting ADA implementation.
Third, it is important to understand that from the virtually countless vari­
ables that may affect ADA implementation, a mere handful have been selected 
for use in this study. This fact, in conjunction with the foregoing, should place 
the reader on notice that the model constructed herein represents an "edu­
cated, best-guess scenario” of ADA implementation.
Of course, this is not to say that only the variables included in the final 
model were investigated. It is to say that in regression analysis an inherent 
trade-off exists between the number of variables utilized in a model and par­
simony. In short, the larger the number of variables vis-à-vis the number of the 
sample population, the better the model generally performs.''^  In part be­
cause of the exploratory nature of this study, and in part because of the rela­
tively low sample population for the study, parsimony has been chosen to be 
of greater importance than model performance. Although the original model 
contained twelve independent variables, the final model consists of only 
seven.
Table 4 depicts the descriptive statistics for all variables contained in 
the original model. As the reader will note, the predictor variables Per Capita 
Income and Population were logged because the values for their measures
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showed heteroscedasticity. The logarithmic transformation was base 10 (Ren­
ner 1988,154-155; Fox 1991; Berry and Feldman 1976, 73-89).
Table 4
Deacrlptlve Statistics: All Variables
Mean Std. Deviation N
Compliance 78.53 19.63 135
Manager .75 .44 135
Union 75 .44 135
Self evaluation 90 .30 135
ADA Coordinator 58 .50 135
intereat Groupe .31 .46 135
PerCapltaiog 4.14 .13 135
PopulatkmloQ 4.56 .27 135
Suburb 41 .49 135
State Law 1.58 .79 135
Timeframe .61 51 135
Court Decision .72 .83 135
Libérai 3.21 1.36 135
The correlation matrix for all hypothesized variables is shown in Table 
5. As the Table depicts, the relationship between the dependent variable, 
Compliance, and Union is weak and not in the predicted direction. Likewise, 
the variables State Law and Liberal have a weak relationship with compliance 
as does Court Decision. Court Decision and Liberal are also not in the pre­
dicted direction. Of the remaining variables, ADA Coordinator, Timeframe, 
Population, and Self-evaluation show the strongest relationships to Compli­
ance. The relationship between the dependent variable and Manager, Interest 
Groups, Per Capita Income, and Suburb, while not strong, are all in the pre­
dicted direction. Of these. Interest Groups shows the strongest relationship to 
Compliance and Per Capita income the weakest.
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TABLE 5. Pearson Conslation: All Variables
Comp Mooopor Union OoNEvol AOACoof MOps PwCap Popu Oubufto 01 Uw Tim# CtDae UM
Comp 1.000 0.120 4.000 0.270 0.473 0.217 0.109 0.370 0.143 0.040 0.299 •0.030 •0.003
Somogof 0.120 1.000 •0.140 •0.074 0.120 •0.120 0.052 •0.033 •0.070 •0.030 0.022 •0.074 •0.037
URtaM •0.0M •0.140 1.000 •0.074 0.097 0.000 0.227 0.142 0.004 0.101 0.090 •0.012 0.291
M omI 0.270 •0.074 •0.074 1.000 0.229 •0.002 •0.120 0.091 0.000 •0.040 0.394 0.071 0.200
ASACoOf 0.473 0.120 0.057 0.229 1.000 0.009 •0.092 0.217 •0.004 0.000 0.227 •0.000 0.034
MOpo 0.217 •0.120 0.000 •0.002 0.009 1.000 0.093 0.149 0.002 0.100 •0.010 0.000 •0.192
MiCap 0.109 0.002 0.227 4.120 4.002 0.093 1.000 0.084 0.002 4.002 0.120 0.093 0.022
a#pu 0.370 •0.033 0.142 0.091 0.217 0.149 0.084 1.000 0.179 4.002 0.100 4.002 4.024
OufenrO 0.143 •0.070 0.004 0.000 4.054 0.002 0.002 0.179 1.000 0.004 0.070 0.100 0.019
atum 0.040 •0.030 0.101 4.040 0.000 0.100 4.092 4.002 0.004 1.000 0.030 0.103 0.101
Tim# 0.299 0.022 0.000 0.394 0.227 4.010 0.120 0.100 0.070 0.030 1.000 0.001 0.321
CIO## •0.030 •0.074 4.012 0.071 4.000 0.000 0.093 4.002 0.100 0.103 0.001 1.000 0.044
UM •0A03 4437 0391 0300 0434 4.192 0422 4424 0419 0.101 0321 0444 1.000
TABLES
 Implementation of The ADA: All Original Variables
Reoreeelon Coefficlenta 
Variables Unstandardized Standardized T Ratio
(Constant) -86.671 -1.462
Manager 4.101 0.091 1.245
Union -5.364 -0.119 -1.565
Suburb 2.705 0.066 0.606
State Law 1.234 0.049 0.674
Self Evaluation 8.565 0.129 1.566
Timeframe 4.449 0.114 1.446
ADA Coordinator 13.759 0.347 4.569 ***
Court Dedsion -0.656 -0.036 -0.496
Interest Groups 7.163 0.170 2.307 **
PerCapitalog 16.064 0.111 1.260
Populationlog 17.496 0.246 3.273 •**
Liberal -1.106 -0.076 0.961
N=135 R= 640 R:=.410 Adjusted R^  = .352
Dependent = Compliance *p<.10 *• p< .05 p< .01
Table 6 is a regression analysis with the twelve variables contained in 
the original model. The original model had an R Square of .410 and an ad­
justed R Square of .352. The analysis showed that Court Decision, Liberal, 
Timeframe, State Law, and Suburb were insignificant. Thus, these variables 
were eliminated from the model.
Although the variables Manager, Union, Self-Evaluation and PerCapita 
were also found to be insignificant, they were nevertheless retained in the final 
model on theoretical grounds. For example, if, as many sctiolars argue, cities 
that have the dty manager form of government are more innovative than
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mayoral cities, that assumption should be tested In the analysis. Conversely, 
If dty managers are more attuned to their long-term careers as other scholars 
have argued, evidence should be found that managers concentrate on the 
visible components of the ADA and neglect the less visible components. Like­
wise, If unions are Indeed tracking the benefits of their members, this might be 
demonstrated in the analysis of the individual ADA components.
Table 7 depicts the results of the regression analysis for the selected 
model variables, Manager, Union, Self-Evaluation, ADA Coordinator, Interest 
Group, Per Capita Income, and Population with the dependent variable. Com­
pliance. As may be readily discerned, the model did not suffer greatly from 
removal of insignificant variables. In fact, the Adjusted R Square is actually 
slightly better than in the original model. Thus the parsimonious approach to 
modeling taken In this study appears to be justified.
The results of the regression analysis show that of the seven independ­
ent variables, population and ADA Coordinator are the most significant pre­
dictors of ADA Compliance. Table 7 also shows that Self-Evaluation and Inter­
est Groups are significant predictors of Compliance followed by Per Capita In­
come and Unions. It Is Interesting to note that although Union Is significant at 
the .10 level. It has a negative relationship with Compliance. Thus, the per­
spective that the existence of unions in a municipality leads to greater compli­
ance may be unjustified.
Table 7 also offers some evidence for the career-goal orientation ap-
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TABLE 7
Implementation of the ADA: Model Variables
Reoieeelon Coefflciente 
Unstandardized Standardized t Ratio
(Constant) -100.894 -0.234
Manager 4.123 0.091 1.265
Union -5.884 -0.131 -1.786*
Self Evaluation 12.263 0.185 2.548***
ADA Coordinator 14.327 0.362 4.862 ***
Interest Groups 6.806 0.161 2.254 **
PerCapitalog 19.906 0.137 1.894*
Populationlog 18.975 0.267 3.673 ***
N = 135 R = .624 R^= .390 Adjusted R^  = .356
Dependent = Compliance • p < .10 ** p< .05 p< .01
preach to assessing the role of city managers in policy implementation. The 
existence of a city manager in a municipality does not seem to be a factor in 
overall ADA compliance.
In regard to the model as a whole, it performed reasonably well for a first 
attempt at explaining municipal ADA implementation. The R Square for the 
model is a moderate, but respectable, .390. Thus with 135 cases and only 
seven predictive variables, the model explains about 39 percent of municipal 
compliance effort. The Adjusted R Square of .356 shows that the model does 
not suffer greatly when the number of predictor variables is accounted for 
However, although somewhat pleasing, the model as a whole fails to reach 
expectations. While two of the seven variables are significant at the .iOlevel,
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one at .05, and three at the 01 level, the negative relationship t)etween Un­
ions and Compliance, and the insignificance of Manager is troublesome.
In an effort to refine what the depicted results actually mean, a regression 
analysis of each of the four separate components of the ADA was conducted. 
The results of the influence of these variables on facilities modification is de­
picted in Table 8.
Table 8
Implementation of the ADA: Facility Modification 
Regression Coefficients
Unstandardized Standardized t Ratio
(Constant) -9.113 -0.550
Manager 2.444 0.186 2.160 "
Union 2.127 0.002 0.002
Self Evaluation 2.493 0.129 1.490
ADA Coordinator 1.645 0.142 1.608
Interest Groups 1.493 0.121 1.424
PerCapitalog 2.310 0.055 0.633
Populationlog 3.068 0.148 1.711 *
N = 135 R = 368 R^M36 Adjusted R^= .088
Dependent = Facility Modification *p < .10 **p< .05 ***p< 01
The facilities modification model shows an R Square of .136, and an Ad­
justed R Square of .088. From Table 8 it can be deduced that the strongest in­
fluence on facility modification is the existence of a city manager form of gov­
ernment in a municipality, followed by population size. This finding is some­
what surprising since dty managers did not fare well in the primary model. 
However, it does tend to support the view that dty managers concentrate their
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ADA implementation efforts on the ADA’s most visible requirements. Perhaps 
this is because of the career-goal orientation held by many managers, or per­
haps for some other reason. In any event, it is an interesting finding.
TABLE 9
Implementation of the ADA: Employment Policy Modification
Regression Coefficients 
Unstandardized Standardized t Ratio
(Constant) -19.362 -0.311
Manager 1.958 0.157 1.941 *
Union -0.808 -0.065 -0.792
Self Evaluation 4.601 0.251 3.083 ***
ADA Coordinator 2.023 0.185 2.217 •*
Interest Groups 1.509 0.129 1.614
PerCapitalog 4.049 0.101 1.245
Populationlog 3.768 0.192 2.356**
N = 135 R = .483 R2 =.234 Adiusted = .191
Dependerrt = Employment Policy Modification *p <  .10 **p< .05 “ •p<01
Table 9 depicts the results of a regression analysis of employment policy 
modification as part of compliance. Table 9 demonstrates that the model 
explained some 23 percent of policy modification compliance with an ad­
justed R Square of .191. Of the variables, Self-Evaluation of ADA compliance 
status by municipalities is significant at the .01 level followed by Population 
and ADA Coordinator at .05, and Manager at the .10 level. Again, the signifi­
cance of Manager concerning the implementation of the ADA’s second most 
visible component tends to confirm the career-path orientation explanation of
138
the policy behavior of these officials.
TABLE 10
Implementation off the ADA: Accommodation Policies
Rearession Coefficient*
Unstandardized Standardized t Ratio
(Constant) 2.073 0.090
Manager 0.819 0.043 0.518
Union -1.533 0.103 0.960
Self Evaluation 2.867 0.102 1.227
ADA Coordinator 4.361 0.263 3.054 ***
Interest Groups 3.110 0.176 2.125**
PerCapitalog -1.727 -0.028 -0.339
Populationlog 4.233 0.142 1.691 *
N=135 R = 425 R: := 181 Adjusted R  ^= -.136
Dependent = Accommodation Policies * p < . 10 •* p< .06 “ • p< .01
The next ADA component subjected to regression analysis was reason­
able accommodation policies. The results of this regression are depicted in 
Table 10. They show that the single greatest influence on reasonable accom­
modation policy implementation is the existence of an ADA Coordinator within 
a municipality. The variable is significant at .01. Not surprising is the fact that 
after ADA Coordinator, the existence of a strong public interest lobby most in­
fluences compliance with the reasonable accommodation component of the 
ADA at .05. Population size is significant, albeit at the .10 level, and manager 
is insignificant. The model for reasonable accommodation demonstrated an
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R Square of .181, and an Adjusted R Square of .136.
TABLE 11
Implementation of the ADA: Benefits Plan Modification
Rearetelon Coefficients
Unstandardized Standardized t Ratio
(Constant) -79.590 -2.868
Manager -0.277 -0.012 -0.146
Union -3.504 -0.152 -1.829*
Self Evaluation 2.507 0.074 0.894
ADA Coordinator 5.985 0.296 3.492 ***
Interest Groups 0.877 0.041 0.499
PerCapitalog 14.594 0.197 2.388**
Populationlog 7.267 0.200 2.419 **
N = 135 R = .458 R^  = .210 Adiusted R^= .166
Dependent = Benefits Plan Modification * p < . 10 ** p< .05 p< 01
The final component of the ADA subjected to regression analysis was 
employee benefit plan modification. Results of this regression are presented in 
Table 11 The model has an R Square of .210, and an Adjusted R Square of 
.166. Of the individual predictors, ADA Coordinator was significant at .01. Per 
Capita Income and Population size were significant at .05.
Of special interest concerning this model is the fact that it is in the area 
of employee benefits that the existence of employee unions becomes a signifi­
cant influence on ADA implementation. However surprisingly, the relationship 
is contrary to what was earlier theorized -  negative. The explanation for this 
finding may reside within the contracts reached by unions through collective
140
bargaining that may contain benefit packages separate from other employee 
groups. However, it remains a surprising, if not startling, finding. Given the fact 
that the relationship between employee benefits and city manager is extremely 
weak and in a negative direction, it may be tentatively concluded that city 
mangers do indeed concentrate on the more visible components of the ADA.
Internal Variables
As part of the statistical analysis, the original internal independent vari­
ables were examined separately as were the external independent variables.
The results of the regression analysis performed with the internal vari­
ables are shown in Table 12. The internal variable model shows an R Square 
of .376 and an Adjusted R Square of .337. Of the independent variables, it Is 
obvious that the existence of an ADA Coordinator and population size are the 
most significant at 01 While significant. Union at the .10 level is again not in 
the predicted direction.
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TABLE 12
Implémentation of the ADA: Internal Variables
Regression Coefficients 
Unstandardized Standardized t Ratio
(Constant) -67.526 -1.523
Manager 3.120 -0.069 ,948
Union -5.931 -0.132 -1.767*
Self Evaluation 8.135 0.123 1.527
ADA Coordinator 14.664 0.370 4.878 ***
Suburb 2.412 0.061 0.719
Timeframe 4.190 0.108 1.354
PerCapitalog 14.985 0.103 0.193
Populationlog 18.967 0.266 3.568 *
N.r.1.35 R = .614 r2 = .376 Adiusted R^  = 337
Dependent = Compliance * p < .10 •* p< .05 *** p< .01
External Variables
Table 13 presents the results of a regression analysis of the external 
variables contained in the original model. Of these variatrfes Interest Group 
strength is significant at the .01 level , and the others are insignificant. The 
model has a low R Square of .056 and an adjusted R Square of only .027. It is 
easily seen that the internal variables contained in the original model are the 
best predictors of ADA implementation. This is hardly surprising since it would 
be expected that local officials are attuned to local influences.
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Table 13 
Implementation of the ADA: External Variables
.B!Min»J&!L£fif9i£if hif
Unstandardized Standardized t Ratio
(Constant) 72.611 14.783
Liberal 0.122 0.086 0.989
State Law 0.490 0.020 0.224
Court Decision -1.084 -.046 -0.526
Interest Groups 9.803 .232 2.640***
N= 135 R = .237 R2 = .056 Adjusted R^  = .027
Dependent = Cofnplianoe • p < 1 0  **p<.05 •**p<.01
Conclusion
In this chapter some influences on municipal ADA implementation have 
been analyzed. Qualitatively the results show that many municipalities appear 
confused over the ADA’s requirements. The most confusing component of the 
ADA is that of modification of benefits and insurance. The least confusing 
component of the ADA is facilities modification. Employment practices and 
reasonable accommodation components are sandwiched between the other 
two. Despite widespread confusion over the ADA, the results from the ques­
tionnaire suggest that municipalities are implementing the ADA, albeit incre­
mentally. One might observe, however, some apparent discrepancies in the 
response by officials to the questionnaire items and their written comments 
expressing reservations about the city’s degree of compliance.
The qualitative findings also show that many municipal officials are be­
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having in a boundedly rational fashion concerning ADA implementation. It ap­
pears that personnel officers are concentrating on personnel related ADA re­
quirements. building officials focus on infrastructure, and city managers con­
centrate on the most visible components of facility modification.
The quantitative data taken from the survey support much of the qualita­
tive evidence. This is especially true concerning the extent of confusion among 
municipal officials over ADA requirements, The quantitative data also suggest 
that not only does confusion exist among municipal officials over the ADA it­
self, but also that many are unknowledgeable regarding state law and ADA -  
related court decisions
Additionally, the data corroborate the qualitative finding that it is the ADA 
components of benefit plan and employment policy modification that are most 
confusing to municipal officials. Similarly, there is support in the data for the 
qualitative finding that city managers concentrate on the most visible ADA 
components. The data also confirm strongly the concept of incrementalism 
and provide some support for bounded rationality in regard to ADA imple­
mentation. Above all, it appears that larger cities with ADA compliance officers 
have progressed further than most other cities in ADA implementation.
In general, the regression analysis tends to support the above findings. 
Although five of the hypothesized variables proved to be insignificant and were 
eliminated from the original model, two of ttie five are explicable in terms of a 
lack of knowledge of state law and court decisions among many municipal of-
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fidals. The final model performed reasonably well for a first attempt at ex­
plaining municipal ADA implementation. Likewise, the individual variables in 
the model performed reasonably well. Of those variables that were insignifi­
cant in the scaled down model, all were later found to be significant in relation 
to one Of more of the four components of the ADA As may be expected, the 
internal variables out performed the external variables in the model.
In sum, the regression analyses of the data provide some measure of 
support for what has been theorized in this research. The analysis shows that 
city managers tend to concentrate their ADA implementation efforts on the 
Act's most visible components. If so, this supports not only the view that city 
managers engage in career goal behavior, but also in boundedly rational ADA 
decision-making. Although it is arguable that career goal orientation is pure ra­
tionality, it is equally arguable that this orientation forms one of many bounds 
on managerial decision-making (Simon 1957, 79).
Likewise, the analyses provide support for incremental t)ehavior on the 
part of municipal organizations. If municipalities were engaging in rational be­
havior, the existence of a self-evaluation would lead to an implementation 
plan. Yet this is not the case in the majority of cities. Similarly, individual mu­
nicipalities would be moving toward ADA implementation at approximately the 
same rate in each of the Act’s components.
Perhaps it is in the area of the extent of knowledge held by municipal or­
ganizations that best supports both bounded rationality and incrementalism. If
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municipal organizations, regardless of their form of government, were engag­
ing in rationalism, it would t»  expected that they would be knowledgeable 
concerning appellate court decisions and state disability laws. However, the 
analysis shows that the opposite is true. Municipal organizations are not rely­
ing on readily available information to implement the ADA. Nor are many mu­
nicipalities relying on the Act itself. Thus, while this research cannot definitively 
conclude that municipalities are engaging in boundedly rational ADA decision­
making, it can conclude they are not reaching ADA implementation decisions 
in a rational fashion.
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CHAPTERS 
SUMMARY. FINDINGS. AND CONCLUSIONS
This research began fmm the perspective that municipal implementation 
of policy mandates is conditioned on the environment that envelops and sur­
rounds a municipality. The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 was then 
selected as the case to test the validity of this perspective. The research has 
documented the history and evolution of mandates and intergovemmental re­
lations from the time of the founding until the present day. The research also 
details the history and background of the ADA and the problems encountered 
by employers seeking to implement it. A theoretical perspective of the envi­
ronmental influences on municipal ADA implementation has been developed. 
This framework has borrowed from the sub-fields of judicial behavior, political 
cognition and organizational behavior to take an integrated approach to the 
explanation of policy implementation.
From the theoretical framework for the study a model of internal and ex­
ternal influences on municipal ADA implementation was synthesized. The op­
erationalized model contained twelve independent variables. The model was 
then measured and tested using regression analysis.
Data for the measurement of the model were collected from a variety of 
sources including self-generated survey research. A survey instrument was
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developed and mailed to 300 municipalities throughout the United States. The 
survey instrument was designed to elicit tx)th qualitative and quantitative data 
from respondents. Of the 300 surveys sent, 135 were completed and returned. 
These surveys form the sample population for the research.
The initial analysis of the data showed that five of the twelve original vari­
ables were insignificant. Thus, these five variables were removed from the 
model and the remaining variables analyzed. The results demonstrated that of 
these seven variables, six were significant. The model as a whole showed an 
R Square of .390 and an Adjusted R Square of .356. Thus, the model per­
formed reasonably well.
Each of the four components of the dependent variable were then ana­
lyzed. The results show that the model best explained the employment policy 
modification component of the ADA followed by benefit plan modification, rea­
sonable accommodation and facilities modification. Of the hypothesized vari­
ables, a regression analysis demonstrated that internal variables explained 
municipal ADA implementation efforts better than the external variables.
The research findings provide support for what has been theorized here. 
It does appear that municipal ADA implementation is influenced by the internal 
and external environment of a municipality. Of the two, the internal environ­
ment had a stronger influence. This is not particularly surprising since it may 
be expected that local officials are more attuned and responsive to local 
Influences than to outside forces.
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The research provides strong support for the viewpoint that municipal of­
ficials take an incremental approach to policy implementation. Although direct 
support for the perspective that municipalities take a boundedly rational ap­
proach to implementation decision-making is somewhat lacking, it may be in­
ferred from the results of the qualitative and quantitative analyses of the sur­
veys. As stated earlier, it appears that human resource managers, city man­
agers and public works managers all tend to concentrate on what they already 
know and what has worked in the past.
Additionally, municipal ADA decision-makers do not appear to rely on 
the ADA itself as an implementation guide. For example, the ADA places the 
burden for ensuring that contractors do not discriminate against the disabled 
squarely upon the shoulders of public employers (Section 35. 130 a, b.). Yet, 
municipal employers appear to rely on their insurance carriers to meet this re­
quirement. Likewise, section 35.107 of the ADA requires that public employers 
designate a specific official or officials to be responsible for meeting the law’s 
requirements. However, only 58 percent of respondent municipalities have 
done so.
Further, the ADA requires public employers to conduct a self-evaluation 
of the extent of their compliance with the Act, maintain records concerning this 
evaluation and correct deficiencies (Section 35-105, 106). Although 90 percent 
of respondents report that they have met this requirement, it should be re­
membered that the vast majority have not turned their self-evaluation plan into
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an implementation plan. It also should be remembered that the majority of re­
spondents were not aware of ADA-related appellate court decisions in their ju­
risdictions and/or did not know whether their state had enacted a disability law. 
Thus, it may be concluded that municipal officials are not relying on available 
factual information to guide their ADA implementation efforts. If this is the 
case, it is apparent that some other decisional mechanism such as tx)unded 
rationality is being utilized.
The regression analyses of the percentage of ADA compliance show that 
some ADA-related variables perform quite well while others do not. For in­
stance, the existence of an ADA coordinator within a municipality appears to 
have a strong affect on compliance. Likewise, the existence of a self- 
evaluation also affects municipal ADA compliance.
However, the regression analyses of the data also show that some of the 
strongest predictor variables are not necessarily related to the ADA. Popula­
tion size is one of these. In fact, ADA-related variables such as the existence 
of state disability laws and federal court decisions performed poorly The fact 
that so many municipal officials lack knowledge about the ADA in general as 
well as about state laws and court cases is a telling point. It may therefore be 
surmised that many ADA implementation dedsion-makers do not rely on risk 
assessment or other forms of rationality. Instead, they seem to rely on general, 
previously stored information to cue their decisions.
On weighing the entirety of the evidence provided by this research, the
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use of a boundedly rational, incremental, cue-fact theoretical approach Is ten­
tatively supported. It seems from among the many potential variables that may 
Influence the Implementation of the ADA, municipal organizations select only a 
few on which to base their decisions. While falling to provide the concrete evi­
dence needed to positively confirm such a perspective, the bulk of the evi­
dence In the research points In this direction.
The ramifications of the research to the discipline of political science 
are relatively stralghtfbnward. The research demonstrates that national public 
policy Implementation Is not necessarily a linear, top-down process as widely 
believed. Nor do the municipal officials who are charged with the Implementa­
tion of national policy behave In a rational, comprehensive fashion. Instead, 
these officials seek to simplify the declslon-making process through incre­
mentalism. The research also underscores the prevailing view that It is un­
funded mandates that municipalities object to and most resist. Further, the re­
search findings provide support for the view that It Is Indeed the local environ­
ment that most affects municipal compliance with policy mandates.
This finding contradicts much of the existing literature concerning policy 
Implementation. For example, the language of the ADA and Its content are 
relatively clear concerning Its basic threshold requirements. Yet, these re­
quirements remain largely unimplemented. Likewise, the role of the courts has 
been found to be negligible. Similarly, federal enforcement efforts, while strong 
concerning the ADA, do not seem to be a major factor In municipal Imple­
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mentation. Additionally, political culture (state ideology) does not appear to in­
fluence municipal ADA implementation. Of course, this is not to say that these 
or other theories of implementation are incorrect or should be discarded. It is 
to say that for some reason they do not appear to apply to municipal ADA im­
plementation.
In the area of intergovemmental relations this research suggests that al­
though not without some utility, many existing theoretical approaches to the 
study of federalism may be outdated. For example, the "rowboat model" that 
depicts national, state and local governments as acting in concert to achieve 
their goals is extremely suspect in light of the findings in this study. It is hard 
to justify such a perspective, given that so many municipal officials are un­
aware of state laws dealing with the rights of the disabled. Likewise, the view­
point that local officials keep a "weather eye” on the judicial system seems 
untenable in light of this research. In truth, this study shows that municipal 
ADA implementation effort occurs without much legal information at all.
This research also highlights the declining usefulness of political culture 
as a predictor of public policy innovation. In short, the ideological orientation of 
a state’s citizens seems to have little impact on municipal implementation of 
national policy. For example, while by all accounts Texas is a conservative 
state, it has a strong disability law and ranked first among all states regarding 
the degree of municipal ADA compliance. Conversely, more liberal states, like 
Maine, present a mixed picture of ADA implementation.
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In conclusion, this research, as with any good social science research, 
should bring fbnward more questions than it resolves. For example, why is per 
capita income negatively related to ADA compliance? Similarly, why do mu­
nicipal ADA decision-makers rely on general, rather than specific, information 
to cue their decisions? Why are ADA implementation rates so low? What other 
influences exist and how do they affect ADA Implementation? Additionally, 
why have so many municipalities not met the simplest and most straightfor­
ward of the ADA’S requirements? Likewise, is the career path orientation ex­
planation of city manager policymaking behavior correct or does this research 
present an anomaly concerning this issue? As is the case with most explora­
tory research, much could be done to improve this study. In retrospect a larger 
population sample would, perhaps, enhance the model's effectiveness. Less 
reliance on existing explanations of municipal policymaking behavior might 
provide greater insight. Additionally, it may be that a wider theoretical net is 
called for. For example, in the information age of today, is there really any dif­
ference between the technology and knowledge of suburban and mral cities? 
Also, would the study benefit from the inclusion of cognitive-cybernetic theory?
Steinbruner’s (1974) cognitive-cyt)emetic theory of information process­
ing is a mental scanning approach to decision-making."^ Steinbruner’s ap­
proach to decision-making does not totally reject bounded rationality. Instead, 
it views decisions as programmed and unprogrammed responses. Cognitive- 
cybernetic theory as formulated by Steinbruner argues that humans attempt to
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escape uncertainty. When faced with a complicated problem and an uncertain 
outcome, a human reduces the number of variables brought to bear on the 
problem to a manageable number. This is accomplished by simply ignoring 
those variables that the person is not previously programmed by past experi­
ence to accept. Instead, according to Steinbrunner (1974, 66) humans "focus 
on a few incoming variables while eliminating any serious calcuiation of prob­
able outcomes." Steinbruner (1974, 87-123) further proposes that humans 
utilize their beliefs to structure their decisions. Therefore, people remember 
general concepts, maintain a consistent belief system and react to their envi­
ronment. Additionally, humans resist change to their belief systems and seek 
to keep this system as simple as possible. While far from comprehensive, this 
brief account of cognitive-cybernetic theory seems to comport with much of 
what has been found in this research regarding ADA implementation
If this research demonstrates anything. It is that many questions re­
main unanswered concerning municipal implementation of the Americans with 
Disabilities Act. It further demonstrates that if the results of this research are 
indicative of mandate implementation in general, the federal govemment is not 
successfully meeting its public policy goals by relying on the willingness of 
municipalities to comply with the requirements of unfunded mandates.
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NOTES
 ^Small and medium-sized cities are defined as municipal corporations 
having a population t)etween 10,000 and 100,000. See U.S. Department of 
Commerce and Census Bureau definitions.
 ^At the very least, states and localities must react to mandates if only 
to acknowledge their existence.
’  The Federalist Papers. No. 10.
* This component of the ADA is predicated on the Architectural Barrier 
Act of 1968.
 ^A diligent search reveals anecdotal and speculative evidence tHJt no 
hard evidence demonstrating ADA compliance rates among small and medium­
sized municipalities.
 ^As defined here, federalism is "a system of rules for the division of 
public policy responsibilities among a numt>er of governmental agencies” 
(Anton 1989, 3).
 ^ For instance, see United States v. Usery 1976 and Garcia v. San 
Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority 1985.
* Full case cites can be found in the references. As the reader will 
notice, the method of legal citation varies. This is because over time, the legal 
community has utilized different styles of citations. Additionally, the method of 
citation differs between jurisdictions. Further, more than one legal reporting 
system exists. Finally, the method of citation varies with the type of decision 
and the current location of a given case in the legal system.
 ^ The Tenth Amendment to the United States Constitution reserves all 
powers not granted to the national govemment to the states and the people.
Article I Section 8, United States Constitution.
"  Since McCulloch, Congress and the president have, more often than 
not, done so.
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It should be noted that the Justices are political appointees placed in 
office for their political ideologies and not necessarily for the legal skill they may 
possess (Murphy and Prichett 1986,129).
See Embargo Act of 1807.
Over its history, the Court has utilized a number of doctrines to 
uphold economic freedom. Included are impairment of contract, substantive 
economic due process, the taking clause of the Fifth Amendment, and others. 
For purposes of simplification in this research, these doctrines have been 
consolidated under the title "economic freedom." Although from the viewpoint of 
legal scholars this would undoutrtedly constitute heresy, to discuss in detail each 
economic doctrine used by the Court over the years would in itself constitute an 
entire research project of this size.
See The License Cases (1847). What the Taney Court did was to 
uphold Marshall’s dual federalism opinions while ignoring his cooperative fed­
eralism ones.
For additional information, the reader is referred to such topics as 
“Bleeding Kansas”, popular sovereignty, and John Brown (Ward 1990 2-24 
and Catton 1996 1-45).
For example, as discussed later in this chapter, the theory by which 
the Bill of Rights has been made applicable to the states, "incorporation" 
depends on interpreting liberty as a code word for other rights not specifically 
granted to state citizens in the Constitution (Zeigler 1962; Mendelson 1965).
It should be noted that in Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific 
Railroad Co. (1886), the Court held that corporations were persons within the 
meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.
See Loaner v. Atew York (1905), United States v. E C Knight 
(1895), Coppagey. Kansas (1915), andFletchery. Padc(1810).
^  Justice Holmes was no fan of economic due process or dual 
federalism. At a time when each concept was held in high esteem by the Court, 
Holmes consistently wrote dissents chastising his brethren for adhering to these 
doctrines. The dissents of Holmes are generally considered to be a prime 
example of how dissenting opinions, over time, may become majority opinions.
A "Brandeis brief' is a legal brief in which social statistics are utilized 
to make a legal argument.
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^  See also Malloy y. Hogan (1964), Near y. Minnesota (1931), Powell 
V. Alabama (1932), Cantwell y. Connecticut {^ 9A0), and Griswold v. Connecticut 
(1965).
”  Today only the Second, Third and Seventh Amendments remain 
unincorporated; to one extent or another, the others have t)een.
Karl Marx in Robert C Tucker The Marx Engels Reader, 2^ ed 
1978 "The German Ideology* 146-200 and "Wage Labour and Capital* 203- 
217.
Roosevelt’s proposal included increasing the number of justices by 
six and mandatory retirement for some incumbents.
^  See also Dellinger v. United States (1973).
For a contrarian view see Hale and Palley (1981,113-116).
^  As used herein, social mandates means a federal mie, regulation, 
or law designed or intended to advance social, political, or economic equality. 
Judicial social mandates means decisions that serve the same purpose.
Brown was a class action suit; thus it was applicable not only to the 
parties to the case, but to all similarly situated persons.
^  See also Sipuel v. Oklahoma (1948) and McLaurin v. Oklahoma 
State Regents (1950).
It is widely rumored in legal circles that not only did Eisenhower at­
tempt to dissuade the Court from its pro-civil rights decision in Brown but also 
that he called his appointment of Earl Warren as Chief Justice the worst mis­
take of his life.
^  The Act also provided for federal oversight of state and local elec­
tions where past history evidenced discrimination against black voters.
”  See also Cipriano v. City of Houma (1969).
^  It should be noted that elections, apportionment, and voting were 
traditionally policy areas left to the states.
^  Categorical grants may only be used for the purpose intended and 
thus allow very little flexibility in spending.
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”  See pages 14-15 of this study.
See also Wyatt v. Adertiolt (1974).
^  It should be noted that one of the judges was a state judge and the 
other, federal.
“  See for example the New York T/mes August 7,1977.1-40.
^  In the author’s experience as a city manager in a city having a 
Community Development Block Grant at the time.
Nor was the Reagan administration noted for its bargaining and 
negotiation skills. As then United States Senator David Boren said to the 
author, "I can't even talk to those people."
The term became a euphemism for a cost sharing arrangement by 
which states and localities had to repay the national govemment for the major­
ity of the costs plus interest associated with the lake’s construction and agree 
to operate and maintain recreational facilities.
As a percentage of total expenditures.
^  Speech to the National Governors’ Association, August 8,1988.
The twelve years spanning the Reagan/Bush presidencies allowed 
them to pack the federal court system with restrainist conservative judges and 
justices.
^  President Clinton appointed Ruth Bader Ginsberg, a Democrat, ju­
dicial activist, and liberal in 1993.
Convictions of state criminal defendants would no longer be subject 
to federal court review except in very limited circumstances. It is important to 
note that the Rehnquist Court has also determined that innocence does not 
preclude the execution of a convicted criminal. See Ignagni and Slayton 
(1994).
^  President Bush had been slow in making nominations for federal 
judgeships.
'  Surveys show that, in general, minorities tend to take a more na­
tionalistic view of public policy.
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50 This Act is controlled by Executive Order No. 12866 and No. 12875.
Near the end of the Clinton presidency, the Court seems to be split 
by a narrow 5-4 conservative majority concerning federalism issues.
It should be understood that in this instance theory and reality often 
differ greatly, especially in regard to large municipalities.
53 In comparison to large cities.
^  The author once served as the city manager in a city where the city 
council adjourned a meeting in order to engage in a fist fight with some mem­
bers of the local community over a policy issue. Also see Lineberry (1971, 23).
Basic services include police and fire protection, sanitation and 
water and sewer services.
”  Swimming pools and other recreational facilities function as de 
facto child care services during the summer. Despite high costs, prices remain 
low because of the pressure put upon city councils by parents. Likewise, sen­
ior prices at golf courses are kept artificially low because of the senior citizens’ 
lobby.
See pages 6-7.
“ Public Law 101-336.
“  42 u s e 2000e-4, 2G000e, 2000 e-6, 2000 e-8, 2000 e-9.
“  Title 1 continued.
BNA Employment Discrimination Report April 1997,8:14.
^  It should be noted that reliance on an opinion letter does offer the 
employer a "good faith" defense if charged with an ADA violation. A "g r^  faith" 
defense, however, does not absolve the employer although it may mitigate the 
damages somewhat since a "willful violation" of ADA will extend the time frame 
when damages can be assessed and the amount of damages to be assessed.
“  Fair Employment Practices Sept. 5,1996,108)
“  Public Employment Law Report Sept. 1993, 3.
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Ibid.
”  Includes concurrent filings under Title VII, EPA and ADEA.
From the U.S. Equal Opportunity web page. January 12, 2000 
(eeoc.gov/stats/ada-charges.html)
^  The EEOC defines a disability related question as "one likely to elicit 
information about a disability." Thus, even indirect questions about a disability 
are an ADA y«Mion {Fair Empbyment Practices Oct. 2,1996,122).
89 Fair Employment Practices. November 4,1996.
A careful reading of the ADA shows that the reverse is also true. 
The mere perception on the part of an employee that he or she is disabled is 
also cause for legal action (Title 1, Section 4c ).
For instance, persons with poor eyesight must be evaluated for dis­
ability while wearing their eyeglasses or contact lenses.
See also Kirkingburg v. Albertson (1999) and Murphy v. United 
Parcel Service (1999).
"Update on 1998-1999 Supreme Court Decisions and What May be 
Ahead.” November 3, 1999 handout at Oklahoma Public Personnel /Associa­
tion's Annual Conference. Presented by Bettye Springer of Haynes and Boone 
Law Firm, Fort Worth, Texas.
Kansas Commission on Disability Concerns Disability Update. Dec. 
9, 1999, 1-2.
"  Ibid,, pp. 2-7.
It should be noted that such requirements as thirty-two inch guard­
rails present municipal governments with a substantial legal risk regarding 
negligent injury or death.
^  The EEOC supports this position.
In the author's professional experience in municipal organizations.
^  Statement to author by Department of Labor representative during a 
1988 investigation into possible FLSA violations. The investigation occurred 
while the author was the city administrator of Sphngtown, Texas
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National Public Employers Labor Relations Association Newsletter 
March 28, 1991.
Thereby adding uncertainty to the ADA implementation equation.
”  Game theory is founded on the rational choice model.
Baum (1981, 51) also notes that rational choice does not travel well 
from the level of individual decision-making to that of aggregated decisions.
^  Dallas Graham, city manager, Edmond, Oklahoma, December 
6,1982 upon the author’s appointment as dty manager of Midwest City, Okla­
homa.
The Tulsa World , “Unbelievable: Pass the Mandates and Hold the 
Deduction.” Inten/iew with Ripley, Oklahoma school superintendent, Roger 
Shaw. January 9, 2000. p. G1.
”  This observation is based on the author's experience as a city 
manager in three different cities.
For instance, the author once served in a city where the annual 
budget only reflected ten months of expenditures. A previous city council had 
decreed an across the board budget reduction and the bureaucratic method of 
resolving this problem was to present the council a ten month balanced budget 
that they approved assuming it was a budget for twelve months. The ten 
month budget was later supplemented with a two month budget and the coun­
cil never caught on until it was pointed out to them by the author when he was 
hired as city manager.
”  The so-called “group influence model” of politics is so well en­
trenched in political science as to not require an accounting here (Ringquist 
1993, 323).
See The Tulsa World “Census Bureau Recruits Indian Workers.” 
January 7, 2000. Page A11.
^  Derived from data reported in American Enterprise 1 (Janu­
ary/February 1990): 96-103 and the General Social Survey, 1996 (Chicago: 
National Opinion Research Center, 1997).
See endnote 6 above.
”  “Failure to represent* is a serious violation of national labor law.
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For example, the state of Kansas has its own statutorily-created 
Kansas Commission on Disability Concerns.
^  The sheer size of the court system dictates that an in-depth study of 
all decisions at the state and federal level is beyond the scope of this project.
”  Public interest lobbies are defined here as good government groups 
such as the League of Women Voters, environmental lobbies, councils of gov­
ernment, mental and physical disability advocates and civil rights and civil litx 
erties lobbies such as the NAACP and the ACLU. For an explanation of this 
approach see Thomas and Hrebenar (1990,145).
"  See also Kingdon (1984) who has called these policy communities.
CFR Vol. 56 No 144 Section 33-105.
"  CFR Vol. 56 No. 144 Section 30-107.
”  25 % + (3 X 12.5 %) = 62.5%.
The reason this variable was coded in this manner was because 
the survey was random. Several large gaps occurred between the numerical 
rankings of state ideology when Whght et al s typology was strictly applied. 
This meant that the data was skewed. By breaking the data into five catego­
ries, these gaps were filled and the variable performed better.
The population of cities selected ranged between 10,000 and
100,000.
For an interesting discussion of the robust characteristics of re­
gression analysis see Dometrius. (1992, 435-437).
As noted in the Introduction, what is being measured in this re­
search is compliance effort. However, by utilizing the four major compliance 
components in the ADA as the measure of ADA compliance, the by-product 
automatically becomes a combined approach.
Americans with Disabilities Act. Section 35.130
The survey instrument did not allow for the identification of any of 
the respondents to the survey. Thus, quotes are not attributed to any particular 
city or individual.
162
The previous question on the survey concerned modification of 
personnel policies.
The previous question on the survey concerned modification of 
personnel policies.
Americans with Disabilities Act. 42 U.S.C.12131. Section 35.105.
Americans with Disabilities Act. 42 U.S.C.12131. Section 35.130.
Americans with Disabilities Act. 42.U.S.C. 12131. Sections 35.149-
164.
Americans with Disabilities Act. 42.U.S.C. 12131. Sections 35.133
and 35. 50.
Although the survey was anonymous, many responding officials 
voluntarily provided their names and titles In case the author needed additional 
information. Additionally, many respondents requested copies of the research 
results when It was completed.
The rule of thumb Is thirty cases.
This Is because each additional variable explains some part of the 
phenomenon under Investigation.
Cognitive cybernetic theory proposes that decision-makers mentally 
store and retrieve information In one of two fashions. On the cybernetic side 
they automatically store experiential Information. Conversely, when faced with 
complex, non-experiential Information, they will seek to compute a response.
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APPENDIX A
SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE 
THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT OF 1990
The following survey is for the purpose of academic research. It is intended to measure implementation 
efforts of municipalises nationwide in meeting ttie requirements of the Americans With Disabilities Act of 
1990. Your dty was selected at random for partidpation in this survey.
All responses will be held in strict confidence and no city or person will be individually 
identified in the research findings.______________________________________________
Instructions: Please fill out the questionnaire completely. When it is complete, please return it 
to me in the stamped, self-addressed envelope that has laeen provided. Thank you for your 
cooperation. If possitHe the survey should be completed and returned as soon as possible.
Name of State
City Manager (or Administrator)/City Council form of government 
Strong Mayor form of government
Are employees in your City represented by one or more Unions?
________ yes ________ no
Americans with Disabilities Act Information
Does your state have a state law mandating accommodations for disatiled employees and/or
applicants for employment? yes no don't know
Have there been any federal appellate court decisions in your jurisdiction that have upheld all
or part of the ADA?_____ yes ________no__________don't know
My City has
 yes_____ no a. enacted a policy or ordinance requiring that future public facilities
be aooessit)ie to the disaljied.
 yes_____ no b. an internal written policy requiring future public facilities to be
accessible to disabled persons.
 yes_____no c. budgeted funds to renovate existing public facilities to provide
access for disabled persons
 yes_____ no d. conducted a study of existing facilities to determine what needs to
be done to make them accessible to disabled persons.
183
 yes_____ no e. If the answer to “d* above is yes, have the study results been turned
into a formal renovation plan with time frames for completion?
 yes no f. adopted a reasonable accommodation policy for existing disabled
employees.
 yes no g. adopted a reasonable accommodation policy for disabled job
applicants.
 yes no h. written policies and guidelines concerning what kinds of questions
can be asked of disabled job applicants.
 yes no i. checked the job descriptions for City positions to identify the
essential functions of the jobs?
 yes no j. changed the job descriptions to include the essential functions of
the jobs.
Over all, how would you rate your City's progress toward ADA implementation in the following 
areas?
Facility modification:
  very low  low  rrKxterate  high  very high
Estimated percent of required facility modifications completed_________ %
Modification of employment policies and procedures
  very low  low  moderate  high  very high
Estimated percent of required modifications to employment policies and procedures 
completed_______ %
Modification of employee benefit plans such as paid and unpaid leave plans, health and/or 
life insurance plans, etc.
  very low  low  moderate  high  very high
Estimated percent of required modifications to health and/or life plans_______ %
What level of compliance with ADA requirements has your organization achieved? 
 Full oomplianoe
 Partial compliance, currently implementing accommodations
 Partial complianca, currently reviewing needs.
 Currently reviewing needs only
 Have not begun oomplianoe efforts.
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Please indicate which of the following areas have been modified by compliance 
with ADA requirements artd to what degree.
No Some Extensive
Effect Effect Effect
a. Pre-employment job skill testing_________ _____  _____  ______
b. Pre-employment medical screening _____  ______ ______
C Pre-employment drug testing___________ _____  _____  ______
d Pre-employment background investigations  _____  ______
e. Job descriptions were re-written _____  _____  ______
Please provide any other information you would like to share concerning your City's ADA 
efforts and experience, circumstances particular to your organization, or your experience 
with ADA requirements.
Has your City appointed a full time ADA Coordinator to oversee ADA implementation? 
 yes no
Has your City appointed a board or commission to oversee ADA implementation? 
 yes no
Has your City conducted a self-evaluation of its ADA implementation status?
 yes no
What is your City's annual budget? _________________
Thank you for your participation in this research project.
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